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Abstract 
This PhD research project investigated the failure of a Public Private Partnership (PPP) ICT 
service delivery project between the South African Department of Labour (DOL) and Siemens 
Information Services (SIS). The research investigated conditions contributing to management 
failure of the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Implementation project, which had the 
objective of improving the Department of Labour’s service operations and the transfer of ERP 
technology competence to the DOL. An important objective of this research was to develop an 
understanding of the special challenges of PPP management in the context of emerging and 
developing countries. International organizations such as the IMF, World Bank and United 
Nations (UN) have been encouraging emerging and developing countries to adopt PPPs as 
vehicles for developing technology competence and improving public sector efficiency. 
However, little research has been conducted to discover whether these countries have the 
competencies to successfully implement and manage PPPs. The goal of this PhD study was to 
develop an understanding of factors and conditions influencing the DOL-SIS PPP failure in order 
to develop theory and approaches, which could help improve management practices in the area 
of contracting-out ICT service delivery in the public sector of the Republic of South Africa.  
The research was guided by an agency theory framework and utilised a multi-method approach 
to conduct three empirical investigations into the PPP institutional framework, project 
governance and public accountability aspects of the DOL-SIS project. Some important findings 
of this research are: (1) Robust institutional policies and governance mechanisms specific to 
PPPs for ICT service delivery are necessary but not sufficient to combat risks of failure; robust 
mechanisms for performance monitoring and penalties for shirking are also necessary. (2) Public 
sector managers need specialised knowledge and competence to effectively manage private 
partners in the execution of ICT PPP contracts; over dependence on the private partners can 
significantly increase the risk of project failure, and encourage opportunistic behaviour and 
shirking by the private partner. (3) Transparent project governance and public accountability 
mechanisms are necessary to maintaining public support and combating opportunistic behaviour 
of both private and public partners on a PPP ICT services project.   
The thesis comprises three empirical studies: Study 1 used an agency theory framework to 
interrogate the PPP institutional framework to understand its provisions for identifying and 
managing risk factors in ICT service delivery projects. Study 2 analysed data from interviews 
with stakeholders, the contract meeting minutes and other relevant documents, guided by the 
agency theory framework to develop an understanding of project governance challenges. Study 3 
focused on identifying public accountability issues and used a critical discourse analysis 
methodology to interrogate the media discourse concerning the failure of the DOL-SIS ERP 
Implementation failure. Content analysis with the use of ATLAS/TI and automated tool was used 
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The general contribution of this PhD research is an explanatory theory illustrating how 
interactions among institutional conditions, governance mechanisms, knowledge and 
management competence deficits, and the behaviour of the PPP actors reinforced dysfunctional 
organisational conditions, which resulted in project failure. The theory is illustrated using a 
causal loop modelling technique and a set of five theoretical propositions clarifying the 
organizational knowledge and competence challenges, which the public sector managers faced, 
and the consequences of these affecting the success of the PPP project. This is an important 
contribution to literature on the use of PPPs for ICT service delivery not only in emerging and 
developing country contexts, but in developed contexts as well. Other contributions specific to 
the South African perspective are: (1) Study 1 revealed gaps in the institutional framework 
concerning the management of risks in ICT PPP projects. While South Africa has much 
experience with managing risks in the engineering and delivery of physical infrastructure, there 
is a comparable lack experience with managing ICT infrastructure implementation project risks. 
(2) Studies 1 and 2 reveal gaps in the governance and accountability mechanisms and practices 
which can be exploited with adverse consequences to the public interest. These studies also point 
to the importance of robust transparency and governance mechanisms, and high levels of 
management competence to the effective risk management of PPPs for ICT service delivery. (3) 
Study 3 reveals importance of the independent media in fostering debate, uncovering evidence, 
scrutinizing the activities of the actors in the DOL-SIS PPP and defending the public interest. 
The independent media played a critical role of agitating for public accountability when the DOL 
was reluctant to do so, and raising issues about SIS underperformance and pushing for public 
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Glossary of terms 
Accountability: This is the capability of the public to hold accountable those responsible for managing the use of 
public funds in the delivery of services.  
Bidder: A bidder is one who submits a bid in response to a project brief or to express interest in a potential contract. 
Build, own, and operate (BOO): This is when the consultant is responsible for the design, construction, funding, 
operate and maintain the facility, during the contract period, with no provision for transfer of ownership to the 
government.  
Build, own, operate, and transfer (BOOT): This is an arrangement whereby an organisation contracts a consulting 
company to designer, finance, operate and transfer a project. The consulting company retains ownership until the 
end of the consulting period, after which ownership and operating rights are transferred back to the government. 
Built, operate, transfer (BOT): This is an agreement where a consulting company designs, operates and transfers a 
project back to the agent on time stipulated in a contract. Thereafter ownership of the project may or may not be the 
consulting organisation’s responsibility. 
Business case: The business case is a full indication of the partnership requirements. The project is fully scoped 
during this process; risks implications and cost-benefit analysis is drawn up to test the net benefit of the proposal.  
Conventional procurement: This is a public procurement approach in which the public sector secures the finance 
directly and pays the consultants as work progresses. 
Core activities: These consist of operational components that require key decision making on delivery of service, 
which may remain, with government.  
Design, build, and finance (DBF): A PPP that involves the procurement of an asset using private finance, without 
private sector processes and provision of the related services. 
Design, build, finance and operate (DBFO): This is the main form of contract in the PFI, whereby the service 
provider is responsible for the design, construction, financing and operation of an asset.  
Design, build, and operate (DBO): A Public Private Partnership (PPP) in which the public sector provides finance 
for a capital investment project, but the providers of the project retain the design and construction, and deliver some 
or all of the operational elements. 
Joint Venture (JV): This is a distinct legal form of PPP arrangement, involving public and private bodies, assuming 
some form of equity stake in a PPP.  
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): These are measures developed under a performance management regime, to 
indicate how well specified performance targets are being realised. 
 
  
PHD THESIS                                                                         RENE ALBERTUS XVIII 
 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI): A British programme encompassing arrangements whereby a consortium of 
private sector partners come together to provide an asset-based public service under contract to a public body.  
Private Partner: This is a private sector entity, which is contracted by the government to assist with contractual 
work the public sector. 
Procurement: This is a process for obtaining services from a provider once a decision has been taken to engage in a 
transaction, which involves negotiation of contracts to secure products. 
Project brief: The project brief details government’s objectives, service delivery requirements, policy and 
commercial matters, material background information and the process for lodging and evaluating submissions. 
Public interest test:  This is the assessment of the project on efficiency measures, accountability and transparency, 
which have an impact on individuals, equity, consumer rights, the public, security and privacy. 
Public Private Partnership (PPP): This indicates a relationship based on a shared objective between the public and 
private sector, to deliver on a project for mutual gain. 
Public sector: This is an enterprise that is financed, owned and controlled by government. 
Risk allocation: This involves managing penalties related to risk, or agreeing to deal with the risk through a 
specified mechanism, which may involve sharing the risk.  
Value-for-money: This means optimising benefits, costs, risks, meeting time lines and objectives, in order to meet 
public requirements.  
Whole-of-life cycle: These are costs associated with the recurring maintenance or Information systems 
implementation process of economic life. 
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CHAPTER 1: Research Problem, Context and Approach  
1.1 Introduction  
This PhD research project is concerned with investigating barriers hindering the success of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) service delivery through Private-Public 
Partnership (PPP) initiatives in South Africa. While PPPs have become the latest 
procurement phenomenon in South Africa’s public management, they have been in use in 
developed economies of Europe, North America and in Australia for decades (Linder, 
1999). PPPs are viewed as special purpose vehicles for introducing the private sector into 
public service departments such as labour, hospitals, prisons and education, to deliver 
advanced technologies and to achieve efficiency (HM Treasury, 2012). PPP contract 
management stipulates the rules for managing PPP projects. PPP IT implementation projects 
are not governed by ordinary contract management processes but by specific government 
policies for contracting out to the private sector (Domberger & Jensen, 1986). Due to 
resource constraints, governments have difficulty upgrading and replacing legacy ICT 
systems. Consequently, the South African government made a decision to engage the 
assistance of the private sector in upgrading or replacing legacy Information Technology 
through PPP type collaborative partnerships. The new thinking is that conventional methods 
of service delivery need to make way for more innovative ways to overcome government 
resource constraints, thus PPPs are viewed as a viable procurement option, which was 
enacted by Treasury Regulation No.16 of 2004 (Treasury, 2004); (Fourie & Burger, 2000).  
Since 1999, the government of South Africa has executed more than 22 PPP initiatives 
under Treasury Regulation 16 with varying degrees of success (Refer to Appendix 7) for the 
list of projects. The initiatives may be categorised into five different groups: Transport and 
Road, Health, Tourism, Information systems and other. Most of these initiatives were 
delivered but did not comply with the contract deadline, resulting in cost overruns, problems 
in the retention of expert resources and performance monitoring issues. Van der Merwe, 
(2011) states that PPP contract failures are due to management incompetence, information 
systems capacity, relationship breakdowns and lack of termination support, resulting in 
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contracts being renegotiated. The South African media has labelled PPP initiatives for 
Information Systems (IS) service delivery the biggest failures due to the lack of expert 
resources and management incompetence issues, resulting in cost overruns to the tune of 
R800 million (Ndenze, 2013). The only other PPP initiative that received positive feedback 
was the Gautrain, which was a major success. According to Van der Merwe (2011), the 
reason for the success of this PPP contract was that the contract was structured to ensure that 
the government and the concessionaire, Bombela Concession Company, operated within 
strict financial and time parameters.  
Research conducted to date has focused on regulatory frameworks for PPPs, and the 
challenges of identifying international best practices. Fombad (2013) indicates that 
institutional bottlenecks have created loopholes in PPP contracts, challenging international 
best practice for accountability of the successful delivery of PPP projects; however, the 
contractual challenges that lead to PPP failures are not well understood. It has been 
established that PPP relationships are ‘incomplete contracts’, characterised by potentially 
conflicting interests, and loss of control to the public sector which transfers power to the 
private partner  (Esteve, Ysa & Longo, 2012). 
This research is relevant not only to the South African public sector but to public sectors in 
other African countries, as well as to Europe and North America that use PPPs for 
contracting with private organisations for IS implementation. The rationale for PPP 
contracting is the need for technical expertise by the public sector and the perceived 
efficiency of the private sector in providing such (Fourie & Burger, 2000). The type of ICT 
to be investigated in this study are Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, which are 
defined as systems that effectively integrate all functional business areas such as operations, 
accounting and customer relationship management with IT tools. According to Esteves and 
Pastor-Collado (2001), ERP implementations are packages that provide integrated solutions 
for all business functions to enable the organisations to operate more efficiently and 
effectively, utilising their resources. Research in this area is becoming increasingly relevant 
for both theoretical and practical use in the area of ICT service delivery for IS upgrades in 
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the public sector. Many public sector businesses want to replace legacy IS due to global 
competition, but IS implementations, specifically ERP systems, e.g., Systems Applications 
and Products (SAP) amongst others, are expensive and have many risks (Shih, 2006:407).  
1.2 What are Public Private Partnerships? 
Linder (1999) and Hodge and Greve (2005) loosely define PPP initiatives as cooperative 
institutional arrangements between the public and private sector for the efficient realisation 
of some project. In 1992, PPPs were proposed as an instrument of the New Public 
Management movement initiated by the government of The United Kingdom (UK). The 
PPP policy was aimed at creating Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) to encourage private 
participation in infrastructure development and social service delivery, in order to bring 
competitiveness to public sector monopolies (Burchell, 2000). More recently, researchers 
have viewed PPPs as institutional arrangements for achieving public value initiatives for 
which governments lack expertise (Naik, Basavarajappa, Sultana & Prasanna, 2010); (Liu, 
Yu & Cheah, 2014); Reynaers & De Graaf, 2014). In the ensuing years, many developed 
and emerging economies adopted PPP policies by setting up PPP units, such as in South 
Africa. Currently these partnerships between the public sector and the private sector are 
accepted alternatives to the traditional state provision of public services. Arguably, this joint 
working approach allows the public and private sector to combine resources and expertise 
for the purpose of achieving a common outcome, which previously could not be reached by 
one party alone (Akintoye, Beck & Hardcastle, 2003). However, the application of PPP is 
not easy and straightforward.  
While PPPs have had some successful performance outcomes, there have been some 
spectacular failures that have led some researchers to express caution in their adoption 
(Ameyaw & Chan, 2015; Zitron, 2006). According to the World Bank, (2003), the 
cancellation and renegotiation of PPP contracts for ICT service delivery worldwide have 
made headlines and, for various reasons, the renegotiation of projects has not been an 
unusual occurrence. The World Bank state that the reasons for cancellation of PPP projects 
include: 1) the private sector ceased to provide services to public sector users or failed to 
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provide licence agreements for software usage; 2) the private sector transferred economic 
interest of the project back to the public sector before the end of the project life; 3) the 
private sector physically abandoned the project and threatened legal action.  
According to the World Bank (2003), there are two basic criteria for PPP project success: 
contract completion and value for money. However, there are a multitude of issues that must 
be considered by governments to ensure the success of PPP contracts for ICT service 
delivery.  
1.3 Study Goal and Objectives 
The goal of this PhD study is to conduct a systematic inquiry into organisational 
competence for PPP contracting for ICT services in the Republic of South Africa from the 
following perspectives (See Figure 1 and 
 
Table 1): a) the policy framework, institutional management and governance structures; and 
b) Managerial competence for PPP project implementation. It is important to note here that 
PPP contracts stipulate the rules for managing PPP projects. As Domberger and Jensen 
(1986) have pointed out, the management of PPP IT implementation projects is not 
governed by ordinary contract management approaches but by specifically designed 
government policies. This research intends to develop an understanding of factors 
contributing to the failure of the South African Department of Labour PPP project for the 
implementation on an ERP system with a view to improving outcomes for future initiatives. 
The research incorporates an Agency Theory perspective to interrogate the failure of PPP 
contract for ICT service delivery in South Africa, by specifically investigating:  
1a. How Government Policy defined risks and risk mitigation strategies for ICT service 
delivery through the use of PPP? 
1b. what prescriptions for managing risks are defined in the PPP policy and contracts 
for ICT service delivery?  
2. What governance structures exist for managing PPP ICT projects in South Africa?  
3. What is the nature of public accountability for PPP contracting in South Africa?  
 
  
PHD THESIS                                                                         RENE ALBERTUS 5 
 
The identification of risk factors is of special interest to this research because it challenges 
the successful execution of PPP IS initiatives. The identification of these risk factors will 
assist with the development of management competencies needed to effectively monitor, 
coordinate and control PPP IS projects. The empirical situation is a case study concerning 
the failure of the PPP initiative for ICT service delivery undertaken by the Department of 
Labour (DOL), the ‘public sector actor’ and Siemens (SIS), a private sector service provider 
from 2002 until 2012. The objective of the PPP initiative was the implementation of an ERP 
system in the DOL with the objectives of: (1) improving operational efficiencies in the 
public sector and (2) developing and retaining technological expertise in the area of ERP 
infrastructure. It was claimed that the PPP initiative was necessary because of technology 
constraints the government faced in providing efficient service delivery, and the lack of in-
house technological skills to upgrade or replace legacy IT systems. The conventional 
methods of service delivery needed to make way for more innovative ways to solve 
government problems and consequently, the adoption of PPPs has a viable procurement 
option for delivery of successful ICT services in South Africa (Pretorius & Schurink, 2007). 
 
Table 1: The Problem Domain of the DOL ERP Implementation Project, Source: The Researcher 
Technical 
Frameworks for contract design and work 
specification 
Routines and Mechanisms for risk and 
performance, and risk and performance 
management; 
PPP Relationship Management 
[  2  ] 
Information architecture specification Application 
configuration and management  
User interaction authorisation configuration and 
management  
Workflow configuration and management 
 
[  3  ] 
Competence 
Domain 
Institutional regulations, organizational policies, 
conditions and knowledge  
Competences for PPP contracting, project 
implementation, management and public 
accountability 
[ 1  ] 
Business process information requirements 
specification 
Information security requirements specification  
Workflow specification and design  
User interface specification 
[  4  ] 
Organisational  
 Organisational Technological 
 Dimensions of IS/ERP Implementation Problem 
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1.4 The Nomological Net and Empirical Studies 
The nomological net for this research (Refer to Figure 1) illustrates the conceptual structure 
of the PPP’s institutional context and defines the key components relevant to the inquiry as: 
Regulatory Body; 1) Institutional Framework, 2) PPP Project Governance, and 3) PPP 
Public Accountability.  
As Cronbach and Meehl (1955) argue, the nomological net is an important aspect of 
empirical research programme, which makes explicit the core areas of interest to the 
research and enables the researcher to contextualise and corroborate the investigation within 
relevant literature. The nomological net also provides a clear structure of the integration of 
the empirical studies in a multi-study research programme. 
 
Figure 1: Nomological net and research programme, Source: The Researcher 
The four components of the nomological net illustrated in  
 
Table 1 are essential not only for developing an understanding of the failure of the PPP 
initiative, but in identifying structural conditions in the empirical situation and interactions 
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that may have influenced the failure of the PPP initiative. Below is a brief discussion of 
aspects of the nomological net, their relationships and the mapping of the three empirical 
studies to key areas in the network. 
The PPP regulatory body in South Africa consists of the National Treasury Department and 
a dedicated PPP Unit, which was created to establish as central information and proficiency 
centre. The role of the PPP unit is:  
(1) to ensure that PPP agreements comply with the legal requirements of 
affordability, value for money and risk sharing, and  
(2) to guide the public sector organisations in accordance with international best 
practice for PPP execution and to guarantee successful outcomes (Fourie & Burger, 
2000; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). 
 A key responsibility of the PPP unit is to provide individual government departments, such 
as the Department of Labour, with technical assistance during the development of PPP 
contracts. They are also mandated to perform specific public accountability tasks, such as 
control of the government departments to ensure their compliance with the institutional and 
regulatory framework that was endorsed in December 1999 for the execution of PPP 
contracts. In April 2000, the National Treasury (the regulatory body) issued a set of 
institutional regulations (the institutional framework) for the governance of PPPs. This 
institutional framework for PPPs comprises a set of legislations for regulating PPPs on 
national, provincial and municipal levels. PPPs at the national and provincial levels are 
regulated by Treasury Regulation No.16 of 2004 (Treasury, 2004), and the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA), Act no.1 as amended by Act 29 of 1999 (Treasury, 2004). PPPs 
at the municipal level are regulated by the Municipal Systems Act No.32 of 2000 and the 
Municipal Finance Management Act No.56 of 2003 (Treasury, 2004). In addition, all PPP 
projects are subject to section 217(1) of the Constitution Act no. 108, of 1996 that stipulates 
the requirement for transparency and public accountability (Treasury, 2004). 
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The focus of Study 1 is an interrogation of relevant aspects of the institutional framework to 
develop an understanding of how it addresses risk identification, risk mitigation and 
management in PPP contracting for ICT service delivery at the national government level. 
According to Fombad (2013), even though South Africa has a robust legislative framework, 
institutional bottlenecks exist and there are noticeable loopholes due to the lengthy and 
drawn-out procurement process that must be followed. It is believed that this has created 
risks and precipated conflicts and disputes between public and private sector partners. Risk 
mitigation strategies are crucial to PPP contract management to avoid penalties and cost 
overruns during the ICT service delivery life cycle (Akintoye, Beck & Hardcastle, 2003). A 
lack of risk management may give flexibility to consultants to renege on contractual 
obligations, resulting in failure and cost overruns. Risk management is a critical issue for 
successful PPP contract management (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002); as such, an empirical 
investigation of the conditions of risk management was essential to understanding factors 
influencing the DOL project failure. The empirical material used for Study 1 was the 
Legislations Policy guidelines for PPP contracting and the Service Level agreement between 
the DOL and SIS, and an agency theoretic framework was used to analyse the empirical 
materials to expose risks factors, risk mitigation and management strategies specified in 
them. 
Empirical Study 2 focuses on developing an understanding of the governance practices 
affecting the PPP contracting for ICT service delivery. Project governance is a critical issue 
as PPP contracting for ICT service delivery has been identified as a failure (Johnston & 
Gudergan, 2007). In response, scholars posit that governance principles and norms should 
be incorporated in the operationalisation and designated objectives of PPPs (Fombad, 2013; 
Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). This study uses a key informant interview strategy, in 
which key stakeholders in the DOL project were identified and interviewed about project 
governance and management practices. At the national level in South Africa, PPP project 
governance practices are subject to section 217(1) of the constitution Act no. 108 of 1996 
(Treasury, 2004) which stipulates: “When an organ of state in the national, provincial or 
local sphere of government or other institution identifies national legislation contracts for 
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goods or services, it must be in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent 
and cost effective”. This empirical study focused on understanding the extent to which the 
stakeholders of the DOL ICT service delivery project understood and enacted the 
provisions. In addition to the interviews with key internal and external stakeholders, minutes 
of PPP project meetings were also used in the empirical analysis. 
Empirical Study 3 investigates the media discourse on the failure of the DOL project with 
specific focus on public accountability. This study uses a critical discourse analysis 
methodology to interrogate the validity claims of truth, sincerity, legitimacy and 
comprehensibility in the media discourse, and to draw conclusions on the state of public 
accountability of the PPP project. There are two important reasons for this empirical study:  
1) Section 217(1) of the constitution stipulates public accountability for public funds, 
and stipulates a role for media in holding the government accountable.  
2) The media played a central role in bringing to the public awareness the challenges 
the government was facing with the private partner on the DOL project, and 
facilitated a wider public discourse on the issues of public accountability.   
As Flinders (2005) state that accountability is vital to a well-functioning liberal democracy, 
because it keeps the power of government checked and the public informed. In this study the 
media’s view is critical in terms of accountability issues that arose due to the self-seeking 
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Table 2: Research Questions and Purpose. Source: The Researcher 




Study 1 What are the factors 
contributing to PPP contract 
failures for ICT service delivery 
in RSA? 
An interrogation of the PPP Institutional 
Framework, PPP Policy documents, PPP 
Management prescriptions to develop risk 





Study 2 What governance structures 
exist for managing PPP 
contracts for ICT service 
delivery in RSA? 
An interrogation into the management 
practices of the DOL project using 
interviews with key informants and PPP 




Study 3 What is the nature of public 
accountability for PPP contracts 
in ICT service delivery? 
Interrogation of the public discourse on the 






Further, this is important in unearthing conditions influencing the DOL project, such as 
moral hazard and adverse selection. It has been proven that PPP contracts for ICT service 
deliveries on a global scale are plagued with adverse selection, due to nepotism, problems 
with corruption, and allocation and lack of management competence, which can lead to 
failure (Transparency international and Cambridge University, 2007). Nevertheless, as 
(Johnston & Gudergan, 2007) argue, there is dearth of empirical research interrogating how 
PPP initiatives for ICT service delivery are structured and managed and how government 
activities in PPP are publicly accounted for in Table 2 summarises the empirical questions 
related to each study, the research method to be used and the research strategy involved. 
1.5 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this research is agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989, Demski & 
Feltham 1978). The principal-agent framework (See Figure 2, below) is appropriate for this 
research inquiry to conceptualise the government as the principal representative for the 
general public that engages various consultants in PPP initiatives (Laffont & Tirole, 1993, 
Martimort & Pouyet, 2008).  
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Figure 2: Principal Agent Framework, Source: de Palma, Leruth & Prunier (2009:13) 
It has been used by some IS researchers to investigate specific aspects of IS implementation. 
For example, Mahaney and Lederer, (2003) used agency theory to examine compensation 
schemes for IS project managers in an attempt to understand project managers behaviours, 
and to develop an understanding of the impact of project managers behaviour on project 
success (Mahaney & Lederer, 2010). A small number of researchers have used the theory to 
investigate IS outsourcing in the private sector (Tiwana & Bush, 2007; Bahli & Rivard, 
2003; Hancox & Hackney, 2000), and a few have used it to interrogate risks in IS 
outsourcing contracts (Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2005; 2007). However, there are no existing 
studies, which have applied it to PPPs for ICT services. 
Agency theory was originally developed and applied in the context of private firms to 
explore the economic relationship between the managers (principal) and an employee 
(agent). However, according to Eisenhardt (1989), any situation in which “the principal 
delegates work to the agent, who then performs the work” can be characterised by agency 
theory. Figure 2 illustrates the key characteristics of the principal-agent relationship. In the 
principal-agent relationship, there are two problems of concern: The goals of the principal 
and the agent are often inconsistent with one another (‘goal incongruence’), and the 
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principal cannot professionally and robustly manage expenditure and the financial 
implication that impact the actions and the information of the agent (‘information 
symmetries’) (de Palma, Leruth & Prunier, 2009). The principal and the agent can have 
many sources in which case the principal tries to control the agent in such a way as to 
maximise his own profits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). “A second important assumption of 
agency theory is information asymmetry, where the principal is at the mercy of the more 
knowledgeable agent, which induces adverse selection during ‘ex ante’ contracting and 
moral hazard during the ‘ex post’ contracting period” (Jensen, 2003). Despite the primal use 
of agency theory in the private sector, it can be applied as the interface between the public 
and private sector when the public sector (principal) contracts the private sector (agent) to 
delegate responsibility in public service delivery (HM Treasury, 2012). Demski and Feltham 
(1978) indicate that empirical research using the agency theory framework can help to 
understand:  
1. the agent’s behaviour, and  
2. contractual and structural conditions influencing the agent’s behaviour such as 
opportunistic bargaining, shirking and the transference of risk.  
Others have argued that the framework can also help researchers interrogate institutional 
mechanisms and management regimes of PPP initiatives and assist in structuring 
appropriate government policy (Burger, 2006; Marques & Berg, 2010; Gottlieb & Moreira, 
2013; Rui, 2008; Transparency international and Cambridge University, 2007). Agency 
theory in combination with the transaction cost approach has been investigated by Ferris and 
Graddy (1998), to assist with problems relating to refining public sector performance. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
While the research falls within a single paradigm, the interpretive paradigm, a multi 
methods approach is used (content analysis and critical discourse analysis) to interrogate the 
failure of the Department of Labour’s (DOL) and Siemens (SIS) PPP contract for ICT 
service delivery. This PPP contract is concerned with the implementation of a fully 
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integrated ERP system at the DOL. The interpretive paradigm views human systems as 
socially constructed and approach the reproduction of knowledge about human interactions 
with the technologies from the perspective of the participants in relation to and within the 
social context of their activities ((Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).  
The interpretive approach offers the prospect of exploring different meaning held by 
dissimilar human subjects, enabling the study of the phenomena (Ngwenyama & Lee, 
1997). The principle method of knowledge reproduction within the interpretive paradigm is 
a qualitative enquiry (Klein & Myers, 1999). As a result, a qualitative method was adopted 
for this research, as it provided an effective strategy for probing phenomena of importance 
in a naturally occurring environment (Kaplan & Maxwell, 2005; Silverman, 1998).   
The underlying principle of interpretive research is hermeneutic analysis, which enables the 
researcher to make sense of the social context of the empirical situation and the relationship 
amongst the public and private sector (Klein & Myers, 1999). The social context of this 
research is the institutional arrangements of PPPs for ICT service delivery in South Africa. 
The empirical situation is the ICT service delivery project between the partners, SIS and 
DOL. This research is interested in a non-deterministic account of the PPP contract for ICT 
service delivery failure; it approaches the investigation through the lens of agency theory, 
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1.7 Structure of thesis 
The remainder of the thesis will be structured as indicated below. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review – Presents an overview of research related to Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP), PPP legislative guidelines, and critical success factors for information 
systems (IS) implementation projects. 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework Agency Theory - Presents a detailed overview of 
agency theory and its appropriateness to this research on PPP failures. 
Chapter 4: Research Methodology - Contextualises the empirical research questions 
presents a description of the research context and an overview discussion of the interpretive 
paradigm followed in this research. The researcher then describes the multi-method 
approach adopted for the research, which combines content analysis and critical discourse 
analysis. 
Chapter 5: Study 1 - Reports on the interrogation into the first empirical research questions, 
1a) How Government policy defined risks and risk mitigation strategies for ICT service 
delivery through the use of PPP; 1b) what prescriptions for managing risks are defined in 
the PPP policy and contracts for ICT service delivery. This study uses an agency theory 
framework to interrogate risk factors and risk mitigation strategies of the PPP contract for 
ICT/IS service delivery. The study utilises qualitative content analysis and derives 
propositions from the empirical observations, and suggests contributions, limitations and 
future research directions. 
 
Chapter 6: Study 2 – Reports on the interrogation into the second empirical research 
question, looking at what governance structures exist for managing PPP ICT projects in 
South Africa. This study takes a qualitative approach using hermeneutic content analysis to 
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Chapter 7: Study 3 – Reports on the interrogation into the third empirical research 
question, what is the nature of public accountability for PPP contracting in South Africa.  
This study uses a Critical Discourse Analysis research strategy to investigate the public 
discourse on accountability affecting PPP initiatives for ICT service delivery in the South 
African public sector.  
Chapter 8: Theoretical elaboration, reflection and conclusions – Presents a detailed 
discussion of the empirical findings of the three studies and provides an integrative 
theoretical explanation of the conditions influencing the failure of the DOL/ PPP initiative, 
along with recommendations for improving PPP management practice in South Africa and 
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review and Context  
2.1 Introduction to the literature review  
While there is a large body of literature on IS/ICT implementation, there is a dearth of 
literature on ICT/IS implementation in the public sector. A search on google scholar yielded 
101 items (Scholar Google, 2015: July) of which the majority focuses broadly on e-
government, with a very small number focusing on emerging economies. The topic ‘PPP 
contracts for ICT service delivery’ has specifically garnered limited attention from 
researchers, as noted by Cordella & Iannacci (2010) and McIvor, McCracken & McHugh, 
(2011).  A close examination of the literature reveals very few items (ten) dealing with 
emerging economies, a finding lamented by several researchers (Ciborra, 2005; Sharma, 
2012). Even though the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been 
pushing PPPs for ICT service delivery in developing countries, research on IS/ERP 
implementation in the public sector in these countries has been largely ignored (Ciborra, 
2005; Hanna, 2003; Leye, 2007; Sharma, 2012; Barca & Cordella, 2006; Cordella, 2007). 
Further, there is hardly any literature that is concerned with PPP contracting for ICT service 
delivery in the context of emerging and developing economies (Jamali, 2004; Sharma, 
2012).  The researcher’s analysis of relevant publications in the IS/ERP implementation and 
public management literatures more broadly focuses respectively on: a) identifying the 
impacts of IS/ERP failures in the public sector, and b) on lack of management competence 
and underperformance of government organisations with regard to ICT. In general, the 
literature is lacking in critical analysis of PPP implementation management failures in ICT 
services, and prescriptions for improving management practice.  
 
The rest of the chapter provides an analysis of the literature relevant to the research on 
management failures in PPP contracting for ICT service delivery in the context of an 
emerging economy. Section 2.2 presents an overview of public sector ICT implementations. 
Section 2.3 sets out ERP implementations, management and critical success factors. Section 
2.4 provides a general overview of Public Private Partnerships. Section 2.5 provides an 
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overview of the different Public Private Partnership structures. Section 2.6 discusses 
management challenges of PPPs, taking into account public value and returns on 
investment, risk sharing and risk management, governance and public accountability. 
Section 2.7 provides the conclusion of the literature review. 
2.2 Public sector ICT implementation 
In the last decade ICT infrastructure expansion has had considerable impact on the way 
local and national governments function (Gupta, Dasgupta & Gupta, 2008). ICT refers to 
technologies such as the Internet, Intranets, Extranets, ERP and other such technologies, 
which serve as basic infrastructure for a variety of services and service improvements 
facilitating effective and efficient public management. Many researchers view ICT 
infrastructure as a catalyst for expanding public sector resources and management 
competencies as well as improving service delivery (Andersen, 1999; Andersen, Henriksen, 
Medaglia, Danziger, Sannarnes & Enemærke, 2010; Chadwick & May, 2003; Dunleavy, 
Margetts, Bastow & Tinkler, 2006). In developed countries governments have adopted 
approaches to ICT service delivery in the public sector since the late 1990s (Cordella & 
Bonina, 2012). Jaeger (2005) and Cordella & Bonina, (2012) argue that these governments 
have implemented ICT systems such as e‐mail, public deliberation on the Internet and e-
voting to enhance citizen involvement and equality. The implementation of ICTs in the 
public sector can be viewed as tools to build trust, and to improve accountability, 
transparency and governance (Avgerou, Ciborra, Cordella, Kallinikos & Smith, 2005). 
While emerging and developing economies stand to gain by introducing these technologies 
to improve public services, they often lack the competences to develop, implement and 
manage such system (Gupta, Dasgupta & Gupta, 2008). In developing countries lack of ICT 
skills has increased the vulnerability of public sector and has prompted governments to 
consider various strategies for developing the capacity to deploy and manage ICT systems, 
but there are still many constraints hindering rapid progress Akintoye, Beck & Hardcastle, 
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Another catalyst for public investment in ICT infrastructure in government and public 
organisations was the belief that such investments would improve operating efficiencies and 
bring down the cost of government (Bellamy & Taylor, 1996; 1998; Fountain, 2001a, 
2001b; Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005; Gronlund & Horan, 2004; Heeks, 1999; Kamarck, 2007). 
In countries around the globe, investment in public sector information systems was 
motivated by New Public Management (NPM) which suggests various ideas and practices 
that recommended adopting the private sector business approaches in the public sector 
(Hood, 1991). There have been many interpretations of what the NMP respresents; however 
the general agreement is to restructure management roles; to transform the public sector into 
self-sufficient organisations; to provide performance-based accountability, particularly 
through contracts; and to use competitive instruments such as outsourced contracts 
(Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow & Tinkler, 2006; Economic Commission for Africa, 2004). 
The NPM’s stance is ultimately that historic public sector philosophy and business practices 
need to change.  
The push to adopt new ICTs has led to a high rate of failure costing developing countries 
large sums of money that could have been allocated to other needs (Heeks, 2002; 
Thompson, 2008; Bollou & Ngwenyama, 2008; Dada, 2006; Dwivedi, Wastell & 
Henriksen, 2015). ICT success or failure in developing countries can be categorised into 
three, depending on the degree of success (Heeks, 2002).  
1. Firstly, the complete failure of an ICT implementation which was abandoned 
without consideration leaving the organisation with no IS platform, leaving no 
choice but  to bring consultants on board for the sake of business continuity;  
2. Secondly the partial failure of an ICT implementation, in which objects was not met 
or in which the outcomes were a disaster and contracts needed to be renegotiated. 
Related to partial failure is a tolerated failure where ICT implementations get off the 
ground but has to be abandoned after a year due to functionality challenges (Heeks, 
2002).   
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3. Thirdly the success of an ICT implementation where the public and private sector 
meet their objectives but the challenge exists for the public sector to take full control 
when the private sector has fulfilled its obligation. The lack of skilled IS 
professionals to manage ICT implementations, specifically ERP, is a challenge in the 
private sector but poses a much bigger problem for the public sector. 
2.3 Public sector ERP implementation and critical success factors 
Although deployment of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems originated in the 
private sector, public sector organisations, driven largely by efficiency concerns, are 
increasingly adopting ERP to replace existing control and operational systems. ERP 
epitomises a process-oriented view of organisational activities and is considered as a 
strategic infrastructure for achieving efficiency and effectiveness in modern organisations 
(Buck-Emden & Galimow, 1996). ERP systems were first widely adopted by the private 
sector, but in recent years this ICT infrastructure has been growing in use by public sector 
organisations. However, the implementation and use of ERP systems by the public sector 
has encountered many challenges, hence there is a need to identify successful management 
strategies to overcome the obstacles (Alves & Matos, 2011; Sommer, 2011; Tarabanis, 
Peristeras & Fis, 2001; Vann, 2004). In the context of the public sector, EPR offers a unique 
set of challenges of integration into embedded government structures. There are several 
challenges which public organisations face when trying to implement ERP systems:  
1. mismatch of culture, norms and values between ERP systems and government 
organisations Allen, Kern & Havenhand, 2002; Allen & Kern, 2001; Bannister, 
2001; Vann, 2004);  
2. technological competence of most government organisations are built around 
legacy systems and are not transferrable to ERP systems (Alves & Matos, 2011; 
Gulledge & Simon, 2005; Wagner & Antonucci, 2009;  Shah, Khan,  Bokhari & 
Raza, 2011);  
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3. ERP systems require very large financial investments while most government 
organisations are challenged by citizens to be fiscally frugal (Ebrahim & Irani, 
2005; Sommer, 2011; Vaidya, Sajeev & Callender, 2006).  
 
In response to the challenges of implementing ERP systems, a line of research has emerged 
inquiring into factors, which contribute to implementation success. This line of research, 
known as critical success factors (CSFs), has a significant literature. However, most of it 
focuses on ERP implementation in private enterprises which face quite different conditions 
from public sector organisations (Choi & Chang, 2009; Shirouyehzad, Dabestani & 
Badakhshian, 2011; Shah, Khan, Bokhari & Raza, 2011; Vaidya, Sajeev & Callender, 
2006), and ignore the challenges faced by organisations in developing and emerging 
economies (Al-Mashari, Ghani & Al-Rashid, 2006; Huang & Palvia, 2001; Hawari & 
Heeks, 2010; Nfuka & Rusu, 2010; Soja & Cunha, 2015). Nevertheless, IS researchers 
(Bhatti, 2005; Leyh & Sander, 2015; Al-Mashari, 2002; Al-Mashari, Ghani & Al-Rashid, 
2006; Kumar & Hillegersberg, 2000; Somers & Nelson, 2004), have proposed sets of CSFs 
as necessary and sufficient conditions for ERP implementation success, namely:  
1. top management support,  
2. project management competence, 
3. risk management competence,  
4. change management competence,  
5. process re-engineering, and  
6. user training.  
However, as researchers investigating ERP implementation in developing countries have 
pointed out, the CSFs that have been proposed for developed countries are inadequate for 
the conditions existing in developing countries (Huang & Palvia, 2001; Hawari & Heeks, 
2010; Nfuka & Rusu, 2010). In addition to the issues faced by ERP implementation projects 
in developed countries, those in emerging and developing economies face significantly more 
human capital and resource challenges (Hawari & Heeks, 2010; Nfuka & Rusu, 2010). For 
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example, professional competence in new ICTs is often in short supply, forcing these 
countries to contract out the work at higher cost (Hawari & Heeks, 2010; Soja & Cunha, 
2015; Soja & Paliwoda-Pękosz, 2015); and, secondly, the high cost of ERP software 
infrastructure is a barrier to implementation for some developing countries (Palanisamy, 
Verville & Taskin, 2015).  
2.4 General overview of Public Private Partnerships 
While there is no formal agreed-upon definition of public private partnerships (PPPs), what 
is agreed is that they are contractual relationships between private enterprises and 
government organisations for the delivery of services or products to the public sector 
(Linder, 1999; Kanev, 2009; Milosavljevic, 2009; Osborne, 2002). Many researchers view 
PPPs as instruments of the new public management philosophy aimed at disciplining 
government organisations into effective and efficient operations (Bovaird & Löffler, 2009; 
Linder, 1999; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Sarma, 2006). However, Hodge & Greve (2005) 
view PPPs as providing institutional arrangements for collaboration between governments 
and the private sector, which can result in positive social benefits. In the last three decades, 
PPPs have taken many forms and delivered many different services and products, from 
education and healthcare to transportation and ICT infrastructure in both developed and 
developing economies, but there have been many spectacular failures (Sharma, 2012; Weber 
& Alfen, 2010; Malone, 2005; Odeck & Bråthen, 2002; Ahwireng-Obeng & Mokgohlwa, 
2002; Tati, 2005; Salamon, 1995).   
In the current incarnation, the PPP has its roots in the new public management idea of 
reducing the role of government and increasing the role of private enterprises in society by 
attracting private funding for public projects via PFIs (Salamon, 1995; Savas & Savas, 
2000; Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001).  Spectacular failures of the PFI approach, such as loss 
of government control and opportunistic behaviour (shirking, price gouging, etc.,) by private 
enterprises, led to a rethinking of the structure of private participation in the public sphere 
and gave birth to the idea of PPPs as an instrument for collaboration and shared control of 
public projects (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002; Bovaird, 2004; Bloomfield, 2006; Chong, Huet, 
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Saussier & Steiner, 2006). PPPs as collaborations for delivering infrastructure or services 
are considered organisations for jointly building, owning and operating infrastructure and 
services, in which each partner’s role and the objectives of the partnership are defined in a 
legal contract that specifies the joint rights and responsibilities (Pongsiri, 2002; Hart, 2003; 
Gasiorowski & Moszoro, 2008; Hodge & Greve, 2007). However, financial structure and 
ownership rights of PPPs can still vary between two extremes:  
1. public ownership and operation of services or infrastructure, and  
2. private ownership and operation of the services or infrastructure (Hart, 2003; 
Gasiorowski & Moszoro, 2008).  
Between these two extremes there are many models of PPP some of which the researcher 
will outline in the next section. 
Table 3: Public Private Partnership models, Source: The Researcher 
Key Aspects Private Own & Operate Public Own & Operate 
Financing Largely private but still joint 51% public, 49% private 
Management Private Joint public-private 
Risk sharing Joint Joint 
Financial Rewards Largely private Shared 
Concession  Often more than 25 years Vary with agreement 
 
The PPP model of private ownership and operation of public services has been widely 
criticised as a neoliberal strategy for privileging private enterprise at the expense of citizens 
and society (Bovaird, 2004; Chong, et. al., 2006; Jessop, 1998; Parker & Hartley, 2003; 
Spackman, 2002; Vining & Boardman 2008; Langford & Roy, 2006; Johnston & Gudergan, 
2007; Hodge, 2004). However, this model is continually pushed by international 
organisations such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank on 
governments in emerging and developing countries (Gasiorowski & Moszoro, 2008; 
McKee, Edwards & Atun, 2006; Estache & Serebrisky, 2004). The central argument of its 
proponents is that it is an optimal capital structure for emerging and developing economies 
with capital constraints (Gasiorowski & Moszoro, 2008; Estache & Serebrisky, 2004). 
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However, these countries are often weak in governance and lack bargaining power and the 
technical capacity to implement governance structures to effectively manage foreign private 
partners (Jessop, 1998; Jamali, 2004; Marin, 2009; Deva, 2006; Samii, Van Wassenhove & 
Bhattacharya, 2002; Abednego & Ogunlana, 2006). The PPP model of private ownership 
and operating has also had some spectacular failures and has been widely criticised in 
developed countries such as France (Bovaird, 2004; Chong, et. al., 2006), the United 
Kingdom (Jessop, 1998; Parker & Hartley, 2003; Spackman, 2002), Canada (Bradford, 
2003; Vining & Boardman, 2008; Langford & Roy, 2006) and Australia (English, 2007; 
Johnston & Gudergan, 2007; Hodge, 2004). Consequently, public management researchers 
have come to view it as high risk (Jessop, 1998; English, 2007; Hodge, 2004; Wettenhall, 
2003; Teisman & Klijn, 2002).   
2.5 Different Public Private Partnership structures 
Between the two extremes of private/public ownership and operation of the infrastructure or 
service resulting from the collaboration, there are multiple structures for PPPs based on the 
combinations of services, roles and responsibilities and different financing methods between 
the government and the private partner. Researchers point out that the most common 
structures are: (1) contracting out, (2) build and transfer (3) build, operate and transfer (4) 
build own and (5) operate.   
 
 Contracting out is a form of PPP where the private partner is only partially responsible 
and provides a service in an advisory and consulting capacity to the public organisation 
without taking any risks. The objective of this form of PPP is to engage the private 
enterprise to use its specialised knowledge to assist the public sector managers with re-
engineering government infrastructure to meet the demands for ICT service delivery for 
information systems implementations. 
 In the Build and Transfer (BT) PPP model the private partner takes primary 
responsibility for funding (via loan arrangements), designing, building and managing the 
project. When the project is finalised it is transferred back to the public sector. An 
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example of this arrangement is the Third Dartford Crossing of the River Thames, linking 
two sections of the M25 motorway, which circles London, reverting to the UK 
government (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004:11). Another variant of this model is Design and 
Build (DB), in which a single contract is provided to a private company, where the 
management of the contract requirements is the responsibility of the private company, 
but the public sector retains legal ownership (Hodge & Greve, 2005:65). The DBO 
model integrates design, construction and maintenance in one contract and is based on 
the traditional public sector procurement methods, where the public sector purchases the 
infrastructure thereafter. 
 Design Building Finance Operate (DBFO) - This particular PPP model involves a 
long-term contract with a private partner of more than 25 years. It is a type of 
concession contract, which requires the private enterprise to invest in building and 
operating a service facility with service and performance standards clearly specified. At 
the end of the concession period the infrastructure is then taken over by the government. 
This is a mutual agreement between the public and private partner where the latter bears 
considerable risk. (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004:60). 
 In the Build Own Operate (BOO) PPP model, the private enterprise is responsible for 
financing, building, operating and outright ownership of the infrastructure. The control 
and ownership of the project remains the property of the private sector. The water 
treatment plants in South Australia utilised this structure for contracting. The private 
sector ensured the process of raw water into filter water through a contract with the 
public sector utility that could deliver to the end user, the consumers (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2004:11). 
Each of these PPP models has its own unique challenges of governance and accountability, 
various levels of success in different jurisdictions and various proponents and detractors 
(Bradford, 2003; Hart, 2003; Oreck & Brat hen, 2002; Allard & Brabant, 2011; English, 
2007; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007). However, all PPPs are relationship agreements, 
reflecting shared responsibilities and competing stakeholder interests (Mitchell, 2008; 
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Reeves, 2008; Iossa & Martimort, 2012; Parker & Hartley, 2003; Bloomfield, 2006). Three 
elements of these agreements are critical:  
1. the specification of goals and objectives for the project  
2. the specification of responsibilities for the outcomes and  
3. specification of accountability mechanisms and strict penalties for 
underperformance.  
Researchers have pointed out that PPPs are successful when there is tangible supervision, 
robust governance structures, transparency and accountability (Kernaghan, 1993; Mitchell, 
2008; Bodha, 2003; Levin, Belfield, Muennig & Rouse, 2007; Ng & Loosemore, 2007; 
Iossa & Martimort, 2012).  
2.6 Management challenges of Public Private Partnerships 
PPPs face a range of management challenges that vary depending on their goals and the type 
of governance and organisational structure they assume. However, there are three critical 
areas of management challenges that are relevant to the success of all types of PPPs:  
1. Achieving public value and return on government investments. 
2. Risk Sharing and Risk Management, and  
3. PPP governance and public accountability.  
The effective management of these challenges is a necessary condition but not sufficient 
condition for the success of PPPs (Gil-García & Pardo, 2005; Zhang, 2005; Li, Akintoye,  
Edwards & Hardcastle, 2005; Jacobson & Ok Choi, 2008; Jefferies, 2006; Jamali, 2004; 
Yuan,  Zeng, Skibniewski & Li, 2009; Ismail, 2013;  Zou, Kumaraswamy, Chung & Wong, 
2014; Mota & Moreira, 2015). 
2.6.1 Public value and return on investment 
A primary goal of PPPs is deemed to be that of obtaining higher public value for the 
investment of public funds than is deemed possible from the traditional public works 
approach (McKevitt, 2015; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Nisar, 2007). A central tenet of the 
new public management philosophy and the existence of PPPs is that they are more efficient 
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vehicles for achieving public capital projects than the conventional public works approach 
(Osborne, 2010; Leigland, 2006; Morallos & Amekudzi, 2008; McKevitt, 2015;). This has 
led to the idea of a Public Sector Comparator (PSC) measure which is applied to assess how 
well PPPs proposed a rating as an alternative to government projects in delivering value for 
money (Leigland, 2006; Heald, 2003). However, empirical research has illustrated that PPPs 
do not deliver any better returns on investment than traditional public works projects and, 
because of the involvement of private partners, PPP projects often take higher risks than is 
possible if government were the sole investor (Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg & Rothengatter, 2002; 
Estache, 2010; Flyvbjerg, 2009; Flyvbjerg, 2013). Further, Budzier & Flyvbjerg (2011) 
argue that ICT projects are much more susceptible to higher risks than other infrastructure 
projects. And, although the PSC method has come under criticism as a valid metric for 
assessing value for money due to its lack of accuracy, challenges on estimating discount 
rates and subjective manipulation by analysts in both developed and developing countries 
(including South Africa) still use it as a benchmark to evaluate value for money (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 2009, 2013; McKevitt, 2015). The challenge then for managers of 
PPP projects is to deliver their projects in good time while delivering on value for money 
promises that may or may not be viable (Flyvbjerg, 2014; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Martins, 
Marques & Cruz, 2014; Tsukada, 2015) 
2.6.2 Risk sharing and risk management  
The allocation of risks is associated with rewards and is a fundamental feature of PPP 
success (Hart, 2003; Iossa & Martimort, 2012; Ng & Loosemore, 2007; Kociemska, 2010; 
Khadaroo, 2014). From the perspective of the new public management philosophy, risk 
sharing between the public and private partners is a key goal of PPPs (Abednego & 
Ogunlana, 2006; Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Iossa & Martimort, 2012). Proponents of the NPM 
philosophy argue that there is a role for risk sharing and that PPPs are designed to ensure 
that risk is allocated between the public and private sector to ensure reduction of cost 
overruns and value-positive outcomes for the citizens (Osborne, 2010; Bovaird & Löffler, 
2009; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011; Valéro, 2015). However, empirical research suggests that 
this has not always been achieved (McKevitt, 2015; Bing, Akintoye, Edwards & Hardcastle, 
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2005). A 2007 European Services Strategy report illustrate this challenge with evidence 
from 102 PPP projects for ICT implementations which had serious cost overruns, delays and 
terminations, for which the citizens paid (Whitfield, 2007). A UK study which reviewed UK 
Treasury documents revealed similar evidence of massive cost overruns, delays and 
terminations of PPP projects which were eventually paid by the citizens (Pollock, Price & 
Player, 2007). The private sector often have superior technical knowledge of risk factors and 
are able to bargain and influence the design of PPP contracts to reduce their own risks, at the 
expense of the public (Bruzelius et al., 2002; Hodge, 2004; Love, Edwards & Irani, 2012; 
Flyvbjerg, 2014; Loosemore & Cheung, 2015).  
 
A second major challenge in this area is managing the strategic behaviour of private partners 
during the project (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2010; Smyth & Edkins, 2007; Klijn & 
Teisman, 2005; El-Gohary, Osman & El-Diraby, 2006). While it is understood that the 
public sector organisation has the role of implementing project governance and managing 
the behaviour of the private partner to ensure positive value outcomes for the citizens, 
achieving these roles is a major challenge (Jones & Noble, 2008; Osborne, 2010; Jessop, 
1998; Klijn & Teisman, 2005). The aim of private enterprise is profit at all costs, and this 
aim can lead to opportunistic behaviours such as shirking, renegotiation and under-
performance when these behaviours are likely to improve profits for the private partner 
(Lohmann & Rötzel, 2014; Shaoul, 2005; Iossa & Martimort, 2015; Vining & Boardman, 
2014). A key strategy for managing the strategic behaviour of the private partner is 
specifying performance criteria in the PPP contract and monitoring performance compliance 
during the project (Katz, 2006; Medda, 2007; Klijn & Teisman, 2005; Stoker, 1998). 
Contracts may also provide incentives and penalties to influence compliance behaviours of 
the partners (Iossa & Martimort, 2014; Wang & Pallis, 2014). Some have argued that public 
sector managers can behave strategically by abusing authority, corrupt practices and biased 
cost estimations (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2010). While corruption has been observed in 
PPP projects all over the world, the public purse is always the loser (Umar & Okafor, 2015; 
Ferk, 2014; Eadie, 2014; Fombad, 2015). The public sector is almost always at a 
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disadvantage due to lack of expertise and technical competence on the work to be performed 
by the private partner, resulting in information asymmetry in favour of the private partner 
(Lohmann & Rötzel, 2014; Spiller & Moszoro, 2014). This almost always results in the 
unequal distribution of power between the public and private partners and can create power 
struggles between actors for the partners (De Schepper, Haezendonck & Dooms, 2015; Ross 
& Yan, 2015; Galasso, 2015; Marques & Berg, 2011).  
2.6.3 PPP governance and public accountability 
The third critical area of PPP management challenges is project governance and public 
accountability (Vining & Weimer, 2015; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007; Abednego & 
Ogunlana, 2006). Strong project governance and public accountability are seen as bulwarks 
against corruption, and are effective to managing project risks and achieving public value 
for money (World Bank, 2003; Allard & Trabant, 2011; Bovaird & Löffler, 2009; Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2011). From the institutional perspective, a regulatory framework is crucial for 
governance of the PPP procurement process and direct organisational management and 
control of the project (World Bank, 2003). It is also important to clarify the legal 
environment and roles of the government and private partners in PPP initiatives and is 
crucial to preventing and settling political issues when they arise (Qiao, Wang, Tiong & 
Chan, 2001). A strong regulatory framework provides policy direction and clarifies the 
government’s expectations for PPPs while providing a level of transparency that facilitates 
public accountability and citizen support (Verhoest, Petersen, Scherrer & Murwantara-
Soecipto, 2014; Yang, Hou & Wang, 2013; Biermann, Abbott, Andresen, Bäckstrand, 
Bernstein, Betsill & Zondervan, 2012). However, institutional frameworks for PPP 
governance have been contentious issues; private partners and supporters of the NPM 
philosophy often prefer as little government regulation as possible (Emerson, Nabatchi & 
Balogh, 2012; Estache & Serebrisky, 2004; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007). However, weak 
institutional regulations often lead to more power imbalance for the public sector managers, 
adverse strategic behaviour of private partners and subsequent PPP failures (Vining & 
Boardman, 2008; Liu & Cheah, 2014; Eberlein, Abbott, Black, Meidinger & Wood, 2014; 
Johnston & Gudergan, 2007).  
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Institutional framework and definitive regulations are also necessary for transparency and 
public accountability. Studies of failure in public accountability on PPP projects in many 
countries suggest that stronger institutional regulation could have made a significant 
difference (Vining & Boardman, 2008; Mota & Moreira, 2015). Weak institutional 
frameworks inhibit effective performance monitoring of the PPP actors (public and private) 
and open projects to challenges of corruption and manipulation when outcomes are not 
positive (Umar & Okafor, 2015; Ferk, 2014; Eadie, 2014; Fombad, 2015). Further, 
according to Flyvbjerg (2009; 2013), McKevitt (2015) and others, robust institutional 
regulation is necessary for ensuring that there is a high level of scrutiny of PPP project 
proposals, which help everyone to avoid catastrophic failures. Some empirical studies of 
PPP mega failures have pointed to weak institutional frameworks and inadequate due 
diligence as major causes of avoidable failure (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015; Bruzelius, 
Flyvbjerg & Rothengatter, 2002; Estache, 2010). However, it is often the case that emerging 
and developing countries are challenged to implement robust institutional regulation and 
often must depend on private consultants to assist their drafting; these private consultants 
then serve as advisers to their private partners in PPP negotiations (Abbott, 2012; Verhoest, 
Petersen, Scherrer & Murwantara Soecipto, 2014; Jamali, Lund-Thomsen & Jeppesen, 
2015).     
2.7 Conclusion 
The main focus of the literature review was to provide an overview of what is known about 
PPPs in general, and ICT/IS service delivery and ERP implementation in emerging and 
developing countries. The aim was to provide a theoretical context to this research on PPP 
contract failure in ICT service delivery in South Africa. The concepts discussed in the 
various sections of the literature review provided context to the research and highlighted the 
challenge on the dearth of literature on PPP contracting for ICT/IS service delivery. There is 
a large body of literature on PPP contracts, e-government and ERP implementation, but 
literature does not address the challenges facing emerging and development countries such 
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as South Africa. Much work needs to be done to develop an understanding of the challenges 
facing these countries that are pushed by the main international organisations to implement 
PPPs as a vehicle for economic and capacity development and technology competence. 
Scholars have suggested that intensive research effort is needed to help emerging and 
developing countries overcome their distinctive challenges of deploying ICT for public 
management (Heeks, 2002, 2010; Dwivedi, Weerakkody & Janssen, 2012), Rana, Dwivedi,  
& Williams, 2013a; Srivastava, 2011). This PhD research project is a response to this call. 
The objective of this research is to develop an understanding of the conditions which have 
influenced failure of PPP projects for ICT implementation in the South African Department 
of Labour. An understanding of the key conditions and factors contributing to this failure 
could offer insights into what improvements in PPP institutional arrangements and 
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 CHAPTER 3:  Agency Theory 
3.1   Introduction 
Chapter 2 illustrated a relational structure that is central to PPP contracts between 
government organisations and private enterprises. The central challenge of such 
relationships is the management of divergent goals between government organisations and 
private enterprises. Agency theory offers an appropriate theoretical framework for the 
interrogation of the management challenges of PPP. In Chapter 3 the researcher will provide 
an outline of the background of agency theory, including an overview of concepts such as 
transaction costs, strategic behaviours and incentive schemes that could be a counter-
measure to agency problems, and which are relevant to this research into the failure of the 
DOL contract.  
3.2 Agency theory origin 
Agency theory (See Figure 3) was originally applied in the context of private organisations 
exploring economic relationships between manager (principal) and an employee (agent). 
Despite the primal use in the private sector, agency theory can also be applied in the context 
of interfaces between the public and private sector when the principal delegates some of 
their responsibility to the agent to assist with enhancing public sector skills for service 
delivery (Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; HM Treasury, 2003). According to Jensen 
(2003), agency theory is a kind of relationship that “. . . is a contract in which one or more 
persons (the principal) engages another person (the agent) to take action on behalf of the 
principals that involve the delegation of some decision-making authority to the agent”. 
Agency theory argues that this occurs because agents are in most cases better informed than 
their principals about the execution of the tasks that they are mandated to do since they are 
seen as the experts. Hence organisations would benefit more if information could be shared 
at zero cost, while the software and hardware elements as well as development cost are the 
cost-bearing elements (Jensen, 2003). This would especially be beneficial if there were no 
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divergence between the goals of the principals and the agents from the rollout of the project 
and if there were risk mitigation strategies in place to manage service delivery. Moe, (1984) 
states that, “Agency theory was initially developed to scrutinise more general questions of 
inadequate information and risk sharing”. 
 
Figure 3: Agency Theory, Source: (Williamson, 1998) 
 
Information asymmetries are used in agency theory where the agent possesses more 
knowledge than the principal, thereby stealthily manipulating the public sector. This is 
difficult for the public sector to detect until it is too late since it is trying to increase its 
expertise. Global experience shows that PPP contracting lacks ‘ex ante’ (evaluation and 
good preparation) of contracts that cover soft and hard issues of governance; these could 
penalise the agent for poor performance and could potentially eliminate moral hazard 
(European Commission, 2003). A long-term strategic plan and actor analysis should be 
considered as a preliminary valuation before a project is implemented. Long term strategic 
planning should be seen as an integral part of the project that provides direction and assists 
with developing specific goals, objectives and actions to achieve the desired vision of the 
ICT deliverables (Haezendonck, 2008). Strategic planning provides a platform for public 
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debates, resolution of conflict of interest and opinion to be addressed during the project, 
which could otherwise have been ignored at a later stage of implementation, causing delays 
or even stopping the project (Haezendonck, 2008). 
 
The basic postulation “for agency theory is the asymmetric information between the 
principal and the agent which induces adverse selection during ‘ex ante’ contracting and 
moral hazard during ‘ex post’ contracting” periods (Jensen, 2003; De Almeida, 2012:29). 
Adverse selection refers to the fact that the principal is unable to access adequate 
information from the agent to back up the skills and deliverable capability the agent is 
selling before signing the contract (Williamson, 1998; Rui, 2008). Moral hazard is a 
strategic behaviour that refers to the endogenous variables of the private sector which 
cannot be freely observed by the principal, thereby causing monitoring problems (Gottlieb 
& Moreira, 2013). 
There are two types of strategic behaviour defined by Laffont and Tirole (1993) in their 
book “A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation” which addresses adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Moral hazard, otherwise known as ‘ethical threat’, occurs when 
the agent (who has more information about their own activities and their nature of work) 
behaves inappropriately from the viewpoint of the principals (who has limited information).  
Adverse selection encourage when the agent is privy to exogenous information that the 
principal does not have in the field of information technology (amongst other areas) and the 
agent’s superior knowledge allows them to charge a premium for services. Based on the 
huge skills divide between the agent and principal, the agent always has the capacity for 
shirking on project deliverables and allowing for opportunistic bargaining (Martimort & 
Pouyet, 2008). 
Information asymmetry does not necessarily pose a problem if the agent’s interests are 
aligned with the principal’s for the benefit of both. Asymmetry, however, has affected the 
level of benefits affecting the principal and this is based on the assumption that goal conflict 
 
  
PHD THESIS                                                                         RENE ALBERTUS 34 
 
exists between the principal and the agent. When the agent’s behaviour is not managed or 
restrained, the goal of the principal is unlikely to be attained. Based on this behavior, the 
principal will apply new ways of contracting in order to minimise deviation from specified 
goals (Caers, Bois, Jegers, Gieter, Schepers & Pepermans, 2006). Agency theory framework 
will be used in Chapter 5 in order to explore risk factors and risk mitigation strategies 
impacting the PPP contract for ICT service delivery.  
Below is an introduction to transaction cost, strategic behaviours, and monitoring, incentives 
and risk management. 
3.3 Transaction cost 
Based on the assumptions above of agency theory it is reasonable to believe that the agent 
will not always act in the best interest of the principal, thus the principal needs to restrict the 
goal of divergence and interest incompatibility by establishing appropriate and adequate 
incentives in the agency relationship. The establishment of appropriate incentives and 
introducing better monitoring mechanisms to curb the agent’s aberrant behaviour can assist 
with limiting the agent from diverging from agreed-upon goals (Jensen, 2003). These efforts 
from the principal to divert certain actions from the agent are not without a price in the long 
run.  Jensen (2003) defines costs below as transaction costs, also called agency costs. 
1. The cost of creating and structuring contracts between the principal and the agent 
2. The monitoring expenditure of the principal 
3. The bonding expenditure by the agent 
4. The residual loss, which means the dollar equivalent to the reduction in welfare 
experienced by the principal as a result of goal divergence; asymmetric information 
is also a cost of the agency relationship. 
 
Based on agency costs, a distinction can be made between ‘ex ante’ agency costs and the ‘ex 
post’ agency costs. The ‘ex-ante’ agency costs are the costs of the first type, incurred 
through creating and structuring the contractual agreement, including information research, 
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negotiation and contract information. The ‘ex post’ agency costs are costs related to the 
second, third and fourth type.  It is cost spend on monitoring, execution and enforcement of 
the contract, as well as safeguarding and settlement of conflicts, adaptations and 
renegotiations during the contractual period (Obermann, 2007; Yesilkagit, 2004). 
Drawing up and enforcing contracts are a costly process and sometimes incomplete (Laffont 
& Tirole, 1993). The reasons for characteristics of incomplete contracts are future 
contingencies and bounded rationality. The more difficult it is to foresee future 
contingencies and to formulate clear plans to mitigate challenges, the higher the transaction 
costs would be. Agents are not in a position to describe all potential contingencies that could 
affect the successful delivery of contract terms; this is based on the high cost and also the 
fact that some contingencies cannot easily be verified by the agent’s level of exerted efforts. 
Guasch (2007) argues that with regard to “granting and renegotiating infrastructure tenders”, 
the contracting parties are not always completely rational and therefore could make 
mistakes, leading to the need to familiarise themselves with the contract, requiring 
adjustment and optimisation over time. Williamson (2008) argues that bounded rationality 
can, when used for self-interest, be applied to disclose information in a selected and 
distorted manner. Calculated efforts to mislead, disguise, obfuscate and confuse are then 
admitted. 
3.4 Strategic Behaviours 
Relationships between the public and private sector are a principal-agent relationship in 
which the asymmetric circulation of information suggests ‘strategic behaviour’ (De Bruijn 
& Ten Heuvelhof, 2010). The challenge resulting from information asymmetry is that the 
private sector might shirk from contributing effectively to the mandate of the contract, or 
renege to behave in line with the requirements of government.  
The moral hazard aspect comes into play during the contract when the agent’s performance 
cannot be monitored precisely in conjunction to the task that they have been assigned to 
deliver on, due to the lack of the principal’s knowledge and their dependence on the agent’s 
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so-called expertise. If the agent’s interest is perfectly aligned with that of the principal, 
information asymmetry should not necessarily present a problem. That said ‘asymmetry’ 
could affect the level of benefit that should be transferred and absorbed by the principal, and 
that is based on the assumption that goal conflict exists between the principal and the agent. 
Therefore, if the agent’s behaviour is not monitored or controlled, the delivery of the goals 
of the principal is likely to suffer and will not be attained. Monitoring and incentives, 
transaction cost and strategic behaviour are incurred by the agency relationship. 
Strategic behaviour becomes evident when the agent uses their advantage to information to 
act strategically in their own interest over the principal’s, this being a direct consequence of 
information asymmetry. Williamson (1998) has pointed out that strategic behaviour can be 
either defensive or offensive; the former involves the efforts to protect the strategist from 
harm and loss of interest, while the latter entails efforts of establishing and moving to an 
advantageous position by the strategist that can cause harm. This kind of behaviour is 
contrary to the efforts of satisfaction and protection of self-interest being pursued. There is 
no unified definition of ‘strategic behaviour’: De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, (2010) 
distinguishes strategic behaviour by providing six characteristics: 
 Strategic behaviour is spontaneous. The strategist reflects on his own behaviour, 
takes into account his opponent’s spontaneous behaviour, and adapts his behaviour 
to it. 
 Strategic behaviour is interactive. Strategic behaviour flourishes in circumstances 
where the actors are mindful of each other and can reciprocally anticipate each 
other’s behaviour and react to it. 
 Strategic behaviour has a time dimension. A time dimension of strategic behaviour 
is derived from its interactive character. Because of bounded rationality, the actors 
cannot fully anticipate others’ behaviours and this cannot clarify everything in an 
arrangement (such as a contract), thus the need for the arrangement to be 
supplemented and reviewed over time.  
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 Strategic behaviour is unilaterally aimed at narrow self-interest. The core of 
strategic behaviour is that it serves the strategist’s self-interest. It requires 
clarification that not all the behaviours that serve self-interest are strategic 
behaviours, only in the event that they are detrimental to public interest. 
 Strategic behaviour is ambiguous. Based on the clarification above, strategic 
behaviour has two interpretations: either it is not detrimental to public interest; or 
strategic behaviour serves the strategist’s self-interest at the expense of prejudicing 
the public interest. 
 Strategic behaviour is intentional. The ambiguity of strategic behaviour is a familiar 
issue – the strategist emphasises that his behaviour poses no harm on the public 
interest and denies that the second interpretation (in the preceding point) is relevant. 
 
These characteristics of strategic behaviour manifest in government procurement projects in 
many different ways. The agent has the unilaterally narrow self-interest of maximising 
profits in pursuing their interest; this could be detrimental to service delivery to the principal 
due to low quality service, cost overruns and opportunistic bargaining. Strategic behaviour 
has its own ambiguity, which provides the agent with the argument that they have no 
intention to take advantage of the principal in their pursuit to maximise profits. During the 
contract structuring phase, the behaviour of the principal and agent are reflexive and rational 
due to the negotiation process on the time frame of the project, quality, output 
specifications, cost, responsibility and risk sharing. This behaviour is purely for strategic 
reasons in order to ensure their objectives are met. Due to the incompleteness of the 
contract, because both parties cannot foresee contingencies in the future, allowance needs to 
be made for adjustments and changes to contractual terms with limited cost implications 
during the contract period.  
Technically, the nature of the contract can be complex or not as complex as the agent makes 
it out to be. If it is complex, the agent may be in a position to convince the principal that the 
contract is mediocre in order to be satisfied with the output levels normally associated with 
average contract deliverables. Martimort & Pouyet (2008) show that giving the principal 
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and resources incentives to ensure they are not in collusion with the agent and to monitor all 
levels of contracts can avoid conspiracy.  Moral hazard (post-contractual opportunism) and 
adverse selection (pre-contractual opportunism) are two factors that have accompanied loss 
of government control in PPP contracting (Gottlieb & Moreira, 2013).  Moral hazard is a 
strategic behaviour that refers to the endogenous variables of the agent that cannot be 
observed by the principal. Challenges by the principal to vigilantly observe the agent’s 
behaviour, reduce the principal’s input level, which could influence project cost and quality 
and lead to moral hazard. Fewness and position (defined in the next two paragraphs), 
combined with moral hazard and information asymmetry, are referred to as strategic 
behaviour that could influence contract outcomes if it is not observed in PPPs (De Bruijn & 
Ten Heuvelhof, 2010; Bain, 1950; Yarrow, 1985; Hunt & Morgan, 1995; Gottlieb & 
Moreira, 2013). 
 
Fewness relates to two market competitions, monopoly and oligopoly; these become two of 
the elements that the private sector uses against the principal when selling their services. 
Most consulting organisations have had monopoly in providing a niche service to the public 
sector, based on their expertise in the particular field and on mastering competitive 
tendering procedures during the procurement process (Bain, 1950; Yarrow, 1985). Although 
monopolists know that pricing could be their downfall, they know they have been accredited 
with preferred supplier status, based on the history of success in the market that provides the 
public sector with the comfort that they are the right partners. Although they might lose 
customers through higher pricing, monopolists know they will make profits from charging 
the ‘right price’, meaning ‘higher price’, which will compensate them for the loss of 
customers (Stern, 1987; Yarrow, 1985). An oligopoly lend itself to colluding, such as a 
‘cartel mentality’ in which agreements are made amongst a limited number of competitors 
on the price and quantity of the service, thereby creating the risk that some of the 
competitors may privately break up the collusion, decreasing pricing and increasing 
quantity. Fewness has the potential to substantially reduce competition amongst service 
providers if it is managed constructively to ensure efficiencies in contracting. Monopolies 
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allow service providers to reduce service quality and create high transaction cost, whereas 
oligopolies allow the few providers to collude with each other during the tendering process, 
in order to get the contract and deal with consequences later; as a result of this manipulation 
the public sector opens itself to moral hazard (Martimort & Pouyet, 2008).   
 
Position is what monopolists and oligopolies pride themselves on in a competitive market, 
since position can prevent new entrants by displaying creditable threat (Hunt & Morgan, 
1995). It would be advantageous for the principal to take on a strong position when 
negotiating with the agent in order to dispel monopolist or oligopolist behaviour. This will 
enable the principal to become more skilled in the services that are required in order to 
manage contract deliverables and to ensure successful outcomes without incurring cost 
overruns, through renegotiating contracts or lack of penalising the agent for non-delivery of 
agreed contract terms. A strong position from the government will provide taxpayers and 
opposition parties with confidence when the public sector engages with the private sector 
for service delivery; it will also discourage the private sector from shirking on deliverables 
that will eliminate the propensity for moral hazard (Gottlieb & Moreira, 2013). 
 
According to Sharma (1997), principals can tactically provide methods to monitor the agent 
behaviour and to safeguard that the agent behaves as specified in the contract. For instance, 
the principal can ease information asymmetry and can impose sanctions if the agent 
diverges from expected criteria of service delivery. This will require a full time project 
manager – even though expensive, this could be useful to manage the agent in efficient 
execution of the contract. Rigidity could develop between information asymmetry and the 
cost monitoring methods. Therefore, if the agent’s behaviour cannot be monitored, 
principals can implement an alternative solution that is based not on reducing information 
asymmetry, but on definite performance of the agent as measured by the outcomes 
comparative to expectations (Sharma, 1997). 
 
Therefore, Jensen and Meckling, (1976:81) indicate that agency theory recommends that; 
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the principal can limit divergence from his interest by establishing appropriate 
incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the 
aberrant activities of the agent. In some situations it will pay the agent to expend 
resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions, which 
would harm the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976:81). 
 
This to the extent that there is still some slippage between the goals of the principal and 
those of agents, the former bears the residual agency cost, which is “the dollar equivalent of 
the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal due to this divergence” (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976:81). When principals in their own capacity cannot afford the cost of 
information gathering (monitoring) devices, agency theory predicts that third-party 
institutions (i.e., auditors, advisors, rating agencies, e.g., Standard & Poor, Moody’s) will 
arise to fill the gap and assist with economic exchange between the parties (Fama, 1980; 
Sharma, 1997). 
 
The theoretical resolution that requires risk transfer to agents is based on relaxing 
assumptions that the agents are risk adverse (Sharma, 1997; Harris & Raviv, 1979) and/or 
that they are powerless to resist the imposition of a risk greater than they would like to bear 
(Sharma, 1997; Perrow, 1986). In spite of suggestions made by agency theory, several 
researches have shown that concerns remain about agent opportunism, since the principals 
are often at the mercy of the agents (Bazerman et al., 1992; Sharma, 1997). The persistence 
of agency problems in many sectors raises questions about the completeness or even 
appropriateness of mainstream agency perspectives; unresolved issues in the theory provide 
the impetus to explore factors that impede application of agency solutions and, for that 
matter, to scrutinise the theory itself so that its structure may be refined. 
3.5 Monitoring and incentives 
It cannot always be assumed that the agent will perform according to the contractual terms 
in agency theory; therefor the principal will have to find measures to ensure that the agent 
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has the best intention and that their actions do not impact the principal’s interest. The 
principal can implement measures to monitor the agent but, if it is not a tangible, it might be 
difficult to evaluate whether the work has been performed, as in the case with information 
systems implementations. Long contractual periods pose a specific problem since errors 
cannot be detected immediately on the project quality and problems can be concealed only 
to be revealed at periods of testing and integration (Lane & Kivisto, 2008). It is costly to 
monitor contracts that are spread over long periods. A period of ten years for IS 
implementations is presumed to be too lengthy because of the rapidly changing technical 
environment. Technical and professional skills are required that understand PPP contracts 
for ICT/IS service delivery by assessing professionally trained agents with practical and 
technical skills to have the capability to assess the private sectors performance (Walsh, 
1995). There is always the option of creating positive incentives for agents based on their 
performance, to try to mitigate shirking and delivering according to the contract terms (Lane 
& Kivisto, 2008; Brehm & Gates, 1999). This could curb the requirement of micromanaging 
the agent’s performance and could attempt to establish mutual trust and commitment, so that 
successful delivery of PPP contracts could be fulfilled. Monitoring and incentives should be 
combined with each other, inducing the agent to be compliant with the contractual terms, 
specifically long-term contracts where reliance is on reputation. Parker and Hartley (2002) 
state that those contracts that are reliant on reputation are central to contracting. Reputation 
could become a business and may be substituted for detailed contractual controls (Powell, 
1990; Klein, 1999; Gulati, 1998), hence it is assumed that the more well known in the 
market the easier it becomes for contractors to build a reputation for quality workmanship. 
Lane, (1997) indicates that reputation building might not work in some social and economic 
contexts, based on underdeveloped legislative and regulatory frameworks. Williamson 
(1996; 1998; 2008) acknowledges that contracting with private sector consultants based on 
good reputation may reduce ‘ex post’ strategic behaviours and affect transaction cost, hence 
the requirement for ‘relational contracting’ that places more reliance on reputation, although 
threats of strategic behaviour still exists. 
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The principal can introduce a set of incentives to increase the agent’s efficiency, but these 
incentives could prove exorbitant. Incentives could have different effects on the projects. 
The main assumptions underlying a principal-agent framework are:  
a. Information is asymmetric between the parties. In general, the agent (the 
private sector) has more information about its own actions (moral hazard) 
and the so-called ‘opposing choice’ (adverse selection), and  
b. The agent pursues its own interests, which may oppose those of the 
principal (the public sector).   
These expectations are very similar to the fundamentals of a PPP contract, with the 
government acting as the principal and the private sector as the agent. When the government 
engages the private sector to perform a certain task on its behalf, it tries to negotiate a 
contract that will specify the applicable parameters, including the requirements and measure 
of output; specific benchmarks and timing; and the tools by which the government will 
control the performance of the private sector operator.  
Where incentives cannot be perfect, it has been found to lead to moral hazard issues on the 
part of the agent. Moral hazard issues can be reduced by the principal calling in auditors to 
assess the nature of the private sectors deliverables compared to the contract (Gottlieb & 
Moreira, 2013).  Global experience has proven PPP projects benefit from introducing 
effective risk management strategies (HM Treasury 2005). Most partnerships are risk-
adverse which gives rise to a cost such as insurance in order to mitigate risks. 
3.6 Risk Management 
There is a disproportionateness of roles and of information between the public and private 
sector and perception biases complicate the rational assessment of risk management, which 
aggravates the impact of information asymmetry. It has been discovered that research 
concentrates on single aspects, such as risk allocation (Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos, 
2008); or quantitative risk analysis (Wibowo & Kochendörfer, 2005). Researchers have 
advanced the technical aspects of risk management in practice, but have given less focus to 
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the managerial challenges on risk for PPP projects (de Palma et al., 2009; Fischer, Leidel, 
Riemann & Wilhelm Alfen, 2010).  Fischer et al., (2010) suggests that an integrated risk 
management approach could improve the risk management challenges by integrating the 
techniques into a wider framework of application. An approach to the life cycle oriented risk 
management framework has been developed by Zou, Wang & Fang, 2008), with a focus on 
risk allocation, separating the process into preliminary risk distribution, detailed risk 
distribution and reorganisation. To further advance this framework, it is necessary to rethink 
risk processes and to develop an overall conceptual approach to risk management.  
However, risk management will only operate properly if it is part of a well-established 
project management structure. 
 
The allocation of risks in PPPs cannot rely on the implicit assumption that the public and 
private sector are on identical or (horizontal) footing in partnerships (de Palma et al., 2009). 
The private sector is contracted by the public sector to undertake a project, which implies 
hierarchy, which has implications on risks affecting the PPP contract for the ICT/IS service 
delivery. Delegating responsibility to the private sector (through a contract) adds a set of 
risks distinct from those linked with the running of the project. These risks might be 
different in nature, but it is usually difficult for government to unravel both risks based on 
the fact that the private sector has more information and knowledge than the public sector. 
Particularly in respect to its ability to carry on tasks and the nature of its actions – the public 
sector cannot determine with accuracy the capability or skill of the private sector (as they 
private sector may enjoy commercial or market exposure) (Martimort & Pouyet, 2008; 
Leruth, 2009). The public sector can observe the output of the PPP but, in the case of low 
output, will not be able to determine whether it relates to low-level effort on the part of the 
private sector. It is therefore vital that, when a contract is signed, the public sector should 
ensure all clauses are in the contract and that it is being monitored, e.g., (controls, penalties) 
that could limit but generally not prevent the ability of the private sector to partake in 
corruption (de Palma et al., 2009). 
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3.7 Theoretical framework 
Theory on PPP contracting for ICT/IS service delivery was introduced in Chapter 2 and 
agency theory that is applied is followed up in this chapter. Before proceeding with 
empirical research, the researcher adopted and extended a risk framework developed by 
Ngwenyama and Sullivan (2005) to direct the research. The framework consists of five risk 
categories and related risk factors which, if not appropriately addressed, may lead to 
negative outcomes. The large amounts of literature on risk management for PPP contracting 
and IS outsourcing provided by researchers (Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos, 2008; 
Fischer et al., 2010; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993; Earl, 1996; Aubert, Patry & Rivard, 
1998; Bhattacharya, Behara & Gundersen, 2003; Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007) assisted 
with constructing this framework.  
 
While the list of risk factors are by no means exhaustive, it covers the most significant risk 
affecting PPP contracting for ICT/IS service delivery and should be covered in a contract for 
information systems (IS) implementations. A brief description of each risk factor will be 
discussed below, and then be expanded on in detail in the subsequent studies. Lack of 
performance monitoring is one of the most critical risk factors since, if performance is not 
monitored diligently, the chance of consultants behaving opportunistically is drastically 
increased. The unfortunate challenge is that monitoring performance requires skilled 
management that has complete oversight of the project scope and will ensure that penalties 
are imposed. The idea is that it must be very costly for consultants to underperform. Based 
on low barriers to entry in ICT/IS service delivery, the chances of an inappropriate vendor 
being selected is quite plausible. Adverse selection is the main driver behind inappropriate 
vendor selection based on nepotism that influences the selection process. Organisations will 
choose a partner based on market exposure instead of technical expertise.  The lack of 
skilled IS resources and competent management fuels the impact of the first two risk factors 
in the following table. Lack of experience and skilled management leads to dependency on 
consultants, destroying value, declining service levels and ultimately escalating cost that 
plagues the contract’s viability. As the terms of the contract increase and consultants are 
 
  
PHD THESIS                                                                         RENE ALBERTUS 45 
 
under threat to perform, moral hazard becomes the next obvious significant risk. This 
ultimately derails contract success because, when consultants renege on deliverables, ethical 
standards are compromised. It leads to attrition of key skills and tarnishes the agent’s 
morale. Lastly, lack of strategic planning to revisit and review contract activities is the 
ultimate risk. If robust strategic management exists, contracts can be managed and failure 
could be minimised. This, however, requires competent management with the correct 
support structures to ensure that adequate monitoring and performance measures are 
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Table 4: Risk Analysis Framework for PPP contracting for ICT service delivery, Source: Sullivan and 
Ngwenyama (2005) 
Risk Category Description of Risk  Citations 
Lack of performance 
monitoring 
1. Inability to completely specify project 
scope and service level requirements. 
2. Inability to specify performance metrics 
3. Lack of incentive and penalty 
mechanisms for inducing consultant 
performance 
 
Bryson & Ngwenyama, 1999, 2000; 
Nelson & Richmond et al., 1996; Brazel, 
1982; Dewatripont & Legros, 2005; 
Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos, 2008; 
Fischer et al., 2010 
Inappropriate vendor 
selection 
1. Lack of experience with IS 
implementation and technology 
2. Expertise in another field of IS 
3. Consultants inaccurately claiming to be 
a market leader and reputable service 
provider 
 
Laity & Hirschheim, 1993; Demski & 
Feltman, 1978: Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 
2005 
 




1. Lack of expertise for managing 
principle agent relationships 
2. Lack of expertise for managing 
collaborative work processes 
3. Lack of management systems for 
information sharing 
 
Earl, 1996; Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 
2007; Dewatripont & Legros, 2005; 
Bryson & Ngwenyama, 2000 
 
Moral hazard 1. Information asymmetry and non-
disclosures resulting in inappropriate 
vendor selection 
2. Opportunistic bargaining on the part of 
the vendor 
3. High cost of changing partnerships (the 
principal to replace agent). 
 
Ngwenyama & Bryson, 1999; 
Williamson, 1996; 1998; 
Bazerman, Neale, Valley, Zajac & Kim, 
1992; Sharma, 1997; Gottlieb & Moreira, 
2013 
Lack of strategic 
planning 
1. Lack of appropriate opt-out 
arrangements and penalties in case of 
vendor non-performance 
2. Lack of flexibility to amend the project 
plan without incurring additional costs 
3. Lack of long term human resource 
capability development planning 
 
Miller & Lessard, 2008; Demski & 
Feltman, 1978 
 
This framework will be developed to include risk mitigation strategies that will be used in 
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CHAPTER 4: Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general description of the research method applied, as well as a 
discussion on procedures and techniques used to gather and analyse the data. The research 
uses an interpretive approach and a single case study, which will be analysed qualitatively, 
using a multi methods strategy consisting of content analysis and critical discourse analysis 
to analyse the data. This research project consists of three studies and all the studies use the 
same type or similar form of data, though the actual data sets are diverse. Data collection 
methods include gathering documents, conducting interviews, using printed and digital 
material from different websites, as well as face-to-face interviews with internal and 
external stakeholders who worked on the project. Research methods include gathering, 
assembling, planning and analysis of data with the mindfulness of the research paradigm. 
The analysis techniques are particularised in each of the individual studies.  
4.2 Principles for conducting interpretivist research   
The research is underpinned by the methodological assumptions and concerns of 
interpretivism in the IS field (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Walsham, 1995; Ellway & 
Walsham, 2015). Interpretive researchers try to learn from detailed in-depth observations 
(Walsham, 1995) and challenge the nomothetic view. They make assumptions that reality is 
perceived individually and knowledge is constructed through social interaction (Orlikowski 
& Baroudi, 1991; Lee & Baskerville, 2003; Stake, 2005).  
Information Systems research can be classified as interpretive if it is anticipated that 
knowledge of reality is gained only through social construction such as language, 
awareness, shared meanings, documents, tools and other artefacts (Klein & Myers, 1999). 
The consequence and meaning of social constructions for planning research methodologies 
is that it can only be extrapolated through collaborations between the researcher and 
participants (Guba & Lincoln, 1999).  
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Table 5: principles for conducting interpretive research, Source: Klein & Myers, 1999. 
Princi
ple 






Explain the nature of 
socially constructed human 
meanings and the 
interdependent meaning of 
the parts and the whole that 
they form  
Nothing was accepted at face value. Many discussions and verification of 
data were corroborated, e.g., stakeholders and the media; stakeholders and 
minutes of meetings; stakeholder interviews as well as the contract. The 
preparation of three different studies is an iterative process in itself and 





Explain the socio-historical 
context so that the intended 
audience can understand the 
emergence of the current 
situation  
A conversation with stakeholders in the initial phase of the contract on how 
to deal with the challenges was the researchers’ original interest in the 
project. Thereafter the researchers followed the progress and when key 
stakeholders started leaving the project due to inconsistencies the researcher 
decided it would be an excellent research project specifically having 
witnessed so many projects going off the rails. The researcher 











Explain the mutual 
interactions of the 
researchers with the 
participants. It stresses that 
social facts are produced as 
parts of the social 
interaction of the researchers 
with the participants 
Data was gathered initially from meetings with stakeholders. After meeting 
with stakeholders, it was important to get the contract and any other 
documentation that was available about the project, in the media as well as 









Explain how insights are 
derived through the use of a 
particular theoretical lens 
acting as a sensitising device 
to view the world in a 
certain way  
Walsham, 1995 suggests four types of generalisation. The 1st generalisation 
is to develop concepts of which study 1 contributes to this type of 
generalisation and the “risk factors” that were introduced. The 2nd 
generalisation is the generation of theory; that is where propositions were 
developed in the first study from the empirical observations. The 3rd 
generalisation draws from specific implications directly related to the 
second study and the interview findings grouped into the five concepts. The 
4th generalisation looks at valuable insights, which are found in all three 








contradictions between the 
theoretical preconceptions 
and the data gathered, 
allowing for a subsequent 
cycle of revision. 
Important theoretical presumption relating to the presence and 
consequential response of existing research of how PPP contracts for ICT 
service delivery in the IS domain will be operationalised.  The development 
of the researchers understanding was not limited to specific theoretical 
concepts as new themes emerged. The fact that this thesis consists of three 








Explain possible variations 
in participants’ 
interpretations. This 
principle asks researchers to 
present possible variations 
in interpretations among the 
participants. 
Much iteration of the media articles, minutes of meetings and interviews 






Explain possible bias in 
narratives collected from the 
participants and in finding 
alternative explanations to 
the problem under 
investigation  
There was a lack of input from end users but the researcher was cautious 
nonetheless of potential bias by verifying facts from interviews and 
newspaper comments. Study 3 using CDA assisted with the challenge of 
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When these constructions are elicited, they are interpreted through hermeneutics – Klein and 
Myers (1999) affirm that the core principle of hermeneutics is the hermeneutic circle 
proposed in the principles for interpretive field research. Klein and Myers (1999) use seven 
fundamental and interdependent principles for conducting interpretive research; these have 
been widely used in IS research and are exemplified below (Sarker & Sarker, 2009; Vaast & 
Walsham, 2009; Ellway & Walsham, 2015). These principles are not intended to be 
administrative rules of conduct, since the presentation of one or more of them still require 
considerable original thinking.  
4.3 Research Approach – Single Case Multi-Methods Strategy 
The case study method is a well-established approach for conducting IS research (Benbasat 
& Goldstein & Mead, 1987; Lee, 1989; Walsham 1995; Klein & Myers, 1999; Ngwenyama 
& Nielsen, 2014). Firstly, it is an empirical enquiry that investigates an existing 
phenomenon within a real life context. Secondly, it uses multiple sources of evidence and 
assists with clarification of the boundary between the phenomenon under examination and 
its background.  
Case studies’ contributions are limited to proposing hypotheses for testing with nomothetic 
methods (Ngwenyama & Nielsen 2014; Benbasat & Goldstein, Mead, 1987), while others 
convincingly argue that a single case study can falsify an existing theory (Campbell, 1979; 
Lee, 1989). Still others argue that case study research offers the power and possibility to 
generalise from empirical observations to theoretical statements (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Walsham, 1995; Klein & Myers, 1999; Lee & Baskerville, 2003). On the issue of theory 
development from case studies, Lee (1989) suggests that any three of the following four 
criteria are sufficient to validate the new theory’s explanatory power (Ngwenyama & 
Nielsen 2014). 
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2. Are all of the predictions consistent with each other? 
3. Does the case study confirm the theory through empirical evidence? 
4. Does the case study rule out rival theories? 
 
The case study research satisfies all four criteria:  
1. The researcher developed a framework consisting of five risk factors which 
allowed for empirical observations of the challenges to be articulated. 
2. The researcher postulated a set of propositions grounded in empirical 
observations consisted with literature focusing on the risk factors;  
3. Empirical evidence from the case supports the claim that the lack of performance 
management and relevant risk management strategies will affect the success of 
ICT/IS implementations;  
4. The researcher can provide a theoretical explanation on how to manage PPP 
contracts for ICT/IS implementations and to improve management competencies. 
Yin, (2003; 2013) suggests that a single case is appropriate if the case was not:   
1. previously accessible by researchers,  
2. a critical case that can be used for testing a well formulated theory, and  
3. an extreme or unique case.  
The unit of analysis was a single case selected because of the unique nature of PPP 
contracting for ICT/IS service delivery and because it was part of a ten-year IS 
implementation in the public sector. The ERP implementation was designed to align 
business objectives with the e-government vision to achieve efficiency with service delivery 
to the public and to transform staff to knowledge workers over time. Single case studies 
provide rich, contextual insights into the dynamics of phenomena (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; 
Walsham, 1995; Stake, 2005). 
The combination of multiple analysis techniques provides the rigour required for eliciting 
data to strengthen and confirm the results. The reason for using a multi-methods research 
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strategy is to facilitate interrogation of the empirical situation from multiple perspectives. 
The multi-methods approach is considered appropriate for studying interactions between 
people, technology in social situations, and as a means of enhancing the research process 
(Esteves & Pastor, 2004). According to Jick (1979), there is a distinct practice in the 
literature on social science research methods that advocates the use of multiple methods. 
This form of research is frequently described as one of convergent empirical analysis 
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959) and convergent corroboration, or what has been called 
‘triangulation’ (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz & Sechrest, 1966). This interpretive multi-
methods approach is guided by hermeneutic principles that help the researcher construct ‘an 
understanding of the data developed from a constant re-interpretation of existing 
data/observations in the new light of unfolding events’ (Sawyer, 2000: 218). 
The fact that there might be limited discussion on multi-methods research for studying the 
roles of information technologies in organisations is due to the diverse skills required in 
presenting explanatory research (Van Maanen, 1995a; 1995b). Since “what we know is 
always shaped by how we came to know it” (Brewer and Hunter, 1989, p.66), the purpose 
for multi-methods research or data collection is to draw on the strengths of some to make up 
for the (often well-known) weaknesses of others (e.g., Campbell, Stanley & Gage, 1963; 
Miller, 2013: Miles & Huberman, 1994). This might be due to the publication format, in 
which journals limit the length and, thus, the explanatory approach, of multi-methods 
research (Yanow, 1995). This might also be due to the present expectations about the use of 
theory and the role of empirical data (Sutton and Staw, 1995). Regardless of the limitations 
given, the impending worth of multi-methods research is vital for these deliberations to 
continue.    
4.4 Data Analysis Procedure 
The data was collected over a period of three years from several sources, stakeholders of the 
project, the media and various documents. Table 6 below provides a summary of the 
qualitative data for this research.  
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For Empirical Study 1, the researcher collected the following documents: (1) the service 
agreement between the DOL and SIS (See Appendix 1) and (2) the PPP policy guidelines 
(Treasury, 2004). These documents were analysed using content analysis techniques, which 
will be discussed later.  
For Empirical Study 2, researcher conducted interviews with stakeholders and used minutes 
of meetings attended by senior stakeholders such as the Minister of ICT service delivery, 
Chief Information System’s officer (CIO), senior public managers of the PPP unit and some 
consultants.  
Empirical Study 3, the researcher downloaded several media reports from a number of 
different websites, namely Department of Labour news desk, Engineering news, Times live, 
IT-online, IT-Web, Creamer media, Business technology and Sheq Africa, all of which are 
influential in communicating failed public sector ICT initiatives and the cost to government.  
The corpus of empirical material consisted of 20 documents that were identified as follows: 
EO1-EO20 (see Appendix 3).   
Table 6: Data Summary, Source: The Researcher 
Study  Title Data Source 
Study 1 An agency theory interrogation into risk factors 
and risk management strategies; The PPP contract 
between the Department of Labour and Siemens 
Public Private Partnership contract, Service level 
agreements and the PPP Policy Guidelines 
 
Study 2 A qualitative enquiry of the perceptions of key 
informants on ICT service delivery using content 
analysis 
Interviews and minutes of meetings from various 
internal and external stakeholders that were part 
of the PPP contract initiation and management. 
Study 3 A Critical Discourse Analysis of Governance 
Issues Affecting Public Private Partnership 
Contracting for Information Systems 
Implementations: A South African Case Study  
Various media sources 
 
The following section provides a brief overview of the different methods of analysis that 
will be used for each of the three studies. 
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Content analysis 
Content analysis research is inspired by the search for methods to infer from symbolic data 
that would be too inflated, no longer conceivable, or too obtrusive by the use of other 
(research) techniques (Krippendorff, 1980:51) as cited by (Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007). 
Content analysis has been used successfully by several IS researchers. It is a method of 
manual and automated analysis of the semantic content of documents (Ngwenyama & 
Sullivan, 2007), e.g., authoritative documents, contracts, newspapers and transcripts of 
audio or video media, to make inferences, derive in-depth understanding, or to draw 
conclusions about the key challenges faced by PPP contract management and management 
competencies for ICT service delivery for information systems. 
 
It refers to the examination of texts in which researchers obtain the groupings from the text 
in an interpretive manner (Mingers, 2001). It allows researchers to make duplicate and valid 
extrapolations from texts (Krippendorff, 2004). This method assumes that reality can be 
interpreted in different ways (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). Therefore, the mindfulness of 
the researcher’s role and of multiple meanings of text is fundamental in content analysis. 
Content analysis has been very prevalent in analysing documents, historical records, 
literature etc. and has a rich history in the field of political science, social psychology, 
journalism, communication research etc. (Kassarjian, 1977).  It has the capacity to produce 
valuable understandings of human experiences within a specific context by allowing deep 
analysis (Castro, Kellison, Boyd & Kopak, 2010). It allows researchers to assess 
communications in an unassuming manner (Kolbe & Burnett, 1991) and can be used as a 
companion method in a multi- methods research (Kolbe & Burnett, 1991). Critiques have 
pointed out that qualitative approach is weaker since it often depends on a smaller sample. 
Other critiques argue that qualitative approach does not offer generalisability, reliability and 
validity of results compared to those of quantitative approaches (Castro et al., 2010). In 
response, Denzin and Lincoln (1994) state that those criteria are not always relevant for 
qualitative research, while other researchers (Kaplan & Maxwell, 2005) argue that 
collecting rich data can ensure reliability and validity of qualitative research, triangulating 
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multiple sources of data, attending to conflicting and negative cases, collecting feedback etc. 
It is important to note that achieving all the criteria may not be possible, given various 
purposes and perspectives of qualitative research. Nevertheless, the researcher must 
acknowledge her role as a research instrument and attempt to adhere to as many criteria as 
the research design and purpose permit.  
Qualitative content analysis has been classified in dissimilar methods. One classification 
identifies two methods – conceptual and relational. Conceptual analysis looks for presence, 
dominance and centrality of concepts in the text, whereas relational analysis accounts for 
co-occurrence of concepts along with the concept frequency in the body of the text 
(Indulska, Hovorka & Recker, 2011). Hsieh and Shannon (2005) identify three approaches – 
conventional, directed and summative. The conventional approach focuses on direct coding 
from texts; the directed approach uses concepts derived from relevant theories as a guide for 
preliminary coding; the summative approach employs comparison, frequency counting of 
concepts followed by interpretations (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Study 1 is a qualitative 
enquiry from an agency theory perspective analysing the PPP contract and policy 
documents, while Study 2 is an analysis of interviews and minutes of meetings. 
4.4.2 Critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
“Traditional approaches to discourse analysis use only qualitative techniques”; in this 
approach of CDA the intent is to use both critical hermeneutics analysis and content analysis 
techniques (Cukier, et al., 2009). Analysis will be conducted on a variety of media articles 
using Habermas’ (1984) four validity claims: comprehensibility, truth, sincerity and 
legitimacy (Cukier et al., 2009). According to Cukier et al (2009), the general procedure to 
operationalise CDA can be summarised in four steps. It is important to note that Steps 2 and 
3 are extremely repetitive and that the empirical evidence from these two steps can prompt 
further data collection. 
1. Step 1 involves defining the corpus of data to be analysed. The political context and 
relationship among participants are essential in CDA (Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997). As 
such, the researcher will have to identify documents necessary to explicate the 
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context as well as documents of immediate communicative exchange. Furthermore, 
the researcher must ensure that multiple data sources are used to ensure 
corroboration of the evidence. 
2. Step 2 involves content analysis and coding procedure. All the files for the study will 
be converted from Microsoft Word to PDF documents and will be imported into 
ATLAS/TI. Multiple data sources will be used to ensure corroboration of evidence. 
These data sources will be retrieved from the Internet by doing extensive searching 
on every article written about the DOL and SIS failure. The objective of the analysis 
will be to identify empirical observation pertaining to the validity claims and to 
determine the frequency of use of specific arguments. 
 The initial stage for the analysis will involve coding under different themes 
that were developed.  
 The second stage will be to go through each theme to ensure that the correct 
empirical observation is recorded and to re-group the observations under the 
correct theme if they were not.  
 Each theme will be used as a search term and all the documents will be 
perused, using one theme at a time, before moving on to the next theme. 
 On searching through the articles, each statement that relates to the theme will 
be encoded. 
3. Step 3 includes reading and interpreting the empirical observations. The texts will be 
read to unearth inferred or unequivocal validity claims. These claims will then be 
tested for empirical observations that negate the validity of claims in the text. 
4. Step 4 involves explaining the findings. The explanation of the findings will draw on 
the broader context of the textual analysis and explore the deep structures it reflects. 
In summary, this chapter on research methodology discusses the research principles and 
methods that will be followed and are particularised to each of the three studies. The 
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Table 7: Research Methodology Summary, Source: The Researcher 
Topic Method 
Philosophical paradigm Interpretive 
Research purpose Explanatory 
Data analysis Qualitative 
Methodology approach Multi-Methods research approach 
Theoretical framework Agency theory 
Data Sources Contract, policy guidelines, minutes of meetings, interviews and media articles 
Study 1 Content analysis 
Study 2 Content analysis 
Study 3 Critical discourse analysis 
 
4.5 Causal loop modelling 
Causal loop modelling will be used to integrate the empirical findings of the 3 studies and to 
illustrate the theoretical contribution of the Thesis in chapter 8. To illustrate the interlocking 
conditions and develop a more general explanation of the empirical observations the 
researcher will develop a causal loop modelling technique proposed by Senge (2006). The 
causal loop model is a useful tool for illustrating and theoretically elaborating the empirical 
findings. It will enable the researcher to capture and model influences of organisational 
conditions and responses of the organisational actors as they tried to mediate the challenges 
of the PPP project.   
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CHAPTER 5: Study 1:  An interrogation of the PPP institutional framework, PPP 
policy documents, PPP management prescriptions to develop risk identification and 
risk management strategies 
Abstract 
This study investigates risk factors and risk management strategies influencing the failure of 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) contracts for ICT service delivery in South Africa. The 
public sector has experienced major ICT service delivery failures. Government has been 
under media scrutiny for incompetent management practices and a waste of the citizens’ 
taxes. Using an agency theory framework and qualitative content analysis, the researcher 
interrogated the PPP policy and a government department contract from a risk perspective. 
Content analysis, was used to interrogate the PPP policy and contract documents, to build on 
a comprehensive risk framework that. The agency theory framework suggested that risk 
factors for ICT service delivery are widely acknowledged in literature however, these were 
not specified in the PPP contract for ICT service delivery. The analysis identified risks 
inherent in PPP contracting that should be addressed to manage ICT service delivery. The 
risk framework provided risk management strategies, which could provide important 
insights to improve future, PPP contracting relationships for ICT services. 







PHD THESIS                                                                         RENE ALBERTUS 58 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This paper uses an agency theory framework to interrogate risk factors and risk management 
strategies influencing the failure of the PPP contract for Information Communication and 
Technology (ICT) service delivery. The aim is to establish: 1) How the Government Policy 
defined risks in PPP contracting for ICT service delivery; and 2) What prescriptions were 
defined for managing risks in the PPP contract for ICT service delivery?  
The reasons the researcher investigated the contract was to develop an understanding of the 
factors that led to the failure and termination of the ICT service project after ten years. This 
PPP contract for ICT service delivery was the first of its kind in South Africa at a cost of R2 
billion to government (KZN PPP benchmarking study, 2005). In 2012, after ten years of 
little progress, a negotiated settlement was reached to terminate the contract due to the 
failure of the private partner to deliver on the contract requirements (Furter, 2012).  
While this was the first failure of its kind in South Africa, these types of PPP failures for IT 
services are well documented around the world (Flyvbjerg, Holm & Buhl, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 
Bruzelius & Rothengatter, 2003; Dwivedi et al., 2014; Dwivedi et al., 2015). Dwivedi, et al., 
(2014): mentioned that knowledge gain in the Management of Information Systems (MIS) 
domain has failed to impact successfully on policy and practice of IS implementation and 
has increased the risk of failure. These major IS failures prove that, regardless of years of 
gathering substantial knowledge within MIS (see, for example, Avison & Wilson 2002; 
Barker & Frolick 2003; Beynon-Davies 1995; Bussen & Myers 1997; Cerpa & Verner, 
2009; Dwivedi, et al., 2015; Fitzgerald & Russo, 2005; Heeks, 2002; Kappelman, 
McKeeman & Zhang, 2006; Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 1988; McMaster & Wastell, 2004; 
Nelson 2007; Sauer, 1993; Yeo, 2002), additional work is required to improve the conduct 
of ICT initiatives. Many IS failures have been reported by Nelson (2007) in both public and 
private sector which has had negative consequences in terms of financial losses and other 
risks (Bruque, Moyano & Eisenberg, 2008; Laumer & Eckhardt, 2012; Maier et al.2013). 
Examples of high-profile IS failures are:  
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1. The 10 year PPP ICT contract between the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) commenced 2004 with guaranteed annual savings of £35.2m but by April 
2006 savings reduced to £21.8m. “While reported performance against key 
service targets has been high, most of the early technology projects 
commissioned from Siemens experienced delays or cost overruns.” (HC Public 
Accounts Committee, 2007),  
2. The London Underground PPP failure was was estimated at GBP4.1billion 
(UKNAO, 2009), 
3. The spectacular failure of the UK Government abandoning the national ID card 
project (Dwivedi, Wastell & Henriksen, 2015).  
These examples are an indication that successful or failed PPP IS implementations are 
multifaceted and challenging, hence more attention should be given to PPP contracting for 
ICT service delivery.  
This study focuses on interrogating the PPP policy and the contract between the DOL and 
SIS to identify risk factors and risk mitigation strategies for ICT services in South Africa. It 
was the first ICT contract in South Africa and was the intended template for other ICT 
service projects to follow. The researcher focused on two important questions:  
1) What risks concerning principal agent relationships have been specified in the 
contract?  
2) What risks management strategies  were identified for mitigating these risks?  
The researcher investigation of the documents was conducted using content analysis and the 
principal agent theoretical framework. This analysis highlights the gap of risk mitigation 
strategies specified in the PPP contract for ICT service delivery and the actual practice of 
formulating contracts to address risks. 
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5.2 Theoretical Perspective 
In the context of PPP contracts for ICT service delivery, two principal issues, namely risk 
management and risk mitigation, should be accounted for. Risk management is a key 
adherent to the successful PPP contracts for ICT service to ensure exposure to threats and 
failure are managed by taking appropriate action (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002).  Risk mitigation 
strategies are crucial to contract management to avoid penalties and cost overruns during the 
ICT project implementation due to neglect and mismanagement (Akintoye, Beck & 
Hardcastle, 2003).  
Risks are embedded in the life cycle of the PPP policy for ICT service delivery, which 
encompasses the project scope, feasibility, procurement, contract management and 
execution. If the various risks associated with ICT projects are not managed correctly this 
could lead to the failure of the project (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius & Rothengatter, 2003). Sharing 
and allocation of risks has huge implications for ICT projects since it is capital intensive, 
therefore the transfer of skills and knowledge has a big role to play to ensure successful 
outcomes (HM Treasury, 2005). The question of risk arises because consequences are only 
partially a function of behaviours (Demski & Feltman, 1978). Government policy, politics, 
economic climate, competitors’ action, lack of management and other factors may intervene 
to cause variations in outcomes. These uncertainties do not only introduce inability to plan 
but also cause financial risk (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). The choice between a contract based 
solely on behaviour and one partially based on outcome depends on the trade-off between 
the cost-measuring behaviour and the cost of transferring risk to the private sector through a 
contract partially based on outcomes (Demski & Feltman, 1978; Shih, 2006).  It is relatively 
inexpensive to manage behaviour, and too expensive to place risk on the private sector, 
hence a contract based solely on behaviour will be most efficient, since behavior can be 
monitored and evaluated (Shih, 2006). 
 
In theory, there is a distinction between risk and uncertainty, in that risk is typically 
observed as an object that can be described in statistical terms, while uncertainty is regarded 
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as something that applies to circumstances in which probable outcomes and causal forces 
are not fully understood (Miller & Lessard, 2008). Risks and uncertainties could be used 
interchangeably, not only because of the vague understanding of causes, outcomes and 
driving forces of uncertainties that would lead to risks, but because risk is multidimensional 
and the unbundling of risk is necessary for clear understanding of causal forces and 
outcomes (Miller & Lessard, 2008). What remains are how to allocate risk between partners 
in a PPP contract for ICT service delivery and how these risks can be mitigated.  
It has been suggested that barriers to successful implementations of ICT service contracts 
are not the content of the contract but, rather, management capability to manage the service 
provider (Hill & Hellriegel, 1994). PPPs create a new form of accountability between the 
public and private sector that resides primarily on trust. Where mistrust and hostility seep in, 
the actual procedure of the partnership may be difficult to achieve (Bennett & Iossa, 2004). 
Specific points should be considered, along with challenges and drawbacks associated with 
collaboration in partnerships, e.g.: 
 Loss of control – the hopelessness to take action if contractual arrangements are not 
going according to the contract expectation during the life of the ICT contract;   
 Multiple goals – stakeholders would potentially have their own goals which may not 
be related to the stated purpose of the partnership;  
 Tension between autonomy and accountability – the service provided not being 
managed and held accountable during the different stages of the ICT service delivery 
process;  
 Penalties on non-performance not being imposed. 
5.2.1 Risk management  
A risk can be defined as any event, cause or threat, whether human or abstract, that hampers 
the successful completion of a project according to the stipulated deadline, and/or adherence 
to quality and budgets that are provided for the scope of the project (HM Treasury, 2012). 
The effectiveness of risk management has a direct financial impact on the successful 
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delivery of ICT service as it will result in effective management of project cost and provide 
improved value for money (European Commission, 2003). Risk allocation should occur at 
the contract negotiation stage and risk identification transpires well before the private sector 
consultant or consortium and the public sector have signed any contract. The public sector 
can prevent many risks if they conduct the due diligence, thorough feasibility studies, 
preliminary risk analysis and market assessments (Berger, 2006).  These interventions could 
estimate the risks the public sector could possibly incur and what should become the 
responsibility of the private sector (Berger, 2006).  
It has been suggested by Delmon (2000) that the effect of risks when implementing ICT 
projects is normally significant, since the private sector has the perception that the public 
sector lacks the skill and knowledge to effectively monitor these projects. The risk arises 
from many sources such as the contract, policies governing the contract, politics and 
credibility, which impact on public sector growth and which creates uncertainty in the 
project life cycle. According to Grimsey & Lewis (2002), much of the risk of PPP projects 
comes from the complexity of the arrangement itself in terms of documentation, financing, 
taxation, technical details and sub agreements involved in major infrastructure ventures, 
while the nature of the risk changes over the duration of the projects (Chan, Yeung, Calvin, 
Wang & Ke, 2010). 
5.3 Framework for empirical analyses of risks 
The agency theory framework (Table 4) identified five major risk categories:  
1. Lack of performance monitoring  
2. Inappropriate vendor selection  
3. Lack of competent management and skilled IS resources 
4. Moral hazard 
5. Lack of strategic planning.  
Ngwenyama and Sullivan (2005) state that current research on IS outsourcing risks factors 
falls into two broad categories: 1) prescriptions for appreciating and managing risk factors 
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(Earl, 1996; Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995), and 2) Approaches to measuring and analysing 
risks and constructing specific management instruments (such as government policies and 
contracts) to address risks (Aubert, Dussault, Patry & Rivard, 1999; Bryson & Ngwenyama, 
2000).  
Policy guidelines are not specific on what could impede successful ICT/IS service delivery, 
which create a need to focus on definitive actions and outcomes for ICT/IS services delivery 
(Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007).  A contract represents a definite deal in an actual situation 
and may be different from the policies from which they were created (Ngwenyama & 
Sullivan, 2007). The research on transaction costs specifies charging for cost drivers such 
as: search and information costs; bargaining costs; and policing and enforcement costs 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1979 as cited by Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 
2007).  
While contracts for ICT service frequently do not address the issues related to search costs, 
they can address monitoring and management costs. All stakeholders involved in the 
contract must agree to the terms and conditions as well as the rights it affords and the 
obligations it enforces (Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007). This is dissimilar from the 
independent perspective of policy guidelines. “The contract assigns and balances the actual 
costs of the transaction between the parties. While policy guidelines are easy to promulgate, 
contracts require the agreement of other parties in an arms-length transaction. Therefore, 
what is circulated and what is agreed upon are often very different concepts (Ngwenyama & 
Sullivan”, 2007:617). Table 8 below is and expansion of Table 4 that includes risk 
mitigation strategies for managing ICT/IS service delivery contracts which have been 
suggested by researchers who take the agency theory perspective (Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 
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Table 8: Risk factors and risk mitigation strategies, Source: adopted from Sullivan and Ngwenyama 
(2005) 




1. Inability to completely specify 
project scope and service level 
requirements 
2. Inability to specify performance 
metrics 
3. Lack of incentive and penalty 
mechanisms for inducing vendor 
performance  
1. Service level agreements must be relevant, 
specific and clearly define how it will be 
measured. 
2. Specify out-come base performance metrics 
rather than work-based metrics. 





1. Lack of experience with IS 
implementation and technology 
2. Expertise in another field of IS. 
3. Vendor inaccurately claiming to be a 
market leader and reputable service 
provider 
1. Hire an experienced outsourcing professional to 
assist with managing the contract. 
2. Engage independent monitoring professionals 
with the skill to manage and identify risks 
early. 
3. Ensure all cost is specified regarding 








1. Lack of expertise for managing 
principle agent relationships 
2. Lack of expertise for managing 
collaborative work processes 
3. Lack of management systems for 
information sharing 
1. Appoint an in-house business analyst to ensure 
project meetings and allocation of 
responsibility includes everyone. 
2. Hire independent consultants to verify and 
validate functions on the contract. 
3. Perform comprehensive background review of 
vendors and their personnel; check references.  
Moral hazard 1. Information asymmetry and non-
disclosures resulting in inappropriate 
vendor selection 
2. Opportunistic bargaining on the part 
of the vendor. 
3. High cost for changing consultants 
(the agent replacing the principal). 
 
1. Choose one of the options to control moral 
hazard in terms of the contract, behavior-based 
or outcomes-based.  
2. Hire independent professional IS project 
manager to manage contract and vendor 
progress. 
3. Ensure internal audit and external audit reviews 




1. Lack of appropriate opt-out 
arrangements and penalties in case 
of vendor non-performance. 
2. Lack of flexibility to amend the 
project plan without incurring 
additional costs. 
3. Lack of long term human resource 
capability development planning. 
1. Implement trade-off between cost-measuring 
behaviour and cost of transferring risk to the 
agent.  
2. Hire an independent project manager to focus 
specifically on monitoring objects not met. 
3. Train in-house business analyst to advice 
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5.4 Research methodology 
The research method for uncovering the assumptions in the empirical materials is deductive 
content analysis (Klein & Truex, 1995).  The empirical materials used in this study consist 
of the PPP contract, which has a service level agreement of 51 pages and 15 annexures (see 
Appendix 1) as well as the PPP policy guidelines prescribed by the South African Treasury 
Regulations (Treasury, 2004). 
Content analysis is a method of manual or automated analysis of the semantic content of 
documents, (e.g., newspapers, contracts and transcripts of audio or video media), to make 
inferences, derive in-depth understanding, or to draw conclusions about the text (Weber, 
1990; Neuendorf, 2002; Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007:618). According to “Krippendorff, 
content analysis research is motivated by the search for techniques to infer from symbolic 
data what would be too costly, no longer possible, or too obtrusive by the use of other 
[research] techniques (Krippendorff, 1980:51). To conduct a content analysis on any text, 
the researcher creates a dictionary of search terms consisting of clusters of words or phrases 
that form mutually exclusive categories for analysing documents and coding the text 
(Weber, 1990:37). Computer supported content analysis is a particularly influential 
technique because of its potential to systematically analyse large volumes of data that would 
overwhelm individuals. Software tools also provide consistency and reliability of the coding 
(Rosenburg, Schnurr & Oxman, 1990; Roberts & Popping, 1993)” as cited by Ngwenyama 
& Sullivan, 2007:618).  
The researcher used ATLAS/ TI an automated tool to conduct the content analysis of the 
policy and contract for two key reasons as per Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007). 
Firstly, an automated tool enhances the management of data, and the relationship to the 
analytical framework, with no manual intervention. The researcher used the key words for 
the framework in agency theory. The risk framework consisted of 15 individual risks and 15 
separate management strategies. Secondly, content analysis facilitated the process of 
achieving a more thorough analysis of the documents by allowing the researcher to draw 
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comparisons, if the contract implemented similar management strategies as suggested by the 
framework. One of the objectives of the researchers’ analysis was to gather information 
about risk factors and risk management strategies embedded in the contracts. 
The contract was a Microsoft Word document, which could be saved as a PDF or left in 
Microsoft Word. 
The content analysis of the documents followed a three-stage procedure that was defined by 
(Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007). 
1) Definition of search terms for identifying themes within the documents 
2) Comprehensive searching of the documents for specific observations of themes 
related to IS outsourcing risks and effective mitigation 
3) Developing a theoretical explanation of the empirical observation and formulating 
propositions to be tested. 
The starting point for assembling the search terms for content analysis was the risk 
framework presented in Table 4 (Stage 1). From the risk framework the researcher 
developed an initial set of search terms to start the analysis. Searching, reading and 
interpreting were an iterative process. 
The Stage 2 activities are as follows: 
1) The documents were loaded without modification into ATLAS/TI. 
2) The researcher searched the documents for keywords . 
3) The researcher coded word grouping, because it was a single contract, the risk type 
was consistent and easily identified. 
4) The coded sentences were then read to determine how well they reflected the risk 
factors involved.  
5) Once coding was completed and text extracts were arranged, it was possible to 
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To support content analysis, ATLAS/TI was used to simplify the data analysis. Using a five-
step scale, as designed by Ngwenyama & Sullivan (2007); the researcher rated each risk 
category in the contract against each risk category of the framework as: 
 ‘Supported’ indicated some support of the risk management strategies. 
 ‘Fully supported’ indicated that all the risk management strategies were completely 
presented.  
 ‘Not supported’ indicated that the risk management strategies for that category were 
specified in the contract but not supported. 
 ‘Partially supported’, Alternatively, if less than half of the risk management 
strategies for a particular category were specified in the contract. 
 ‘Adequately supported’ was assigned if more than half of the risk management 
strategies were thoroughly specified.  
5.5 Contract background  
The PPP contract between the DOL and SIS was the first of its kind involving the South 
African government and therefore represented a significant milestone in terms of the way in 
which ICT was managed within the public sector.  In December 2002 the DOL engaged in a 
ten-year contract with SIS for the provision of all ICT services. Unlike traditional 
outsourcing relationships, the PPP contract demonstrated a desire on the part of government 
to develop strategic alliances with private sector partners and to utilise these alliances in 
order to internalise necessary ICT infrastructure and expertise. The significance of the 
arrangement meant that the DOL exerted great effort in procuring a service provider who 
would best meet the needs of the Department and would assist in bringing innovation to the 
Department’s general strategies and business direction. At the time of contracting, the 
Department acknowledged that engagement in such a contract involved a large investment 
in ICT as well as reliance on external information management expertise (particularly as the 
Department transferred all internal ICT capacity with a view to achieving skills transfer in 
the long term). It was agreed, however, that such up-front investment of private finance 
would provide numerous long-term benefits to the Department.  
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At the time of contracting, the Department’s vision was to strive for a labour market which 
would be favourable to economic growth, investment and employment creation and which 
would be characterised by rising skills, equity, sound labour relations, respect for 
employment standards and worker rights. However, the Department identified a number of 
key challenges within the ICT Department that represented obstacles to the achievement of 
this vision. A list of the main challenges leading to the PPP is as follows:  
1. High turnover of public sector ICT staff;  
2. Requirement for integration of labour market services and systems;  
3. Automation of services towards e-government initiatives;  
4. Attaining ICT objectives against budgetary constraints;  
5. Need to partner with a private sector for improving ICT capability; 
6. Leveraging of expertise and specialist knowledge, and exploiting international 
standards and best practice.  
The objectives and requirements that defined the PPP contract were intended to address 
these critical challenges, whilst also acting as a means of measuring performance during and 
at the conclusion of the contract. 
5.6 Empirical findings 
The following section of the paper focuses on descriptions of risks and risk management 
strategies that have or have not been specified in the PPP policy or contract.  
A detailed discussion will follow of each risk specification and risk management strategy, in 
each of the subsequent sections of the paper. The empirical analysis yielded the following 
empirical observations concerning description of risks factors (see Table 9) and risk 
mitigation strategies (see Table 10). 
 
None of the principal-agent risks articulated in agency theory were specified in the PPP 
policy or the contract. The PPP policy did specify 18 risk categories concerning financial 
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Table 9: Empirical observations concerning PPP policy and PPP contract specifications, Source adopted 
from: Sullivan and Ngwenyama (2005) 




1. Inability to completely specify project scope and service 
level requirements 
2. Inability to specify performance metrics 
3. Lack of incentive and penalty mechanisms for inducing 









1. Lack of experience with IS implementation and 
technology 
2. Expertise in another field of IS 
3. Vendor inaccurately claiming to be a market leader and 










1. Lack of expertise for managing principal agent 
relationships 
2. Lack of expertise for managing collaborative work 
processes 







Moral hazard 1. Information asymmetry and non-disclosures resulting in 
inappropriate vendor selection 
2. Opportunistic bargaining on the part of the vendor 
3. High cost for changing consultants (principal to replace 







Lack of strategic 
planning 
1. Lack of appropriate opt-out arrangements and penalties 
in case of vendor non-performance 
2. Lack of flexibility to amend the project plan without 
incurring additional costs 









Lack of performance monitoring: Measuring a consultant’s performance is complex, based 
on the many challenges that can be encountered. Performance monitoring affects all aspects 
of contractual engagements and is often a determinant of the successful outcome of a PPP 
contract. Challenges with managing the private sector performance stem from the inability 
to completely specify the scope of work, and failure to apply penalties based on 
performance as the timelines allowed. The CIO of the DOL (See Appendix 3; DOC=01) 
mentioned that PPP contract was written to favour the private sector but allowed for early 
termination see clause 20.1 (Refer to Appendix 1). Therefore if management structures had 
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The contract stipulated that in the event that the Department on reasonable grounds believes 
that the Contractor is not meeting its performance management obligations in terms of this 
Agreement, the Parties agree that an independent third party auditor of the Department’s 
choice, consented to by the Contractor, and which consent shall not unreasonably be 
withheld, will be provided reasonable opportunity and access to audit the Contractor’s 
quality management system and its use in the provision of the Services on the Department’s 
behalf. This right shall include the right to examine or inspect works or activities on- or off-
site (Refer to Appendix 1, Annexure 1 -Department's Business Objectives). 
Inappropriate vendor selection: In practice, the DOL would seem to have managed this 
evaluation area comprehensively and effectively. Unfortunately the supplier that was 
selected, Siemens, was selected as the preferred candidate based on additional superior 
criteria, namely its more commercial exposure as opposed to technical orientation. The fact 
that the agent can mislead the public sector with regard to their professional skills allows the 
agent to act in an iniquitous manner after the contract is signed. The agent is normally a 
huge private consortium and the public sector is led to believe that they possess hidden 
knowledge, which makes the public sector question their own capability and therefore fail to 
impose penalties when they should. The challenges that are created for the public sector, if 
they do not impose penalties from the beginning, give the private sector confirmation that 
they are dealing with a weak partner. This allows the private sector to renege on certain 
aspects of the contract such as having fewer resources to do the work, which will lead to 
under- performance and overbilling. This has led to many questions why EOH Holdings 
Limited is a South African based ICT service group who was not part of the tendering 
process but ended up performing work on behalf of Siemens. What later emerged was that 
EOH had taken over Siemens. This type of manipulation undermines competitive 
bidding/tendering; more attention should be given to the selection and criteria to avoid the 
private sector’s commercial exposure to be the influencing factor to secure projects. A real 
danger that exists in selecting an agent is to allow the competitive tendering to become a 
routine process rather than a motivational platform for enhancing the evaluation. 
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Lack of competent management and skilled IS resources: The DOL transferred all their 
staff to Siemens; Clause 6 and Annexure 11 of the service agreement made provision for 
this transfer (See Appendix 1). This, however, put them in a position of weakness, giving 
Siemens full control of the staff, which, the researcher later observed, was detrimental to the 
project governance due to attrition. The DOL staff had little commercial and market 
expertise and, as staff turnover occurred, continuity in capability was lost and expertise was 
eroded in the DOL from the time SIS/ EOH had replaced the staff with their own 
consultants. This is a high risk factor since core in-house capability is eroded when agents 
take control and responsibility of a project. Siemens tried to rationalise this as part of 
strategic relationships, but this eroded the DOL skills, hence at the end of the contract there 
were no IS professionals that could maintain the project. 
Moral hazard: This is a strategic behaviour that refers to the endogenous variables of the 
private sector, which cannot be observed by the public sector. The lack of skilled 
management is what allows the private sector to reduce their input level. This may influence 
project cost and quality, leading to moral hazard. Moral hazard in renegotiations of PPP 
projects has not only led to the loss of social surplus, but also minimised the expected 
benefits and outcomes of the intended contract for both parties in the long run. Government 
regulations, lack of public supervision and incentive mechanisms were factors influencing 
the private sector’s strategic engagement with the public sector, to take an opportunistic 
bargaining view instead of a cooperative strategy when entering into a contract. There are 
two kinds of opportunism that affect aspects of a contractual relationship, namely ‘adverse 
selection’ and ‘moral hazard.’ The persistent problem of information asymmetry that 
occurred is based on the fact that the private sector had more information about the object of 
exchange, (e.g., the product or the service). The effects of structural incompleteness should 
be assessed to find potential adjustment mechanisms, in one way by an adequate system of 
incentives and in another by a system of control aimed at forging efficient and trusting 
relationships. This is as a direct result of the challenges with skills retention strategies for IS 
in the public sector; competent management to ensure the PPP contract is legally sound; and 
that the contractual terms can be enforced during the life cycle of the contract.  
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Lack of strategic planning: The public sector cannot anticipate every circumstance or 
conflict of interest that a PPP contract can present; hence providing guidelines to clarify the 
goals and values could be the first line of defense against preventable risk in the future. 
Strategy risks are quite different from preventable risks because they are not fundamentally 
adverse. A strategy, which thrives on high returns generally, requires organisations to take 
on substantial risks, and managing those risks is an important factor in capturing the 
potential benefits. Strategy risks cannot be managed through a rules-based control model; 
instead a risk-management system is required to decrease the likelihood that the assumed 
risks actually materialise. Systems like these should not stop the private sector from 
undertaking risk adverse opportunities; to the contrary, it would enable them to take on 
higher-risk, higher-reward ventures than competitors with less effective risk management 
could. Some risks arise from events outside the public and private sector control and are 
beyond their influence or control. Sources of these risks include natural and political 
disasters and major macro-economic shifts. The public sector should adapt their risk-
management processes to these different categories. While a compliance-based approach is 
effective for managing preventable risks, it is inadequate for strategy risks or external risks, 
which require a fundamentally different approach, based on open and explicit risk 
discussions. That, however, is easier said than done; extensive behavioural and 
organisational research has shown that individuals have strong cognitive biases that 
discourage them from thinking about and discussing risk until it is too late. To be sure, the 
public sector should have a level of tolerance for defects or errors that would not cause 
major damage to the IS platform. In general, the public sector should seek to eliminate these 
risks since they get no strategic benefits from taking such risk upon themselves to manage. 
These risk factors are best managed through active prevention: monitoring operational 
processes and guiding people’s behaviours and decisions toward desired standards. To 
facilitate the discussion, each risk management strategy has been allocated (in Table 10) 
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Table 10: Empirical observations of Risk Management Strategies, Source: adopted from Sullivan and 
Ngwenyama (2005) 
Risk category Suggested risk management strategy Empirical observations 
Lack of performance 
monitoring 
1. Service level agreements must be relevant, specific and 
clearly defined as to how it will be measured. 
2. Specify outcome-based performance metrics rather than 
work-based metrics. 







1. Hire an independent IT professional to assist with 
managing the contract. 
2. Engage independent monitoring professionals with the 
skill to manage and identify risks early. 
3. Ensure all cost is specified regarding transitioning 











1. Appoint an in-house business analyst to ensure project 
meetings and allocation of responsibility includes 
everyone. 
2. Hire independent consultants to verify and validate 
functions on the contract. 
3. Perform comprehensive background review of vendors 








Moral hazard 1. Choose one of the options to control moral hazard in 
terms of the contract, behavior-based or outcomes-
based.  
2. Hire an independent professional IS project manager to 
manage the contract and vendor progress. 
3. Ensure internal audit and external audit reviews 







Lack of strategic 
planning 
1. Implement trade-off between cost-measuring behaviour 
and cost of transferring risk to the agent.  
2. Hire an independent project manager to focus 
specifically on monitoring objects not met. 
3. Train an in-house business analyst to advice 
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Lack of performance monitoring: The role of monitoring the contract is similar to the role 
performed by external auditors, though the former activity might involve a little less 
discretion. The main difficulties of monitoring are related to managing service quality, 
resolving contractual disputes and stakeholder complaints, performance incentives, 
participating in potential renegotiation, addressing early termination of contracts, overseeing 
transfer of assets, and specifying terms for the renewal of the PPP contract. The PPP 
contract should specify resources to carry out the PPP monitoring and be specific on how 
the monitoring will be performed, including: 1) all reporting procedures, 2) the amount and 
circumstances under which penalties can be applied, 3) procedures in the event of 
renegotiation, and 4) quality of service supervision and, particularly, the handling of 
complaints. The public discussion of PPP contract performance can be an effective tool for 
highlighting the private sector’s indiscretions so that performance results should be known 
publicly on a regular basis. Contract monitoring is often absent in the tendering documents, 
despite its significance to PPP contract success. 
 
Inappropriate vendor selection: This represents the biggest challenge. Based on the risk 
management strategies suggested, having an independent consultant to assist with the 
creation and management of the contract should enable the public sector to make the correct 
selection decisions. Ensuring independent audit verifications of the vendor to validate the 
experience and service delivery history is critical. The vendors’ background in terms of 
technical experience should be tested – a vendor should not be appointed on commercial 
experience or political affiliation, but on the correct criteria to deliver on the scope of work 
that is required. This includes signing a contract that is not open-ended and sketchy and 
ensuring that feasibility studies provided by the private sector are verified, leaving no room 
for cost increments that have not been part of the contractual agreement. In the DOL case, 
this risk area was not mitigated by a comprehensive evaluation of ‘partnership capability’ 
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Lack of competent management and skilled Information systems resources: The four 
faces of the IT function 1) governance, 2) interrogation and delivery of IS requirements, 3) 
maintaining the technical domain and 4) managing private consultants should be 
implemented to try to mitigate risks related to competence and skilled management, staff 
authority, delivery of IS requirements, maintaining the technical environment and managing 
external stakeholders with their basic skills. These are leadership and governance; 
relationship building and business systems thinking (business ‘face’); technical architecture 
and making technology work (technical ‘face’); and governance, contract facilitation, 
contract monitoring and vendor development. The DOL failed in the retention of skills since 
they transferred all their staff to SIS as part of the contract. This was a strategic decision in 
the hope that the IT resources would be up skilled under the guidance and leadership of SIS 
and acquire the expertise to manage the new IS platform after the implementation. Important 
risk-mitigating features would have been retention of in-house project management skills, 
and of control over the project by a business analyst dedicated to monitoring the project and 
Siemens output, instead of allowing Siemens to manage the process.  
Moral Hazard: At the time the public sector (principal) had appointed the private sector 
(agent), the task should have been performed to the required standards of the public sector. 
Post-contractual agency challenges of moral hazard may arise in situations where the public 
sector does not have the expertise to directly observe the private sectors actions. This is 
what allows the self-interested agents to pursue their own goals at the expense of the 
principal. The hiring of internal and external auditors, as well as an independent project 
manager, is critical to monitor opportunistic habits of the agent and to ensure this does not 
hamper the success of the project. The difficulty the principal encounters to monitor the 
agent is what results in moral hazard and opportunistic bargaining, allowing the agent to 
produce poor quality outcomes.  The DOL should never have allowed self-interest to creep 
in and that could have been prevented if the agent was monitored closely. The DOL has two 
basic options in seeking to control moral hazard; the first option which is behaviour based 
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which will allow them to monitor the agent behaviour and secondly reward or penalise the 
agent for not behaving in line with ethical and moral standards of delivering results aligned 
with the contract standards. The basic idea is to decrease information asymmetry between 
the agent and the principal. Monitoring behaviour is likely to inform the principal about the 
agent’s behaviour and could curb agent opportunism since the agent would realise that the 
principal cannot so easily be deceived. Behaviour-based monitoring could be a costly 
exercise or too tedious for it to add value and hence ‘outcome-based’ could be a logic 
choice. ’Outcome-based’ compensates the agent based on certain achievements and 
milestones. Outcome-based contracts are considered the more effective monitoring method 
in curbing the agent’s opportunism. This type of contract has the likelihood to reduce goal 
conflict, and is a motivator for the agent to pursue outcomes that are incentive-compatible 
with the principal’s goals.  
Lack of Strategic Planning: In light of the findings from this review, it was concluded that 
it was absolutely vital to ensure that an ICT strategy was put in place in order to transform 
the way in which ICT/IS services were provided in going forward. The ICT/IS strategy 
would need to address the following requirements: The DOL Departments requires a 
strategic ICT partner to enable current and future service delivery. ICT /IS must be able to 
define and implement a long-term architectural roadmap aligned to business requirements. 
Projects must be delivered in a predictable and reliable way (on time and budget). ICT must 
provide a stable and cost-effective infrastructure and network environment. Secondly, 
competent management is to channel communication and proficient IT resources will go a 
long way in meeting the DOL’s business requirement. As the Department’s PPP contract 
with SIS involved elements of Design, Build Finance, Operate and Transfer (DBFOT), it is 
evident that a high degree of risk was involved. This shared risk and benefit model requires 
careful management that starts from understanding the purpose of PPP models and the 
benefits that might be derived.  The empirical findings suggest a need to elaborate on the 
risk factors and risk mitigation strategies 
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5.7 Theoretical implications of the empirical observations 
The empirical analysis has revealed that the DOL followed the PPP project cycle that was 
mandated by the legislative framework and signed off by the treasury for successful PPP 
contracting. Bear in mind this was a project for ICT/IS service delivery and should not have 
had a basic PPP contract but one that would cater for ICT/IS services. It appears that the 
formalities and management of the PPP contract was clearly understood by the principal 
(DOL) and the agent (SIS) but the facts of ICT/IS was overlooked. Evidence of the outcome 
of the contract suggests that it lacked the focus of an ICT/ IS project and has been dubbed an 
epic failure by the media after interviews with a number of project sponsors. The fact that 
neither the PPP policy nor the contract had specified any of the risks or risk mitigation 
strategies suggested by agency theory indicates that it would be unlikely to manage the 
outcome of the PPP contract for ICT/IS services successfully. The details of the empirical 
observations on the agency theory framework outlined (Refer to Table 4) suggested the 
following propositions relating to risks and risk mitigation.  
P1: When risks are not specified in the PPP policy or the PPP contract, the 
principal will have challenges monitoring the agent’s performance; the agent will be 
inclined to shirk on contractual deliverables. 
 
The PPP contract for ICT/IS with Siemens failed to achieve key objectives such as 
improving the DOL’s “IT capability, leverage expertise and special knowledge, and 
exploiting international standards and best practice.” It also failed to “integrate labour 
market services and systems to offer better services” and to “achieve maximum IT benefits 
and objectives against budgetary constraints” (Furter, 2012). This posed a huge risk to the 
success of the PPP contract, risks that were not specified or considered when the contract 
was drawn up. 
Systematic risk management has proven that risks can be detected early and provides 
encouragement for PPP stakeholders to identify, analyse, quantify and respond to risks in 
the early stages of a project, as well as allow them to take measures to introduce risk 
mitigation strategies (Akbiyikli & Eaton, 2004). Risk allocation should be managed in the 
most cost-effective manner, especially when related to implementation and service delivery 
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– it has been recognised that the private sector is reluctant to absorb certain risk from the 
public sector such as inflation rate, exchange rate, interest rate fluctuations and delays in 
project approvals (Roumboutsos & Anagnostopoulos, 2008).  Therefore, based on the PPP 
manual (Teasury, 2004), PPP contracts follow a rigorous methodology set out by the PPP 
Regulatory unit to ensure successful outcome of the contract. Public Private Partnership 
contracting in South African PPP unit has adopted a PPP methodology that was informed by 
the United Kingdom’s Private Finance initiative (PFI) and has to comply with following the 
Legislative and Regulatory framework as well as all phases of Treasury approval (Treasury, 
2004).   
It has become clear that a PPP contract that complies with the legislative framework and has 
gone through extensive treasury approval as indicated in the literature, does not necessarily 
constitute a successful contract. A PPP contract without the risks specified by agency theory 
is vague and open to interpretation (Sharma, 1997; Dewatripont & Legros, 2005). PPP 
contracts require extensive monitoring and management and, if monitoring is absent, the 
chance of failure becomes greater. This has become clear from the empirical evidence.  
The CIO of the Department of Labour state that “the contract was favourable to Siemens, 
and that Siemens was not the right service provider. This was a global company that 
specialised in providing machines and boxes, and not systems development, the contract 
was for a long period, ten years being too long in the IT sphere, being such a dynamic and 
changing environment”. Although the contract made provision for some reviewing, it was 
generally skewed (Godi, 2013). The argument is that such contract should co-align the 
preferences of agents with those of the principal because the rewards for both depend on the 
same actions and, therefore, the conflicts of self-interest between principal and agent could 
be reduced. The proposition put forth is: 
P2: If an inappropriate vendor is selected that lack capabilities to adequately 
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The proposition derived from the empirical analysis is corroborated in the content of the 
literature. Several researchers have shown that poor vendor selection practice, 
misperceptions of vendor capabilities, together with exaggerated expectations as a result of 
vendor promises have been the source of lack of success in IS contracts (Lacity & 
Hirschheim, 1993; Michell & Fitzgerald, 1997). A contract written with the assumption that 
a principal believes the agent possesses the requisite skills and experience to fulfil the 
contract requirements, without verification, is another pitfall (Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 
2007). Trusting an agent based on reputation is disastrous and the contract is not an 
appropriate for addressing risks; these issues are usually resolved in the proposal phase  
(Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007).  
According to Marques and Berg (2011), as ex-post opportunism and renegotiations 
represent major failures of PPP contracts, the public sector should try to avoid this 
contingency by ensuring the following procedure is accomplished:  
1. allocating risks to appropriate parties,  
2. guaranteeing the economic and financial equilibrium only for the contingent risks 
borne by the public sector;  
3. assigning payment based on outputs and performance;  
4. assuring that the winning tender is fulfilled when the contract is signed;  
5. constraining the possibility of bargaining after the public tender and contract 
signature,  
6. clarifying the terms of contract termination.  
Enforcing penalties in line with the contract arrangement could prevent underperformance, 
since the private sector will be more cautious if the contractual obligations are enforced as 
the contract unfolds. Contract deliverables should not be left to chance or discussions late, 
they should be addressed immediately – therefore the requirement for management with 
appropriate skills to manage conflict and have in-depth knowledge regarding the 
deliverables of the contract. Management inefficiencies will almost invariably challenge the 
successful project outcomes. Agency theory is concerned with resolving two 
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problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the agency problem that 
arises when; the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict, and it is difficult 
or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing.  
The problem this represents is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has 
behaved appropriately. This leads to the question of risk sharing. When the 
principal and the agent have different attitudes toward risk, they might prefer 
different actions because of the different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
proposition suggested is: 
P3: When there is a lack of capacity planning and resource expertise, there will be 
challenges with skills transfer and knowledge management. 
The empirical analysis revealed that the DOL entered into the contract with SIS and the 
requirements from the PPP contract were clustered into five key areas of delivery: initial 
services; improvement services; operational services; additional services; and exit and 
transfer services and skilled IS resources; as discussed in the case. It became evident after 
the ten-year period of the contract that SIS had reneged on some of the deliverables of these 
services. The biggest let-down of the PPP contract was the transfer of services and skilled IS 
resources. SIS had eroded all the DOL IS staff by excluding them during the 
implementation process; this was part of what resulted in high attrition of the DOL 
resources. The required guidelines set out in the PPP contract were to ensure that SIS 
offered services based on expertise; parting with the expertise would mean that their 
services were not required anymore and that could put them out of business or back in the 
market earning a minimum wage instead of extra ordinary consulting fees. Hence agents 
will not provide skills and knowledge transfer in good faith the will hold back on sharing 
information. 
The subject of skills retention for IS implementations through contracting with the private 
sector has received little attention (Lacity & Willcocks, 2000) A common approach, 
particularly noticeable in the UK public sector, has been to retain a limited number of staff 
in a ‘residual’ function, carrying out IT governance contractual monitoring and 
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responsibilities relating to liaising with consultants (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994). More 
recently, other research has pointed to more in-depth capabilities and skills challenges for 
complex ERP implementation where private consultants are used on a substantial basis 
((Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994; Rockart, Earl & Ross, 1996). Research by Feeny & 
Willcocks, (1998) states that the need to mitigate risks should be staffing the four faces of 
the IT function 1) governance, 2) interrogation and delivery of IS requirements, 3) 
maintaining the technical domain and 4) managing private consultants with nine capabilities 
and their underlying skills. These skills are leadership and governance challenges; 
relationship building and business systems thinking; technical architecture and making 
technology operational; and informed contract facilitation, contract monitoring and 
consultant scrutiny. According to Greiling (2009), consultants are essentially motivated by 
self-interest based on rationality, but the main focus is how the agent can be forced to act in 
accordance with the principal which can considerably reduce the risk of the agent 
underperforming. The proposition suggested is as follow: 
P4: When an agent is not held accountable, moral hazard will pose a risk to the 
objectives of the contract. 
Moral hazard is one of the major risks experienced with PPP contracting for ICT/IS service 
delivery. Moral hazard leads to opportunistic behaviour by the consultants and is defined as 
“self-interest seeking with guile” leading to shirking, lying or other moral hazards. 
(Ngwenyama & Bryson, 1999). Moral hazard leads to making unrealistic or false 
representations about their capabilities in the proposal phases of the process, and then 
shirking under the terms of the contract once the contract is delivered. Moral hazard can 
have an impact on the contract at any time during the implementation phase or any other 
phase. The DOL include a termination clause 19 in the original contract document which 
specifies that (the consultant) will cooperate with the government to assist with the logical 
transfer of the services, functions and processes provided. The support specified in this 
section includes software and service migration, as well as turning over all relevant 
documentation, and dealing with questions from service providers or the public sector. 
Inclusion of penalties and incentives in the contract is important to align the interests of 
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consultants with that of the principal (Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007). The PPP contract 
between the DOL and SIS included penalties; but did not include incentives for improved 
performance or performance that consistently exceeded the specified service levels. It is 
therefore imperative to include in the contract as part of the penalty clause the importance of 
managing the behavioural, ethical, trust and mediation issues, to ensure that moral hazard 
can be addressed before it eradicates value. Abstract risks such as opportunism are difficult 
to articulate in a contract due to the nature of the risk. 
P5: When public sector managers do not have a strategic plan in place, there will be 
challenges with reviewing and managing ICT/IS implementation as they develop. 
The propositions above took into account that the lack of planning even basic planning and 
monitoring will impact the success of any contractual arrangement. The continuous review 
of the strategic plan will allow the project plan to be amended, adapted and adjusted in ways 
that would be acceptable to the ICT/IS implementation and the partnerships allow for early 
conflict resolution. Strategic planning is a methodology intended to produce results (Hill & 
Lynn, 2009; Mulgan, 2009) it goes hand in hand with creating wise judgment and can 
enhance public value. It is fundamental to project implementations, contract management, 
performance management and challenges developing skills. Strategic planning is about 
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5.8 Conclusion  
This study represents an empirical analysis of how lack of risk management impacted the 
monitoring of this PPP contract and ultimately challenged the success of the project. The 
empirical analysis revealed that the contract dealt with all the legislative requirements, as 
stipulated by the constitution, necessary for the execution of a successful PPP contract. 
However, the lack of risk and risk management strategies being specified was neglected. 
Challenges relating to management competency to effectively manage risks led to the actual 
downfall of the project. The empirical analysis indicated that if effective risk management 
strategies had been implemented, it could have had an impact on the contract’s success. 
According to the principles of agency theory, a successful project is probably one where the 
principal is able to aggressively monitor the agent’s behaviour. The link between evaluating 
performance of the principal and the agent is straightforward, given that the agent is 
contracted to perform, hence underperformance by the agent should be managed by the 
principal and the agent should be penalised on compensation (Eisenhardt, 1985; 1989).  
The theoretical contribution is to address goal conflict between the public and private sector 
for ICT service delivery. It is assumed that much of organisational life is partly based on 
people’s self-interest, opportunism and goal conflict. Agency theory draws specific attention 
to asymmetries of information. An important contribution of agency theory is risk 
implication, since organisations are rumoured to have uncertain futures. Koelble (1996) 
states that as a framework, agency theory has provided “interesting new ways of thinking”, 
has had “considerable value in sorting out and clarifying relationships of power” as well as 
contributing to the “understanding of existing governance structures” (Ferris & Graddy, 
1998). 
The practical contribution for ICT service delivery is providing risk management strategies 
to effectively manage the private sector’s performance.  Risk management strategies are 
necessary to ensure risks are identified from the onset, which could facilitate open and 
honest communication and mitigation practices. Monitoring and assessing risks associated 
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with PPP, contracting is an integral part of good business practice and sound contract 
management. By automating contract writing, contract changes can be tracked to ensure 
adherence to legal requirements while retaining flexibility to draft contracts that meet 
varying business requirements. It allows flexibility with the contract design, authoring while 
accelerating the approval process and ensuring that none of the crucial elements of a 
watertight contract is over-looked. Relationship management is the most important part of 
the project life cycle and, therefore, the requirement of an impartial intervener such as the 
external auditors is critical to act as an intermediary and ensure the project is kept on track 
by providing the external auditors’ input at key stages of the project. The external auditors 
can assist with identifying issues with information asymmetry where the agent (who is in 
most cases the more knowledgeable partner) has the potential to underperform and engage 
in opportunistic bargaining. Management training programmes could deal with competence 
challenges and ensure it address the day-to-day managing of the private sector. Retention 
strategies of expert IS resources is important contributory factor to the successful delivery of 
PPP contracts.  
The researcher, using the results of this research, hopes to demonstrate the positive 
contribution proactive management could contribute to prevent PPP contracts for ICT/IS 
service failing, by introducing effective risk management strategies. The PPP unit indicated 
that long term PPP ICT projects were a major risk because of the rapid changes in 
technology. The limitation of this study was that this was the first PPP contract for ICT/IS 
service delivery in South Africa and lacked a basis of comparison. Further researcher is 
encouraged using lessons learnt from Europe, North America and Austalia. 
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CHAPTER 6:  Study 2: An interrogation into the management practices of the DOL 
project using interviews with key informants and PPP project meeting minutes 
Abstract 
This study is aimed at examining various stakeholders’ views through an interview process 
and the analysis of the minutes of meetings relating to the PPP contract for ICT service 
delivery. The agency theory risk management framework was used as a guide to interview 
the various stakeholders. The interviews assisted with extending and refining the risk 
management framework for PPP contracts for ICT service delivery. Content analysis was 
used with ATLAS/ TI to analyse interviews and minutes of meetings, which corroborate the 
risks that were identified previously as shortcomings in PPP contracting. These risks are 
widely acknowledged in literature but have not been specified or considered by the 
interviewees. These risks need to be highlighted in PPP contracting for ICT service delivery 
to protect the public sector from the more knowledgeable private sector in the future. The 
study contributes to the transparency and governance to effectively manage risk and address 
management competency issues for ICT service delivery. 
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6.1 Introduction 
In this study, the researcher will examine the previously defined risk factors from a 
governance, transparency and accountability perspective, by conducting interviews and 
examining the minutes of the meetings pertaining to the PPP contracts for ICT/IS service 
delivery. More specifically as stated in Table 2 above this study interrogates the question:       
What governance structures exist for managing PPP contracts for ICT service 
delivery in RSA?   
 The aim of this paper is to assemble, through an interview process and minutes of meetings, 
the views of internal and external stakeholders and how these risk factors impact the project 
success. Since the late 1990s, PPP contracting in South Africa has proven to have a long 
history of conflict, but became the face of development for infrastructure reform (Fourie & 
Burger, 2000). In 1994, economic reform became the basic principal for starting 
collaborative partnerships between the public and private sector in an attempt to establish 
cooperative relationships. It was also a method to further common goals of market-driven 
growth aligned with 21st century infrastructure by improving legacy ICT services. 
The collaboration of the private sector was required to bridge the inefficiency gap that the 
public sector had suffered from for decades, since they had always been viewed as the 
custodians of expertise and skill in apartheid days (Fourie & Burger, 2000; Brinkhoff & 
Brinkhoff, 2011). The significant size of this PPP contract for ICT service delivery has 
raised concern with actual management of the project and particularly with issues of risk 
mitigation. ICT service delivery failures have specifically emerged as a challenge because 
of the bad publicity and results that IS implementations have received in business and 
academic literature (Dempsey, 1999; Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993; Willcocks, Lacity & 
Kern, 1999; Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2005). 
The reason for conducting interviews and reviewing minutes of meetings of stakeholders is 
based on the role the stakeholders the played managing the ICT /IS project. From the 
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analysis the researcher intends to reveal what the limitations of the interviewees were in 
managing the ICT project, as well as what there views on risk management were. Using the 
risk framework (see Table 4), the researcher ascertained, through an interview process and 
minutes of meetings, the risk and efficiency challenges stakeholders experienced and which 
affected the success of the ICT/IS project. The researcher used content analysis to analyse 
interviews and minutes of meetings of internal and external stakeholders. This is defined by 
Weber (1990); Neuendorf, (2002); and Ngwenyama and Sullivan (2005) as a method of 
manual and automated analysis of the semantic content of documents, (e.g., transcripts, 
minutes of meetings, interviews), to make inferences, derive in-depth understanding, or to 
draw conclusions about the text. 
6.2 Theoretical Perspective 
A definition often used is that PPPs are “ . . . cooperation of some sort of durability between 
public and private actors in which they jointly enter into agreements for service delivery, 
share risks, train resources which are connected with the contract” van Ham & Koppenjan, 
(2001:598). This particular definition about PPPs is all encompassing, which allows for 
variances across parameters such as time, closeness of co-operation, types of 
products/services, cost, complexity of the service, levels of institutionalisation, as well as 
the number and type of actors involved. Furthermore, it does not specify whether a 
partnership has to rest on a legally binding contract or not in order for it to be a partnership. 
It is all these initial challenges that create the questions around risks, since the definition 
might be all-encompassing but not necessarily documented in the PPP contract for ICT 
services. Governance, transparency and accountability are key risks relating to individuals 
managing organisations.  
There has been a great deal of literature developing around governance; accountability and 
transparency not being the focus of PPP contracting; and increasing the challenges to 
managing risk factors. Governance can be broadly defined as the exercise of political, 
economic and administrative authority to manage countries’ affairs as well as to how 
stakeholders interact with each other to influence outcomes (Johnston & Gudergan, 2007). 
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Thus, governance has an impact on the development of the contract – the legal aspects as 
well as on the behavioural, ethical, mediation and trust aspects that could have a major 
effect on the success of the contract (Williamson, 2008). Mulgan (2003) defines 
accountability as “a relationship of social interaction and exchange involving 
complementary rights on the part of the account-holder and obligations on the part of the 
accountor”. Hodge & Greve (2011) state that transparency comes in many guises in PPPs 
and, whilst in a technical sense more information is better in some instances, this can 
sometimes have clear conflict with the political need to encourage projects, which may be 
shunned or ignored by government critics. It is, therefore, important to ensure that a PPP 
contract covers both technical elements, and human elements such as behaviour and 
arbitration, especially in the case of disagreements to manage risks.  
6.2.1 Governance, accountability and transparency 
The overall evidence from PPP research has proven that there is a deficiency in the way 
PPPs are developed and mediated over time from a governance perspective (Williamson, 
2008; Johnston & Gudergan, 2007).  This leads to the fact that attention should be given to 
the social aspects of contract within PPPs for ICT/IS service delivery and how these they 
can be incorporated within a broader and potentially more meaningful governance system. 
Considering these issues, governments will have to have more foresight, avoid political 
behaviour when executing PPPs, and behave as ethical leaders exhibiting moral 
responsibility and ownership of the project along with the private sector. This is by 
government standards a huge request but one that is necessary in this very diverse 
collaborative partnership (Johnston & Gudergan, 2007).  
 
If government cannot meet the objectives in terms of economic infrastructure growth in the 
public interest by using their own resources, and decides to enter into a partnership, then 
there are moral obligations about behaviour. As Bovaird (2004) suggests, when public 
sector organisations are not in a position to use their own resources, or do not have such 
skills to implement public policy, then a partnership arrangement that aims to effect 
 
  
PHD THESIS                                                                         RENE ALBERTUS 89 
 
cooperative benefit may be the answer. An important opinion that should be considered is 
that mutual responsibility of the partners should be taken into account to achieve the 
objectives of the project and should be of paramount concern.  PPP needs to be formulated 
with formal legal and behavioural requirements to find solution to moral hazards that seem 
to be the norm rather than the exception when the public and private sector are in a 
partnership (Bovaird, 2004).  
Accountability can also be considered as a forceful process in which agents have to provide 
explanations to principals. Bovens (2007) elaborates on the definition of accountability: “a 
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain 
and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the 
actor may face consequences”. Bovens also provides three essential mechanisms for 
accountability:  
1. the agent should be obliged to inform the audit committee about their conduct,  
2. there should be an opportunity for the committee to debate with the agent about 
the conduct as well as an opportunity for the agent to explain and justify the 
conduct in the course of the debate, and  
3. both parties should know that the committee is able not only to pass judgment 
but also to present the agent with certain penalties. Moreover, accountability is 
definitely retrospective or ‘ex post’ in nature, as opposed to ‘ex ante’ control. 
Accountability is a golden concept that cannot be disputed; it has come to stand 
as a universal term for any mechanism that makes powerful institutions 
responsive to their particular public and has become an icon for good 
governance, first in the United States of America (USA) but increasingly also in 
the European Union (EU) (Mulgan, 2003; Bovens, 2007; Partnerships, 2008).  
Accountability has become less valuable for analytical purposes and today resembles a 
wastebasket filled with good intentions, loosely defined concepts and vague images of good 
governance. It is one of the suggestive political words that can be used to cover up a long-
winded argument, to conjure up an image of trustworthiness, fidelity and justice, or hold 
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critics at a distance; therefore, for anyone reflecting on accountability, it is impossible to 
disregard these strong suggestive hints (Bovens, 2007). 
Transparency is present at different stages of a PPP development. Transparency is 
understood as disclosure of information and accessibility of information, especially present 
in the pre-contractual phase. Hodge & Greve (2011) suggest that the British government 
should follow the lead of Denmark that introduced “local planning initiative”, necessary by 
law, which calls for the opinion and evidence from citizens and organisations for a set 
period to submit their opinions on PPP projects. The project plans are made available to 
citizens to examine, while the accessibility of documents concerns the general plans, not the 
financial proposals, submitted by the private sector contenders for the project.  The fact that 
the competitive tendering process is guided by rules, which is supposed to work against 
corruption, should make the financial status available in order for inflated cost to be 
recognised before projects are allocated. 
The goal is that PPPs’ financial status should be open to scrutiny by independent valuators 
to ensure transparency (Rosenbloom, 2007). The establishing and signing of a PPPs contract 
requires further review and interpretation to ensure key deadlines have been stipulated and 
that the length of the partnership justifies the scope of the work. Another aspect of the 
contract is the mandatory documents that lawyers, financial experts and accountants need to 
review to ensure that they are compliant and justified (OECD 2008:125). The challenges 
presented with the PPP contract that were the focus of this research, visibly lacked 
accountability and transparency, which should be the focal point of a watertight contract that 
can hold the private sector accountable. 
6.3 Research methodology 
Content analysis is a method that has been used successfully by several IS researchers 
(Klein & Truex, 1995; Ngwenyama & Nielsen, 2003; 2014). Content analysis was used to 
extrapolate, from the interviews and minutes of meetings, challenges embedded in the ICT/ 
IS service delivery PPP contract, leading to failure. Content analysis is a method of manual 
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or automated analysis of semantic content of documents (transcripts, minutes of meetings, 
interviews – audio or video) to make inferences, derive in-depth understanding or to draw 
conclusions about the text (Neuendorf, 2002; Williamson, 1975; Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 
2005). According to Krippendorff (1980:51), “Content analysis research is motivated by the 
search for techniques to infer symbolic data what would be too costly, no longer possible, or 
too obtrusive by the use of other (research) techniques”. To conduct content analysis on any 
text, the researcher creates a dictionary of terms that are clusters of words or phrases that 
form mutually exclusive categories for analysing documents and coding the text 
(Williamson, 1975; Sullivan and Ngwenyama, 2005). Computer-supported content analysis 
is a particularly powerful technique because of its potential to derive meaningful categories 
from large volumes of data that would overwhelm researchers. Another important advantage 
of using content analysis software tools is the consistency and reliability of the coding that 
does not exist in manual analysis (Ryan & Bernard, 2000). There are a number of software 
packages available that help to facilitate content analysis. In this study, the researcher used 
ATLAS/TI. 
6.3.1 Empirical material and analysis  
The empirical materials of this study consist of minutes of meetings and interviews held 
with the stakeholders of the Public Private Partnership contract responsible for the project 
(Appendix 2). This paragraph provides the details about the method followed to gather the 
data. The research started with a number of telephone calls of one hour to narrow down the 
required details. It was followed up with email correspondence to decide what would be 
discussed during the formal meetings. Telephonic notes were coupled with email 
correspondence and used to assist during the meeting to extrapolate information from the 
interviews and to prompt the stakeholders on the details that had been discussed for further 
elaboration. Valuable insight was gathered from the telephone conversations as well as the 
minutes of the meetings. Hence, each of the minutes of meetings requires a different kind of 
clarification to give logic to data with the overall aim of finding the challenges and 
opportunities. From the available materials, the minutes of the meetings served as the main 
sources of analysis.  
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The interviews assisted with enriching the minutes of the meeting and provided 
corroboration. While transcribing and interpreting the interviews enriched information, 
other documents were interpreted and analysed to add information to the results found. A 
follow-up study of the results with relevant participants through email was made possible in 
order to avoid researchers’ biases and corroborate the findings. These results were 
complemented by the analysis of documents, such as meeting notes, from the consultants. 
Based on the data collection and analysis, the process that ensues is the results and findings 
about the interviewees’ responses with regard to PPP contracting for ICT service delivery in 
the information systems domain. The primary objective of the analysis was to use content 
analysis to ascertain what the participants’ views were of the contract between the DOL and 
SIS and what the perceived challenges of the contract were.  
6.3.2 Content analysis procedure 
The initial process that was followed for gathering information was telephonic 
conversations with individuals in the PPP unit and individuals who had been part of the 
project life cycle, as well as looking at minutes of meetings held by stakeholders. One-on-
one meetings followed up the initial telephonic conversations in order to gather information 
that was relevant and useful to the future of PPP contracting for ICT service delivery. The 
interview study was designed by following the work of Myers and Newman (2007), 
Schultze, and Avital, (2010). Even though the interviews are rich sources of interpretations, 
they were supplemented with other sources, including email correspondence and minutes of 
meetings. The researcher hand coded a sample using the five risk factors from the 
theoretical framework (refer Table 4), in order to develop search terms to do the systematic 
content analysis using Atlas/TI.   
 
The minutes of meetings and interviews required several iterations and searching, reading 
and interpreting text segments linking up with the five themes. I examined the interviews to 
identify similar themes or new themes. Data from the interviews were categorised under the 
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five themes after the statements were evaluated within the context. This process allowed the 
subtleties and semantics to be taken into consideration and provided in-depth familiarity 
with the data through a reiterative reading process (Basit, 2003; Graneheim & Lundman, 
2004; Bailey, 2009).  The coding and analysis process required intense concentration and 
rigorous input from the researcher in order to analyse meaning conveyed by the data (Coffey 
& Atkinson, 1996; Hunter et al., 2005; Bailey, 2009).    
6.4  Empirical findings from interviews and minutes of meetings 
 
Empirical observations on lack of performance monitoring - The DOL and SIS had a 
detailed contract that was negotiated from 1998 to 2002, articulating the design, project 
scope, cost, and the timeline for completion and termination support when the final contract 
was signed and work on the project started. Considering the fact that the planning for this 
contract had been done over four years, one would assume a strategic plan was in place to 
assist with contract challenges during the life-cycle of the project in order to mitigate 
opportunistic risk. The empirical observations suggest that the DOL was fully aware of the 
project challenges and asymmetry of power in favour of Siemens. They had experienced 
intermediaries such as KPMG Service Proprietary Ltd that pointed out blatant flaws of 
overbilling.  The management of the DOL overlooked key clauses in the contract that could 
have been implemented to terminate the project due to non-performance. This unfortunately 
was only considered when the contract that was ending. The following quotation illustrates 
the lack of performance monitoring by the DOL from the following stakeholders: the 
Treasury, Chief Information Systems Officer (CIO), political parties and the Director 
General of the DOL. 
“The treasury's review of the system found several flaws in the PPP, including that there 
was insufficient monitoring and contract management by the DOL. The treasury also 
found that a lack of contract understanding by the DOL stakeholders resulted in 
contractual remedies not being utilised when Siemens' performance was inadequate” 
(Interviews and minutes of meetings, Appendix 2).  
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The relationship breakdown between the DOL and SIS led to fewer constructive discussions 
and decision-making forums; the result of this was lack of participation at meetings, 
resulting in inadequate monitoring, accountability and delays in decision making to manage 
the contract. This is ultimately a sign of project fatigue where relationships have broken 
down irreparably, hence the lack of management involvement from the Department allowed 
the oversight for effective execution of the contract, which should have ensured that the 
scope and deliverables were adhered to and compliance effected. This included the failure to 
implement a penalty function that would penalise SIS for failure to deliver the requirements 
and could have terminated the contract during the first four years if internal resources with 
relevant technical skills to oversee SIS deliverables had been available. The DOL resources 
were handed over to SIS at the inception of the contract, which meant that non-ICT 
personnel were required to monitor and control ICT deliverables, which was a fundamental 
error and poor judgement by the DOL management. The following statement by political 
parties and the Director General reflects the fact that the contract suffered due to the lack of 
performance monitoring. 
 
“The DG commented that the management of the contract did not fully meet 
expectations, owing to the department’s inability to manage the scale of the project, 
and described it as being “a boat that was allowed to float without direction. Going 
forward the department should take the lead in developing a business imperative 
that suits its delivery objectives” (Interviews and minutes of meetings, Appendix 2).  
 
If the objective of the PPP contract had been achieved, it would have been beneficial to 
government success to facilitate improvement in public service delivery. This would have 
built key IT resources in the public sector that could support government and improve 
efficiencies that are much required for the future success of the public sector ICT/IS 
implementations. 
Empirical observation on inappropriate vendor selection - It is of paramount concern how 
the DOL decided on Siemens as a service provider, knowing they were not experts on IS 
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implementation. Siemens is a global company that provides machines and boxes; they do 
not develop systems. This information challenges the fact that DOL management did not 
scrutinise the tender process diligently since, if it were the case, they would have known that 
Siemens was not the appropriate partner. Siemens had indicated that EOH would be the 
service provider since they had the technical expertise for this scope of work. The question 
is why EOH did not tender for the project directly. It was later established that EOH was 
taking over Siemens and they would be one organisation anyway. Unfortunately, this is not 
how a tender process works; EOH should have submitted tenders in their own capacity. 
When scrutinising the contract the new Chief Information Systems Officer made the 
following comment: 
“The (CIO) mentioned that the contract was favourable to Siemens, and that 
Siemens was not the right service provider. This was a global company that 
specialised in providing machines and boxes, and not systems development. Also, the 
contract was for a long period – ten years was too long in the IT sphere. This was 
such a dynamic and changing environment. Although the contract made provision 
for some reviewing, it was generally skewed. This statement was backed up by most 
of the interviewees who concurred that the contract dragged on too long. 
Information systems are a dynamic environment that requires upgrades and system 
changes every three years and, apart from that, require skilled professionals who 
are able to maintain and manage rapid change” (Interviews and minutes of 
meetings, Appendix 2).  
The contract cost might never have been an issue if EOH had been the only people needing 
to be paid, but it seems Siemens inadvertently benefited from being a go-between without 
providing much in terms of service. The fact that challenges would be experienced with 
large and complex IS implementation was almost unavoidable, since even systems that work 
could have had technical challenges. This does not mean the public sector should not have 
been held accountable for mismanagement of public funds and poor judgement of the 
correct vendor selection. Leading political parties, as quoted below, were concerned about 
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EOH being hosted on a non-tender basis as it showed a breach of fundamental controls in 
PPP contract bidding. 
 
Political Party: Democratic Alliance (DA) said the issue of the R2 billion contract 
had been a source of quarrel with the Department. A substantial amount of money 
had been spent and yet there was nothing to show for it. The DOL should explain 
why it would want to allow the engagement of EOH as a service provider on a non-
tender basis, while there were suspicions about how EOH had got into the picture. 
Unless the situation was contained, it would continue to cost the Department. The 
DOL did not learn anything from the initial PPP contract with Siemens” (Interviews 
and minutes of meetings, Appendix 2).  
The debate continued on how EOH was hosted by the DOL on a non-tender basis since this 
was one of the most contentious issues for most part of the contract. This places emphasis 
on how important it is for the correct tender process to be followed when selecting a vendor, 
not to encourage opportunism by granting tenders to the private sector based on their 
popularity rather than competence and best fit for the job. The promotion of trust through 
corporate citizenship will allow businesses to benefit from reduced risk relating to projects, 
crises escalation, shareholder activism, lawsuits and social issues.  Increased trust driven by 
a commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) can enrich the reputation or brand 
value of organisations. CSR is a business endeavor with stakeholders to achieve improved 
economic, environmental and social performance, sometimes referred to as the triple 
bottom-line. The integration of CSR is no longer “a nice to do” or a matter of compliance 
with bylaws or standards for business; it is a requirement that business with a long-term 
strategic view need. That Siemens failed to disclose the subcontractor EOH for service 
delivery raises a serious question; the external auditors comment on this was that the DOL 
should ask Siemens to rectify their actions and that the DOL should penalise them for 
defaulting on the terms and conditions of the contract. 
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“KPMG comments: Siemens had subcontracted the delivery of its services and the 
department was not happy with this. KPMG found that since the department had not 
agreed to this, there was a contractor default, and the department should ask 
Siemens to rectify it. The report also found there was no feasibility study done, nor 
any agreement from the department on the use of a SAP platform. In addition, the 
service it received from Siemens has not been up to standard, partly as internal 
restructuring at the company saw it outsources delivery to a sub-contractor. The 
Department said it had not agreed to this arrangement "nor is it obliged to agree to 
the cession of the contract". KPMG was of the opinion that it constituted a breach of 
contract on the part of Siemens. EOH’s involvement in the contract followed their 
purchase of Siemens as a ‘global solutions’ IT company” (Interviews and minutes of 
meetings, Appendix 2).  
The fact that Siemens claimed that EOH had bought them out begs the question why no one 
was aware of this arrangement during the contract period but only became aware of it 
towards the end. Siemens changed the scenario, stating that EOH were subcontracted to 
them – this raised another question since the DOL had not been aware of this. The fact that 
the Director General (DG) was surprised by the exorbitant salaries earned by EOH was 
another question which was raised, since he had signed off on the contract and should have 
been aware of this. This seemed be a contract that was written without substance; which 
blatantly seemed to ignore human resource issues; that lost control of IS implementation 
activities; overlooked hidden cost; and reflected government politics, absence of enforcing 
exit strategy, and challenges with internal resources. Trust issues and insufficient quality 
control of the project diminished this project value and put the DOL in a very vulnerable 
position. The following statement backs this up. 
“A political party the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) agreed with the Chairperson’s 
conclusion that the DOL was obliged to take over the EOH staff at the salary scales 
that had been quoted. This appeared to be robbery. The government only realised 
after 10 years that it had created a monster, by failing to have the correct resource 
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on board to manage the consultant’s performance. Now the departments appeared 
confused as to what the next course of action should be, especially as the contract 
had not provided the service. Departmental entities had failed in the IT sphere 
because of this contract’s inability to deliver” (Interviews and minutes of meetings, 
Appendix 2).  
SIS had failed to prove that they were a significant contributor to the South African 
economy in terms of this contract; they had violated the trust of the South African public. 
They had robbed the South African economy by not being socially responsible and, as an 
international service provider who had received market related compensation; they should 
have been more open and transparent regarding the relationship with EOH consulting.  
Transparency should be a prerequisite for all PPP contracts regardless of whether it is 
information systems, roads, transportation or hospitals. Government must ensure a 
competitive tendering process in order to ensure that the vendor selection process is well 
formulated and reviewed specifically in the IS domain.  It has become apparent in this case 
study that even if the correct vendor had been selected, PPP contracts are open to corruption 
and, if service levels are not of the desired standards, the public sector manages to turn a 
“blind eye”, pleading ignorance. When institutional mechanisms fail, moral hazard is 
nourished (Luo, 2002). This is what Siemens had to say to the media. 
“ . . divisional director of Siemens IT Solutions and Services, says engaging in a 
PPP requires the commitment of both parties. “Our relationship with the 
Department of Labour is based on two pillars: value for money and risk sharing. A 
clear understanding of those two pillars, handled with commitment and maturity, is 
the foundation of our successful partnership.” In terms of the PPP agreement, 
Siemens assumed full responsibility and the risks associated with taking over the 
DOL’s IT resources, including hardware, software, support, and maintenance and 
application development. The Department of Labour was responsible for accurately 
defining business processes and ERP requirements. Siemens was tasked with system 
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design, development and delivery of the project” (Interviews and minutes of 
meetings, Appendix 2).   
The DOL was responsible for defining business processes, while Siemens was given the 
tasked for system design, development and delivery. It is unclear why, after 11 years, the 
DOL only realised that the then current PPP model would not meet the organisation’s 
changing needs in the future. This was the first partnership of its kind in South Africa and, 
no doubt, encountered many obstacles. This should not have been the case since 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) were appointed to assist as transaction advisors to the 
department in issuing requests for proposals and selecting the ICT vendor. Hence, with their 
assistance, some of these obstacles could have been minimised if institutional mechanisms 
had been analysed to ensure that there was a best fit for this type of PPP contract.   
Lack of internal resources with relevant Information systems skills - The transfer of all 
personnel to SIS was not one of the best strategic moves the DOL could have made since it 
stripped them of all of their intellectual capital and crippled them in the process, in order to 
monitor SIS. This gave SIS more power to manage the contract as they saw fit, since there 
was no supervision and they were well aware of it. It seems that even though problems were 
acknowledged, the public sector management encouraged the project continuation to save 
face, regardless of the financial impact. It is pressure from political parties that encourages 
ideas of grandeur by public sector officials taking entrepreneurial risk in a complex field 
such as IS. Perhaps they should aim to be more cautious on large technology improvements, 
when using public funds with their limited knowledge and skills, to manage large private 
sector consultants such as SIS:  
“The reasons for establishing the PPP include the high turnover of IT staff in the 
public sector; difficulty in reaching IT objectives; the automation of services 
towards e-government initiatives; the department's need to improve its IT capacity 
and expertise; and to build management skills to ensure the IS environment is 
maintained when consultants are off the project. The deliverables comprised of data 
centre services, local area network services, IT help-desk, office productivity, 
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customer satisfaction, end-user access, and the deployment of end-user devices, such 
as desktops, laptops and printers. Systems development included training services 
for new systems; the design, construction and implementation of new systems; and 
maintenance, support and enhancement and development of technical skills”  
(Interviews and minutes of meetings, Appendix 2).  
The fact that they failed to up-skill resources that could have benefited the DOL after the 
contract completion was another violation, since the DOL ended up taking on EOH staff 
with salary packages way beyond the normal government scales. Financial risk can deviate 
in practice from what has been incorporated in the contract to what happens during the term 
of the contract; this was evident in the relationship between the DOL and SIS. The 
Department of Labour (DOL) entered into a termination support for 12 months, within 
which the current ICT service provider (EOH) had to deliver on the outstanding 
deliverables. It was expected that the contractor would deliver in terms of the public-private 
partnership (PPP), and hand the ICT environment back to the DOL.  
“Delivery aspects of the contract included such matters as the institutional memory 
in terms of information, licences, skilled IS staff and an IS platform that would be 
integrated and fully functional. SIS was required to improve the effectiveness, 
efficiency, quality and perception by improved delivery and reliability of routine 
services so that they meet published and agreed service levels; remove reliance on 
key individuals; improve technical quality and functional quality of systems so that 
maintenance and support costs were reduced and systems better supported the DOL; 
providing a consistent level of Information Technology service across all areas; 
along with continuous improvement and upgrade of systems and processes. The 
DOL made it clear that the PPP contract was to strengthen internal resources to 
prevent dissemination of internal capacity. We intend to strengthen institutional 
capacity by using information systems to improve reporting and decision-making 
capabilities. Among the key lessons learned from the PPP outsourcing has been the 
importance of retaining a strong internal capacity in IT. To this degree, going 
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forward IT service provisioning will be delivered by a combination of internal staff 
and external industry specialists. As a result, one of the unintended consequences of 
the PPP that officially ended last November 2012 was that it decimated internal 
capacity and had no proper governance structures in place” (Interviews and 
minutes of meetings, Appendix 2).  
The expected outcome was to fully integrate all functional areas with one ERP system that 
would benefit the Department Head Office, Office of the Unemployment Insurance Fund 
(UIF) and the Office of the Compensation Fund (OCF). The intention was that it would lead 
to improved measured customer satisfaction; provide advice on emerging technologies and 
opportunities; provide integration with SITA services; provide the ability to accommodate 
future growth/decline in services and service levels; and ensure that current technology, for 
the time, would be in place at the expiry of the Agreement. It would assure that all 
hardware, applications or other infrastructure would, on termination of the contract, be 
capable of operation without the need of continuing any of the Contractor’s services. The 
deliverables that were agreed on with SIS were not seemingly complex, therefore being 
presented with having to exit the contract when the contract deliverables were not achieved 
posed a threat to the DOL in terms of higher cost and challenges with competent skills. 
 
. . . the department was under no illusion that the exit from the PPP would pose with 
it risks and threats such as increased levels of attrition with the current Siemens 
resource pool, procurement of services that may result in higher than expected costs, 
the transition to a new operating model represents an inherent risk in operational 
stability and, other security risks. The auditing firm advised that unilaterally 
scrapping the contract could lead to costly litigation, and that it would be wiser to 
come to a negotiated arrangement with Siemens. This should however include 
reviewing areas of the contract where Siemens failed to deliver on its commitments 
on time, and enforcing the applicable penalties. It was expected that the contractor 
would deliver in terms of the public-private partnership (PPP), and hand the ICT 
environment back to the DOL. Delivery aspects of the contract included such 
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matters as the institutional memory in terms of information, skilled IS staff and 
licences as stipulated in the contract” (Interviews and minutes of meetings, 
Appendix 2).  
The SITA legislation is mandatory for government departments acquire certain services. 
The DOL had a limited budget for ICT, and as a result had to decide what the most 
important services that should be pursued. The Labour Relations Act (LRA) section had to 
be considered to ascertain which resources had to incorporate into the DOL. A key risk 
influencing the future of ICT services environment was not having an adequate funding 
strategy. Current funding strategies had to be rationalized by the DOL for the continuity of 
ICT service delivery. There was insufficient time for a transition period and an adequate 
handover process. To mitigate these risks incorporating the resources of the EOH 
consultancy company in-to the DOL establishment would have come with the necessary 
intellectual property that was required.  
 
Moral hazard - When an agent’s action is not verifiable or the agent receives private 
information about a principal after a partnership has been established, moral hazard comes 
into existence. Moral hazard would not present a problem to a partnership if the agent and 
the principal’s objectives were aligned. There were two possible forms of moral hazard 
problems that existed in this PPP contract:  1) the effort of agent which is not verifiable, and 
2) the agent having information advantage when signing the contract.  
 
In an effort to eliminate moral hazard, the principal should have offered a contract that was 
contingent on project milestones and linked to an incentive scheme. It has become apparent 
from the interview process that the agent was risk adverse instead of risk neutral; hence, the 
solution differed from the optimal contract under symmetric information. The agent, being 
assured of monthly payments with little scrutiny, would exert little effort to perform, hence 
why should an agent bear some risk?  
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“The agent was not penalized for not performing and opened the gateway for them 
to become an ethical threat. Internal politics and challenges with public sector 
management also allowed the agent to go unobserved. Lack of skilled management 
to identify and verify performance will always present ethical challenges.  A lot was 
taken for granted. The lack of the public sector exposure to ICT/IS implementation 
was the biggest downfall of the project. When individuals cannot acknowledge that 
they lack the skills based on job preservation, this is the loss the public sector and 
government will have to face. South Africa’s public sector has reached a place 
where spending without consequence cannot be tolerated since it is crippling the 
economy” (Interviews and minutes of meetings, Appendix 2).  
Implementing a system such as SAP that integrated all processes and ensured controls that 
did not exist were in place was an innovative step for South Africa’s Department of Labour 
which had been plagued through the years for poor turnaround time, bad service delivery 
and many loopholes for fraud, due to the lack of a fully functioning IS platform. The process 
was mostly manual and left room for error, for example, identity theft, documents going 
missing and losing money due to the lack of system controls. This should have been a 
project that shared the same success as the Gautrain that was the largest PPP contract for 
transportation launched in South Africa. The reason for the success of this PPP contract was 
that the contract was structured to ensure that the government and the concessionaire, 
Bombela Concession Company, operated within strict financial and time parameters. Many 
interviewees made reference to the success of the Gautrain and felt that the PPP contract for 
ICT/IS service delivery was a project that should have been a success; there was nothing 
complex about it. 
“A world class project of this nature should have been a proud moment for any 
private sector provided to ensure it is successful since it related to the department of 
labour who is responsible for unemployment benefit pay-outs to manage it more 
efficiently and ensuring controls are in place to generate revenue more effectively 
and prevent fraud among others. Siemens had no reason for botching this project 
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since they had EOH who are professional service providers to facilitate the IS 
implementation” (Interviews and minutes of meetings, Appendix 2).   
Unfortunately, when agents see a loophole, which was the case with this PPP contract, 
shirking becomes the order of the day. Not being monitored or penalised for non-delivery 
opened the door for SIS to renege on deliverables. The unintended consequence of this 
behaviour resulted in huge cost overruns, even though there had been an agreed amount for 
the initial contract price when it had been initiated. 
 
Lack of Strategic Planning - Strategic planning provides a platform for public debates, 
resolution of conflict of interest and opinion to be addressed during projects, which would 
otherwise have been ignored at a later stage of implementation, causing delays or even 
stopping the project. The review of the strategic plan at an early stage of the project plan can 
solve conflict and allow for amendments and adjustment in ways that would be acceptable 
to the partnerships while the project was still being implemented. Basic challenges of the 
project should be resolved through the strategic planning phase – that is why the strategic 
plan should be clear to ensure that future decision-making can be managed with little 
requirement for disaster management. This was a quote from one of the managers: 
 
“The department had a strategic plan towards achieving the completion of the PPP. 
Thus it has done a diagnostic review of the partnership and established an internal 
steering committee to manage the transition to a new IT delivery model. The 
development of a draft plan for the exit and transfer of the PPP is currently in 
consultation; a new ICT strategy is being developed by the State IT Agency (SITA); 
and the department will conduct a feasibility study on a new ICT delivery model 
once the strategy is completed. There is a process under way to resource the current 
office of the CIO to manage closure and transition. The department secured the 
involvement and participation of National Treasury, SITA and the State Attorney to 
assist in resolving current PPP contract problems”(Interviews and minutes of 
meetings, Appendix 2).  
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“SITA's contract manager was appointed to oversee the PPP's contractual matters 
and high-level engagement with Siemens is under way. They are also implementing 
the recommendations of the KPMG report and are requesting an early contract 
termination for October this year. The department also says it has strengthened 
governance structures to oversee current IT projects. The management committee 
receives regular progress reports and provides guidance to the IT steering 
committee.  There was a request for an increased participation of business 
stakeholders at forums which was difficult to sustain and which could have assisted 
with cost containment”(Interviews and minutes of meetings, Appendix 2).  
The cost of the PPP increased and was expected to rise further, despite the fact that SIS had 
agreed to the delivery of the project for a set fee of R1.2 billion. This included upskilling IT 
professionals who should have been trained by SIS and transferred back to the DOL. Key 
issues derived from the assessments that were done revealed that: the PPP contract provided 
ICT capabilities with significant gaps that had to be addressed in the new ICT strategy and 
future ICT operating model.  SIS tried to justify this cost with the following statement: 
“. .  this increase is due to the increase in the consumer price index, services relating 
to the annual report, and an increase in end-user devices. The projected cost at the 
end of the contract in November 2013 is R1.9 billion. The reasons for establishing 
the PPP include the high turnover of IT staff in the public sector; difficulty in 
reaching IT objectives; the automation of services towards e-government initiatives; 
the department's need to improve its IT capacity and expertise; and the need to 
exploit international best practice. The treasury's review of the system found several 
flaws in the PPP, including that there was insufficient monitoring and contract 
management by the DOL” (Interviews and minutes of meetings, Appendix 2).  
Even though a strategic plan existed, it was not reviewed or enforced and was a major 
downfall to the success of the project. Nothing was reviewed timeously; hence, all the 
negotiations and amendments happened at the end of the project life cycle. The DOL has 
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had to start over after the ten years to carve out a strategy that should have been thought of 
ten years previously. This failure set the department back ten years; robbed the public of 
efficient service delivery; and contributed to fruitless and wasteful expenditure of the 
taxpayers’ money. It would have been important for the DOL to do a post-mortem of the 
contract and negotiate with Siemens to provide compensation for obvious shirking and 
opportunistic gain to save face as a global competitor. 
“The acting (CIO): of the DOL said that the original intention was to develop an 
ICT strategy and move towards a future ICT landscape. The strategy contained two 
approaches: a multi-vendor environment, and an in-house capability. There were 
factors that had impacted on the strategy, such as compliance with the State 
Information Technology Agency (SITA) Act, the budget, and Section 197 of the 
Labour Relations Act (LRA). With three months to go there had been deviation from 
the strategy and the Department still needed to stabilise its ICT/IS enviroment” 
(Interviews and minutes of meetings, Appendix 2).  
A strategic plan with monitoring mechanisms, strong internal capacity and the appropriate 
management to monitor the contract could have prevented many of the challenges 
associated with non-delivery and over-expenditure that plagued the contract. Lack of 
competence and a skills retention strategy seem to have been overlooked at the initiation of 
the contract – these became critical towards the end when the DOL had to manage on their 
own. 
6.5  Theoretical implications of the empirical observations 
The empirical observation revealed that the various risk factors encompassed accountability, governance and 
governance and transparency, which are critical to the successful monitoring of ICT/IS implementation. 
implementation. Accountability, transparency and governance are particularly relevant to contractual 
contractual principles pertaining to financial management that, if unclear, could lead to major disputes. While 
major disputes. While it can be debated that the public sector management did not understand risk 
understand risk management or policy making for PPP contract management, they had embarked on this 
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embarked on this ICT/IS project with the intention of providing public value and improving efficiencies. It 
efficiencies. It would be expected that risk management should have been the most important component of 
important component of the project to negate failure. The risk factors and propositions from Study 1 
Study 1 corroborated the findings in Study 2, highlighting governance, transparency and accountability issues 
accountability issues (See  
Table 11). Irrespective of the challenges associated with the ICT/IS project; it presents 
opportunities for the development of successful PPP ICT/IS service delivery in the future. 
ERP software remains an effective tool that ensures efficient service delivery and 
consolidates day-to-day operational requirements. SAP is a fully integrated system that has 
the capacity to automate multiple functions that align business objectives. The 
implementation of a fully integrated system would align the DOL’s e-government vision. 
This alignment would take place through the achievement of five functions. First the digital 
linking of information systems with operational systems of government processes. Second, 
digital transactions that is self-service between the government and the public sector. Third, 
the shifting of human involvement from routine and low value tasks to high value personal 
consulting on important issues. Fourth, the transformation of staff into knowledge workers 
and equipping them with digital information tools to communicate with clients and manage 
relationships. Last, the provision of access (to the public and staff) to appropriate and real-
time knowledge and information with a few simple objectives: 
 
1. Acquisition of a single coherent set of services that integrates and provides for 
(by incorporation into a single information technologies service entity, including 
the management of third party providers of related services), the business needs 
of the DOL, the Unemployment Insurance Fund and the Compensation Fund, 
including provincial offices and labour centres;  
2. Supporting the Department’s initiatives in regard to business restructuring and 
advising on the efficient operation and the meeting of the business objectives of 
the Department;  
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3. Implementing an electronic one-stop service infrastructure as an optimal 
business scenario for the Department, including integrated systems and call 
centre technology;  
4. Providing information management and operational and support training to 
Departmental staff; and  
5. Supplying, installing, operating, maintaining, routinely upgrading, refreshing and 
if necessary changing and/or enhancing and/or replacing the Information 
Technologies required for the provision of the Services in accordance with the 
provisions of the Agreement.  
 
The achievement of these objectives through a fully integrated system will assist with 
managing risk and can decrease cost in the public sector and increase productivity. With 
defined risk structures and decision-making policies put in place, successfully utilised public 
sector ICT/IS projects can be managed in an effective manner along with the following:  
1. A core group of internal resources with technical skills and knowledge should be 
appointed to oversee delivery of the contract requirements.  
2. Business analysis capability is critical to ensuring that the business requirements can 
be fully understood and articulated.  
3. Project management methodologies should be utilised to manage performance 
according to requirements and agreed timescales.  
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Table 11:  Propositions derived from the risk factors and corroborated by the interviews, Source: 
(Interviews and minutes of meetings, Appendix 2).  





P1: When risk is not specified in the 
PPP policy or the PPP contract, the 
principal will have challenges 
monitoring the agent’s performance 
– the agent will be inclined to shirk 
on contractual deliverables. 
The treasury's review of the system found several flaws 
in the PPP, including that there was insufficient 
monitoring and contract management by the DOL. 
Inappropriate 
vendor selection 
P2: If an inappropriate vendor is 
selected that lacks capabilities to 
adequately engage with all the 
actors in the project; the contract is 
likely to fail. 
 
The (CIO) mentioned that the contract was favourable 
to Siemens, and that Siemens was not the right service 
provider.  
This was a global company that specialised in providing 









P3: When there is a lack of capacity 
planning and resource expertise, 
there will be challenges with skills 
transfer and knowledge 
management. 
 
The reasons for establishing the PPP for ICT/IS service 
delivery was the high turnover of IT staff in the public 
sector, resulting in difficulty in reaching IT objectives. 
The department's need to improve its IT capacity and 
expertise and build management skills should have 
ensured the IS environment was maintained when 
consultants were off the project. 
Moral hazard P4: When an agent is not held 
accountable, moral hazard will pose 
a risk to the objectives of the 
contract. 
 
The agent was not penalised for not performing and 
opened the gateway for the agent to become an ethical 
threat. 
Lack of skilled management to identify and verify 
performance will always present ethical challenges. 
Strategic 
planning 
P5: When public sector managers 
do not have a strategic plan in 
place, there will be challenges with 
reviewing and managing ICT/IS 
implementation as it develops. 
 
Compliance with the State Information Technology 
Agency (SITA) Act, the budget, and Section 197 of the 
Labour Relations Act (LRA).  
With three months to go, there had been deviation from 
the strategy and the Department still needed to stabilise 
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6.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the empirical analyses presented provide evidence of the challenges relating 
to the management of the PPP contracting for ICT/IS service delivery. Sullivan and 
Ngwenyama (2005) assert a consultant lacking experience with business activities and/or 
technology can lead to disputes and litigation or escalating costs and declining services 
levels. The fact that IT is such a dynamic changing environment, vendor experience and 
expertise should have been verified before the contract was granted. However, large 
information systems projects are difficult to monitor and it is therefore a challenge to know 
whether things are doing well or badly until ultimate abandonment and failure (Oakeshott, 
1962). The challenges the DOL had with performance monitoring during the life cycle of 
the contract resulted in complete loss of control of the project, due to lack of technological 
skills, management expertise and adequate advisory services, to caution them about project 
pitfalls during the project. They therefore only realised, after ten years that they had spent a 
huge outflow of cash for information systems implementations, but little to show.  
 
When a project goes off the rails, it can sometimes be difficult to find those responsible and 
hold them accountable, even in the unlikely event that any one identifiable person or group 
is responsible. Much of IS failure suffers from what (Oakeshott, 1962) terms “rationalism,” 
that is, a belief that there is some technique that can be applied to IS developments that will 
fix them for the last time. Failure is still so common because that right technique, new 
programming methodology, a better design contract, a new management fad, a new 
consultancy template or whatever has not yet been discovered, or if it has, it has not yet 
been applied” (Goldfinch, 2007).  
Goldfinch, (2000; 2007) noted that there is a belief that processes involved in IS 
development are not fully understood and that these complexities makes it difficult to 
control, hence there is no magic solution to IS implementations. In the public sector, IS 
developments are: 
“ a potent mix of dangerous enthusiasms, unclear aims and technical specifications; 
highly challenging technical problems; problems of agency; frailties of humans and 
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management systems; personality and other conflicts; immensely complex contracts; 
producer and consultancy capture; legislative instability; and clashes of cultures 
amongst public servants, software developers, consultants, sales people and their 
respective organisations amongst other issues” (Goldfinch,  2007:925).  
 
The research contributes to theory and practice of management competency challenges. Key 
findings of the empirical analysis indicate that the public sector needs to rethink the strategy 
of ICT implementations. They also need to look at PPP contract management to ensure the 
public sector has recourse against the private sector and that challenges with skills transfer 
to manage the IS platform is supported. There is a very specific gap in literature about ICT 
implementations using PPP contracting. Although this research has advanced one’s 
understanding of PPP contracting for ICT service delivery, moral hazard, adverse selection, 
and inappropriate vendor selection remain a challenge for PPPs with reference to ICT/IS 
service delivery; hence the need for further research in this domain.  
 
The limitation of this study was the researchers’ inability to interrogate more stakeholders of 
the DOL and SIS that could have enriched the empirical analysis. The increase in moral 
hazard in the public sector has the potential to accelerate if adverse investigation to 
gathering information persists.   
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CHAPTER 7:  Study 3: Interrogation of the public discourse on the DOL project using 
media documents  
Abstract 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) contracts for ICT/IS service delivery have drawn 
considerable media interest due to the fact that many such contracts have been plagued by 
problems such as cost overruns. The purpose of this paper is to critically analyse media 
discourse relating to the failure of a PPP contract between the South African Department of 
Labour (DOL) and an information and communication technology (ICT) firm (referred to in 
this paper as SIS). The contract pertained to the provision and implementation of ICT/IS 
services for the DOL. The theoretical foundation for this research is Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action that focuses on normative standards for communication and 
implications of public speech. The research builds on a growing literature on critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) that systematically applies Habermas’ validity claims to empirical 
research on public communication focused on revealing distortions concerning claims of 
truth, sincerity, legitimacy and comprehensibility. The study contributes to understanding 
issues of public accountability of PPP contracts and extends the reach of critical research 
into PPP contracting for information systems (IS) services. It highlights key challenges of 
the lack of public sector management competences in securing the public interest in PPP 
engagements. 
Keywords: Critical discourse analysis, Habermas, Validity claims, Information systems 
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7.1 Introduction   
The subject of this paper is to look at the media’s reflection regarding the failure of Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) contracts between the public and private sector for Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT) service delivery. The aim is to interrogate PPP 
contract failures and highlight the consequences of a lack of skills in PPP contract 
management amongst Information Technology (IT) professionals in South Africa. Such 
skills are needed in order to deliver successful Information Systems (IS) implementation 
projects through PPP contracts. More specifically as stated in Table 2 above this study 
interrogates the question: 
What is the nature of public accountability for PPP contracts in ICT service 
delivery? 
The lack of conceptual clarity on PPPs often leads to false statements about PPP contracts, 
since what is true for one specific PPP type cannot necessarily apply to other forms of PPP 
(Weihe, 2006). The fact that a PPP is a contested and ill-defined concept leads to confusion, 
since the term PPP has a different meaning to different people (Hodges & Greve, 2005; 
Linder, 1999 & Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001). 
Governance principles should be operationalised for the designated objectives of PPPs, 
since accountability is becoming critical, given the increase in PPP contracts being used by 
government for doing business with the private sector (Hodges & Greve, 2005; Brinkerhoff 
& Brinkerhoff, 2011). Despite PPP contracting being the government’s preferred choice of 
doing business with the private sector, there has been limited academic research on the 
success of ICT service delivery for in IS implementations through PPPs. Hence, there 
remain a number of unanswered questions about the use of PPP contracting for ICT/IS 
service delivery and the retention of skilled IT professionals in the public sector. 
There is a dearth of literature on IS implementations in the public sector which employ a 
critical stance such as through the lens of Habermasian theory (Klein, 1999; Richardson, 
Tapia & Kvasny, 2006). Media coverage of the PPP contract between the DOL and SIS is of 
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academic interest for this research, since the media is not only a provider of information but 
helps shape public opinion. Cohen (1963) states that the media is believed to be successful 
in influencing their readers in what to think about articles. Media discourse is one of the 
important ways through which reality is socially shaped (Cukier et al., 2009; Jankowski & 
Jensen, 2002; Chigona & Chigona, 2008). Media discourse can affect the acceptance, the 
use and the effect of an ICT project. 
Through the use of the Habermasian concepts of ideal speech and the four validity claims of 
truth, sincerity, legitimacy and comprehensibility, this paper sheds light on some of the 
arguments that various actors in the public discourse have made to explain the issues of 
skills retention and management competence influencing the success of the PPP initiative. 
This research uses a critical discourse analysis (CDA) method (Cukier et al., 2009) to 
interrogate public documents and media articles, which have discussed the matter during the 
period 2012-2013. It has become critical to conduct empirical research to build theories 
(Habermas, 2006). CDA was deemed appropriate for the research on the PPP contract 
between the DOL and SIS since it provided insights and moral standards for the analysis to 
identify distortions that might have influenced the success of the contract. Critical analysis 
infers that the validity of the statements or feebleness in theories or their concerns is 
aggressively pursued (Stahl, 2004a; Chigona & Chigona, 2008). There had been limited 
media coverage over the first eight years of the DOL-SIS PPP contract under study, and 
mainly from 2012 to 2013, when challenges were experienced with service delivery at the 
DOL, did the media take note.  Media discourse of the PPP contract between the DOL and 
SIS that was analysed in this research was from South African media articles for the period 
2012-2013. 
7.2 Background Context  
The government of South Africa is engaging in PPP contracts in order to enhance public 
sector skills development. Based on information asymmetry, however, public sector 
employees gravitate to the private sector since the public sector cannot compete with salary 
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scales offered by the private sector and eventually this leads to emigration of IT 
professionals to Europe and other international countries. 
Historical records have shown that the emigration of highly skilled IT professionals from 
South Africa has long been a concern for the country and one leading to deviating 
clarifications, disagreements and expression of fears (Kerr-Phillips & Thomas, 2009).  
South Africa’s dramatic changes with the end of apartheid in 1994 and the advent of a 
multiracial society have been matched by unparalleled devotion being directed towards 
migration issues (Bhorat, Meyer & Mlatsheni, 2002). The technology revolution has 
resulted in huge growth opportunities across the world, notably in the (IT) sector. Countries 
like South Africa who have a pool of highly skilled IT professionals have seen the demand 
for their skills globally (Birt, Wallis & Winternitz, 2004).  
The post-apartheid government inherited a disseminated work force and education system, 
which was established along racial and provincial lines (Du Toit & Van Tonder, 2009). This 
has created chaos, which has resulted in fruitless and wasteful expenditure and an inefficient 
and poor graduate output, which aggravates the skills dilemma further (Hofmeyr & 
Buckland, 1992:26).  
South Africa’s democracy in 1994 created beliefs of an intense change in economic and 
social development taking place; however, for millions of South Africans this transition has 
not delivered on changing the lives of the people of this country (Du Toit & Van Tonder, 
2009). From 1984 to 1993 trade and financial sanctions contributed to the lowest growth, 
hence the removal of these challenges was expected to transform South Africa (Du Plessis 
& Smit, 2006). There has been a slight improvement since 1994 specifically when compared 
to the previous ten years; improvement has been marginal both by international standards 
and by the standard of South Africa’s own history (Du Plessis & Smit, 2006).  
There were extensive expectations and hope that a democratic institution would change and 
alleviate poverty as well as the shortage of IT skills in the public sector, but transformation 
remains questionable (Desai, 2013). The public sector is still reliant on the private sector for 
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IT services, hence widening the skills gap.  Government’s move to PPP contracting for ICT 
service delivery was specifically advanced since PPPs have been used successfully to 
turnaround infrastructure challenges, e.g., transportation, roads and hospitals (Altbeker, 
2007).  It has been unfortunate that this PPP contract for ICT service delivery was not 
successful considering it was the first of its kind. However, South Africa is not the only 
country struggling with IS implementation in the public sector using private sector 
contractors; Europe and America’s public sector have experienced similar challenges 
(Hodges & Greve, 2005).    
It has become a macro challenge for the South African government to improve services and 
retain key IS skills, hence the need for PPP contracting (Kerr-Phillips & Thomas, 2009).  
The government’s expectation was twofold; that there IS pool would be trained and 
upskilled by the private sector and that they would have a fully integrated IS system that 
would streamline operational requirements: that is why the staff of the DOL was transferred 
to SIS. According to Kerr-Phillips & Thomas (2009), there have been major challenges for 
South African private sector to retain IS talent for their own retention due to the demand 
internationally for IS professionals. The immigration of IS staff makes it difficult for the 
private sector to train and retain for their own service let alone to replenish the public sector 
shortage. International markets offer better incentives for IS resource resulting in the brain 
drain in South Africa hence affecting IS skills retention. 
7.3 Theoretical framework 
The framework for the study is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), of which the term 
discourse can be described as “traditional language codes to express the social construction 
of reality and events” (Cukier & Thomlinson, 2005:89; Chigona & Chigona, 2008). The 
format in which events or issues are discussed has the ability to profile or limit people’s 
understanding, through the underpinning of norms previously allowed. Furthermore, 
discourse analysis endeavours to search various ways in which the use of linguistic 
arrangements and assumptions are used.  
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Studying discourse is concerned with the ways social and political control are replicated by 
text and/or speech, as it views language as a “form of social practice” (Fairclough 1989: 
20). There are many CDA viewpoints. Two examples used in the field of Information 
systems are known as Faucauldian and Habermasian. This study utilised the Habermasian 
model, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 7.4 (Cukier et al., 2009). 
It has been established that the majority of CDA procedures work on a small set of 
documents, due to the rigour involved in analysing texts. Typically, CDA has been useful 
where the quantity of data is small, such as media articles, policy documents and where 
there are an inadequate number of dialogues (Roode et al., 2004). The question is how CDA 
can be applied to a large corpus. A practical approach involves selecting a small corpus of 
text. For example, in analysing the South African government’s view on ICT for 
development, (Roode et al., and 2004) selected three dialogues from a bulky pool of 
government officials’ dialogues. Such approaches are often critiqued for being potentially 
selective (Stahl, 2004a; Cukier et al., 2009). The question asked is: how it can be proven 
that the researcher did not deliberately select the documents to prove a point (Stahl, 2004a; 
Cukier et al., 2009)? Various authors propose that a CDA method addresses this concern by 
combining content analysis and hermeneutics approaches to critically analyse a large corpus 
(Stahl, 2004a; Cukier et al., 2009). Considering that this research dealt with media discourse 
spanning a period of two years and consisting of a number of media reports, an approach 
based on the Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) was used (Cukier et al., 2009). 
Habermas had one objective and that was to provide a theoretical framework for the critical 
analysis of assemblies for, and the replication of, discourses of the public domain (Cukier et 
al., 2009). Essential to Habermas’ programme is the examination of how the media and their 
relationships with influential economic and political interests shape decision-making, public 
opinion and choice in democratic societies (Cukier et al., 2009). The critical questioning of 
public discourses about information technology revealed in the media is important to 
information systems as it has an influence on democratic societies (Cukier et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, a deep-rooted tradition of critical theory exposes how discourses broadcasting 
the idea of technological imperatives, and signifying technological change as unrelenting 
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and inescapable, are shaped (Ellul, 1980; Winner, 1986). Several researchers have 
implemented Habermas’ theoretical framework for critical analysis of communication, as a 
basis for serious questioning of pertinent IS phenomena (Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997). The 
following section represents the key concepts and principles relevant to this research (for 
detailed discussions (see Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997; Klein & Huynh, 2004; Ulrich, (2001). 
A variety of theoretical viewpoints can inform discourse analysis (Heracleous & Barrett, 
2001; Slembrouck, 2001), but CDA is used to cross-examine texts in order to reveal 
structures, methodical communicative distortions and power associations core to the 
discourse (Fairclough, 1995). The purposes of CDA are to effect change; in other words, the 
liberation of participants in the discourse and improvement of social activities and relations 
(Wodak & Meyer, 2001; Brooke, 2002). Following Forester (1983) and Ngwenyama and 
Lee (1997), Habermas’ worldwide philosophy is used as the conceptual framework in the 
approach to CDA (Cukier et al., 2009).  
7.4 Principles of Habermasian CDA 
Very few scholars have articulated principles for conducting Habermasian CDA apart from 
Cukier et al., 2009, therefore (Cukier et al., 2009) is the foundational reference for this 
section of the thesis. Often ignored in Habermas’ TCA is the primary approach for 
analytically questioning discourses (Cukier et al., 2009). Habermas has been criticised for 
not for not giving programmatic advice on using his ‘worldwide pragmatics’ for empirical 
analysis (Cukier et al., 2009).  The approach for empirically applying the TCA conceptual 
framework is entrenched in the concept itself, namely the recognition of unconventionalities 
from the worldwide standard for communication, by disputing the validity concepts and 
revealing the resulting communication misrepresentations (Cukier et al., 2009). The 
important principles for applying widespread language to analysis of discourses are: 
1. The listener or reader accepts all dialogue and is focused on attaining communal 
understanding of the dependability of the validity claims (Cukier et al., 2009).  
Consequently, this requires that every discourse is taken to be unrestrained and valid 
when its implied validity claims are disputed. 
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2. The analyst must make rulings about the intent of the discourse, if the discourse fails 
any of the claims; this is achieved through examining the orientation and aims of the 
discourse (Cukier et al., 2009). 
3.  The discourse must be questioned from the viewpoint of each of the four validity 
claims of truth, sincerity, legitimacy and comprehensibility (Cukier et al., 2009). 
Table 12: Communication strategic action and distorted communication, Source:  Adopted and 
extended from (Cukier et al., 2009). 





Open Strategic  

















Habermas’ viewpoint proposes that a discourse is always questionable and convertible, 
based on the orientation (Cukier et al., 2009). Habermas’ own analysis of public discourses 
is always based on the orientation of the participant, the impact and implication of what is 
said and not on the level of the sentence or minute textual level (Habermas, 2000). 
Habermas stresses that individual validity claims can be thematically emphasised; however, 
they are extensive and must always be raised concurrently, even when they cannot be 
focalised at the same time (Habermas, 1984). He also said that these validity claims 
“constitute universal conditions of communicative action and are applicable for empirical 
analysis of discourses” (Habermas, 1984:440-441). Thus, Habermas’ validity claims serve a 
common standard for analysing communication distortions across a wide range of extremely 
varied discourses (Cukier et al., 2009).  
7.5 Categories and principles for analysis 
The strategy for critical discourse analysis outlined in Cukier et al., (2009) revolves around 
the four validity claims of truth, sincerity, legitamacy and comprehensibility which, 
according to Habermas (1984) are inferred in every communication and represent 
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appropriate circumstances for understanding and providing thoughtful analysis of 
communications. Cukier et al. (2009) used these theoretical concepts and the principles for 
ideal communication to develop a framework and method for empirical analysis of 
discourses. It is important to note here that the approach formalized in Cukier et al., (2009) 
was earlier illustrated in Ngwenyama and Lee (1997), but they did provide all the details of 
their method. Specifically, Ngwenyama and Lee (1997) did not discuss the use of Toulmin’s 
(cf. Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, 1978) schema in their analysis of the claims. This detail was 
provided later in the methodological prescriptions in Cukier et al. (2009). However, these 
two papers (Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997; Cukier et al., 2009) are the seminal works outlining 
the principles for Habermasian critical discourse analysis in the IS discipline. Table 13 
below provides a short summary of the general framework and principles of their approach 
to discourse analysis, which I will now briefly explain, staying as close to their intentions.  
The Habermasian approach to discourse analysis as outlined by Ngwenyama and Lee (1997) 
and Cukier et al. (2009) was intended to assist the researcher in discerning whether a 
communicative act should be considered truthful, sincere, legitimate, clear and 
comprehensible, by examining empirical features of the communication (Cukier et al., 
2009). By methodically analysing speech elements using empirical materials against the 
theoretical concepts, researchers can unearth and analyse the evidence of communication 
distortions (Cukier et al., 2009). The violation of the truth concept is important for CDA, 
specifically to detect untruths, biased declarations and incomplete statements in which 
counter-arguments cannot be formulated, which can lead to manipulations. In testing the 
validity of the truth concept, one asks the question “Is what is said factual or true?” Is the 
truth recorded or communicated factually or objectively correctly? This will however 
require appropriate reading of the text and suitable analysis of the argument including a 
thorough analysis of the entire discourse that should be logical, consistent, complete and 
defensible (Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997; Cukier et. al., 2009). 
The Sincerity concept is concerned with the communicator’s intention. The question which 
the hearer (reader) must interrogate if what is said really what is intended (Cukier et al., 
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2009). Since intentions cannot be perceived openly, an inference must be made and tested 
concerning sincerity of the speaker. The testing of implied sincerity is achieved by 
examining the communication for inconsistencies between the participant’s statements and 
actions, as well as inconsistencies between what the participant says, how the participant 
says it. Cukier et al., (2009), suggests using the following questions to guide the empirical 
examination of sincerity in the communication: “Is what is assumed or implied consistent 
with what is stated in the discourse?” “Is the text intending to evoke an emotional 
response?” “Is the participant or writer using hyperbole or excessive jargon (Cukier et al., 
2009: 180)?”. While Ngwenyama and Lee (1997) stresses the social and political context of 
actors when interrogating sincerity, Cukier et al. (2009), citing Van Dijk (1991) argue that 
stylistic choices often suggest the sentiments of the communicator and should be 
interrogated. They argue that attention should be paid to expressive adjectives and nouns, to 
hyperbole, to metaphors and to jargon, which can be used to invoke powerful associations, 
values and larger discourses (Cukier et al., 2009). Both Ngwenyama and Lee (1997) and 
Cukier et al., (2009) pay close attention to interrogating legitimacy of communications as it 
is most important to identifying systematic distortions. Legitimacy addresses the need for 
correspondence between the speaker’s expressions and his/her role within the social and 
political context. It also concerns who is ‘allowed to speak’ and who is ‘silenced’ 
(Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997).  Ofter, technical jargon can be used to silence stakeholders as 
it can create an inescapable technical ‘mystique’ reinforcing the dominance of some actors 
in the doscurse (Cukier et al., 2009). To interrogate legitimacy it is also important to 
question whether communication conforms to the norms of the social setting in which it is 
immersed. And a prerequisite to legitimate and factual communication requires that all 
arguments must have an equal chance to be heard (Cukier et al., 2009). For example, in 
journalism, a well-established standard requires journalists to ensure symmetry in their 
reporting. Hence, an indicator of legitimacy in public discourse is the level of representation 
and muting of non-conforming voices (Van Dijk, 2002). Another requirement is the choice 
of experts and the ways in which they are used to influence readers to accept certain 
opinions (Cukier et al., 2009). Empirical testing of legitimacy is directed by the following 
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questions: “Who is allowed to speak?” “Who is considered an expert and on what basis?” 
(Cukier et al., 2009:181). When these questions are answered, it is possible to consider 
discourse deficiencies, which groups and viewpoints are sidelined or excluded, as well as 
“What information is missing or stifled in the discourse?” (Cukier et al., 2009: 181). 
Table 13: Categories and Principles for Habermasian CDA, Source: Adopted and extended from Cukier 
et al., 2009 
 




Validity Test Speech elements for 
empirical analysis 
Truth The propositional content 
of what is said is factual 
or true.              
Misrepresentation Is evidence and reasoning 
provided sufficient? 
Argumentation 
Sincerity The participant is honest 
(or sincere) in what she/he 
says. 
False Assurance Is what is said consistent 




Legitimacy What the participant says 
(and hence does) is right 
or appropriate in the light 
of existing norms or 
values. 
Illegitimacy Are competing 'logics' (e.g. 
Stakeholders) equally 
represented? 
Use of 'experts' and 
'authorities' Silences 
Comprehensibility What is said is audible (or 
legible) and intelligible. 
Confusion Is the communication 
sufficiently intelligible?             
Is the communication 
complete?                                  
Is the level of detail too 








Comprehensibility refers to the technical and linguistic clarity of the communication (Cukier 
et al., 2009:179). In other words, is what has been communicated distinct (or intelligible) 
and lucid? This is the only claim out of the four that addresses grammar and semantics as 
prerequisites for pragmatic analysis (Cukier et al., 2009). Indicators for comprehensibility 
are the “completeness of the symbolic representation, the presence of a shared language and 
the exclamation of grammatical and semantic correctness” (Cukier et al., 2009:179). 
Consequently, interrogation of comprehensibility is guided by the following questions: “Is 
the communication complete and without oversights important to this meaning?” “Is the 
amount of information onerous for the reader or listener?” (Cukier et al., 2009).  
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7.6 Research Methodology  
This section documents the preparation and critical discourse analysis technique as well as 
data collection. This chapter aims at presenting the philosophical assumptions guiding the 
research process and the methodology adopted. This is essential because philosophical 
assumptions are likely to influence the choice of methodology and information gathering 
techniques. It also provides, according to (Cukier et al., 2009) philosophical guidelines for 
further development of the conceptual area.  
The chapter starts with an illustration of the way a critical discourse analysis is 
operationalised in this research. 
7.6.1 Operationalising TCA 
Cukier et al., 2009, cited that both hermeneutic analysis and content analysis techniques are 
suitable for CDA since discourse analysis uses only qualitative techniques. By 
operationalising TCA, Habermas makes it clear that solely an objectivist epistemology 
cannot inform critical social analysis. Habermas (2000) states, that an epistemology for 
critical theory that embraces multi methods is worthwhile, as long as it is critically oriented 
and self-scrutiny. Having considered the above, if media text is overwhelming to a 
researcher, content analysis software such as ATLAS/TI can assist with CDA analysis. 
ATLAS/TI allows for exhaustive analysis of data to unearth empirical observations that 
could remain unobserved if human information processing were used. Phillips and Hardy 
(2002) state, “the discourse analysis is selective and lacks rigour”. Without tools to conduct 
analysis it will be difficult to systematically analyse large volumes of textual data. The 
general procedure that was followed to operationalize the approach to CDA in this study is 
summarised in four steps: 
1. Ngwenyama and Lee (1997) state that relationships and political affiliations among 
stakeholders are essential to CDA. Therefore, it is imperative that the identification 
of documents that is required to extrapolate text is given careful consideration. 
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2. Content analysis was used to analyse the media articles. The objective is to identify 
empirical observations relating to the validity claims and to identify repetition of 
precise arguments. The analysis endeavours to unearth the periphrastic strategies 
related to repetition of exact opinions (often uncorroborated by evidence) to include 
it in life world issues taken for granted as established facts. Content analysis is a 
two-stage procedure, which uses preliminary coding to identify the speech 
dimensions that signify each validity claim, as outlined in Table 14. Considering the 
challenges with public accountability, particularly in this instance with PPP 
contracting for ICT service delivery, the researcher placed particular emphasis on the 
public accountability issues by interrogating the issues relating to the failure of the 
DOL-SIS ERP implementation. Each article was reviewed and coded twice for; 
 Statements relating to the challenges of the ERP implementation failure;  
 terms used to describe the project, adjectives, metaphors and other 
associative language;  
 specialists and stakeholders  quoted in the context of the PPP contract; and 
 specific language or jargon. 
3. Reading and understanding the empirical observations are vital. The media articles 
are read to unearth implicit or explicit validity claims that are tested. The test 
involves searching for empirical observations that refute the validity of claims made 
in the texts. A methodical interpretative technique is followed, as Ngwenyama and 
Lee (1997) advice, exploring meaning of the text in the context of the political 
situation and the implications of the outcome to the stakeholders (Cukier et al., 
2009:179).  Table 14 provides some examples of the empirical observations how 
they were critically examined, and the validity of the claims tested as reflected in the 
media discourse. 
4. An explanation of the findings is necessary. The explanation of findings draws on 
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Steps 2 and 3 above are highly repetitive, and empirical observations from these two steps 
could trigger further data collection (as in Step 1). 
7.6.2 Empirical illustration  
To illustrate the approach to CDA, a formative discourse was selected on PPP between the 
DOL and SIS for ICT service delivery. Most of the media articles started appearing in the 
public domain from the end of 2012 to 2013 when the contract termination was in sight and 
the DOL realised they had no continuity plans in place. Multiple data sources were used to 
ensure corroboration of evidence. These data sources were retrieved from the Internet by 
doing extensive searching on every article written about the DOL and SIS failure. All the 
files for the study were converted from Microsoft word to PDF documents and were 
imported into ATLAS/TI.  Content analysis and coding procedure was done on the 
individual articles. 
7.6.3 Case study background 
The PPP contract between the DOL and SIS was the first of its kind within the South 
African government and therefore represented a significant milestone in terms of the way in 
which ICT was managed within the public sector. Unlike traditional outsourcing 
relationships, the PPP contract demonstrated a desire on the part of government to develop 
strategic alliances with private sector partners and to utilise these alliances in order to 
internalise necessary ICT infrastructure and expertise. 
The significance of the arrangement meant that the DOL exerted great effort in procuring a 
service provider who would best meet the needs of the Department and would assist in 
bringing innovation to the Department’s general strategies and business direction. The 
principle of joint risk that forms the foundation of PPP arrangements also meant that the 
procurement process and the development of a suitable contractual framework were critical 
to both the Department and SIS.   
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ICT is a critical area for the DOL to develop a strategic advantage and ensure that it is able 
to create key IT skills and management that will be able to manage ICT service for future IS 
implementation projects. The PPP contract provided the Department with an opportunity to 
focus on its core capabilities and to acquire value from the lessons learnt in order to better 
manage IS services in the future. This opportunity could be maximised as a foundation for 
the creation of future ICT strategy and direction.  
Despite the negative perceptions that were cultivated throughout the ten-year contract 
period, the PPP contract was vital for developing the foundation for ICT within the 
Department. Key successes can be found in the operational area where SIS successfully 
developed support services and provision for end-user ICT accessibility. The Department 
was also introduced to project management disciplines and efficiency measures. This focus 
on operational elements can be said to have encapsulated the spirit of the contract that was 
based around the need to develop the necessary infrastructure and end-user accessibility of 
ICT within the Department.  
The majority of challenges were found within the improvement services domain, 
particularly in relation to the development of applications, where issues arose around 
delivery of applications against stipulated business requirements. This highlighted a number 
of management failures on the part of both the Department and SIS. Despite the control 
mechanisms put in place by the contract, the PPP demonstrated a failure to implement 
appropriate governance and monitoring channels. For instance, the Department failed to 
make use of the Service Credit Regime detailed within the contract as a tool to penalise SIS 
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Table 14: Empirical Analysis of validity claims, Source: The Researcher 






Confirmation of claim Source  
Relationships breakdown between 
the two parties, plagued by 
irregularities and challenges 
TC incomplete 
statement 
Few constructive discussions 
led by SIS 
DOC=20; 
02; 12; 01 
Continuous decrease in 
participation at meetings, the 
DOL was on-going. Disputes with 
SIS as no clear validation or sign 
off process existed. 
TC Logical 
consistency 
Inadequate monitoring of the 
project. Accountability about 
delays in decisions were 
required but DOL 
management was dis engaged 
DOC=12; 
07; 01; 04 
Contract was written that the DOL 
staff would be transferred to 
Siemens at the beginning of the 
contract to be up skilled and 
transferred back to DOL when the 
project was complete. 
TC Logical 
consistency 
DOL management was not 
vigilant during the project.  
The consultants managed the 
DOL staff during the project 
and  because of the free rein 
employed their own 
consultants. 
DOC=08; 
13; 07; 01 
Management of the contract did 
not fully meet expectations. The 
department could have terminated 
the contract after four years by 






Owing to the department’s 
inability to manage the scale 
of the project, it was described 
as “a boat that was allowed to 
float without direction”.    
DOC=10; 
11 12; 04; 
01 
KPMG report says a termination 
of the contract will prove too 
onerous. 
SC Who are the 
experts? 
KPMG suggested a negotiated 
termination since the legal 
route will also be too costly. 
DOC=02; 
06 
The contract was favourable to 
Siemens, they failed to achieve 
key objectives, were they the 
correct service provider. 
SC  Who are the 
experts? 
Siemens is a global company 
that specialised in providing 
machines and boxes, and not 
systems development.  
DOC=12; 
01; 15 
Siemens had subcontracted the 
delivery of its services to EOH 
and the department was not happy 
with this. This is a contractor 
default, and the department should 
ask Siemens to rectify it.  
LC Are there 
undisclosed 
interest? 
The DoL should explain why 
it would want to host EOH on 
a non-tender basis. While 
there were suspicions about 
how EOH had got into the 
picture. 
DOC=18; 
01; 11; 06 
The contract was for a long period 
-- ten years was too long in the IT 
sphere.  
LC Are there 
undisclosed 
interest? 
Siemens failed to achieve key 
objectives such as improving 
the DOL’s “IT capability, 




Language and grammer used by 
the media are generally clear and 
appropriate  





Unnecessary or unexplained 
PPP contractual requirements 
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Whilst the evaluation of delivery against service requirements provides a historical view of 
events that took place over the ten-year PPP period, the significance of this research lies 
principally in the lessons learnt and which seek to provide a standpoint for other 
governmental departments that may be involved in such a PPP arrangement in years to 
come. In fact, the recommendations pertaining to internal control and monitoring systems 
are relevant not just to PPP contracts, but also on a wider level to all project activity where 
defined deliverables are identified. 
7.6.4 Empirical material and analysis 
The empirical material used in this study was gathered through downloading several media 
reports from a number of different websites: e.g., Department of Labour News Desk, 
Engineering News, Times Live, IT-Online, IT Web, Creamer Media, Business Technology 
and Sheq Africa. All of these are influential in communicating failed public sector ICT 
initiatives and the cost to government when having to renegotiate these contracts. The 
empirical material was collected by searching the Internet, using search statements (SIS and 
the DOL ICT), (ICT PPP contract the DOL and SIS) and (SIS, the DOL ICT failure). Table 
15 provides a detailed list of media sources and the number of articles used in the study. 
Each document was given a code by which it can be identified e.g. DOC=O1-DOC=20 
(refer to Appendix 3). 
Table 15: List of Media articles, Source: The Researcher 
Media sources                                       Number of 
articles 
Political Parties news room DA and ANC 1 
Sheq Africa 1 
IT-Online 2 
IT-WEB 2 
Business Technology 1 
Department of Labour (Media Desk) 4 
Engineering News 1 
SA IT News 2 
Times Live 3 
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The qualitative analysis ATLAS/TI software was used to support content analysis and 
coding of the empirical data. An interpretive analysis was conducted using key principles of 
the hermeneutic circle – i.e., abstraction and generalisation, dialogical reasoning and 
suspicion (Klein, 1999).  Abstraction is a conceptual process that removes certain 
characteristics from one set of ideas to reduce it to a set of essential characteristics. In 
generalising, specific information is applied broadly to different scenarios to draw a general 
conclusion from specific observations. Dialogical reasoning assists with the use of language 
and interaction with others, to make sense and understand the world around us. With 
suspicion comes the feeling of mistrust that something might be true or false but there is no 
certainty. Hence, after defining the corpus, Steps 2 to 3 (See Section 7.6.1) was followed, 
using the analysis procedure explained above. A list of central validity claims explicitly 
stated or implied in the media discourse was developed.   Table 14 illustrates how the 
validity of the claims was tested. The findings of the validity claims are explained below. 
 
Truth claim 
The truth claims were assessed by looking at argumentation and evidence in the text by 
evaluating the media articles relating to the challenges experienced with managing the 
project. The primary claim made by the stakeholders was that the project was a failure due 
to the lack of IT internal capacity not being developed to manage the project after the 
termination period, as well as competent management and relationship breakdown between 
stakeholders (DOC=12; 02; 01). The contract stated that the DOL staff would be transferred 
to Siemens at the beginning of the contract to be upskilled and to gain the necessary 
intellectual capacity to run the DOL’s IS platform at the end of the project (DOC=09; 06; 
07; 15; 13). Based on the challenges with competent DOL management not monitoring the 
project the consultants managed to expose the weakness of most of the DOL staff during the 
project. The conflict with SIS resulted in many DOL employees resigning who in the end 
was replaced with SIS/EOH consultants who had to be retained for business continuity and 
expertise. This led to expensive termination costs since the consultants, who had to be 
retained to continue running the IS platform, added more cost to the already inflated project 
 
  
PHD THESIS                                                                         RENE ALBERTUS 130 
 
costs. The government salary scales were lower than what the consultants were earning, 
adding an astronomical wage bill to the already strained project cost. Even though the main 
claim related to the lack of IT internal capacity not being developed, there were other 
challenges that contributed equally to the deterioration of the project such as. 
1. Relationship breakdown with SIS led to fewer constructive discussions and decision 
making forums;  
2. Continuous decrease in participation at meetings made way for inadequate 
monitoring, accountability and delays in decisions required;  
3. Lack of management involvement from the Department; 
4. Lack of clear contract management to provide proper advisory and oversight 
function for effective execution of the contract to ensure scope and deliverables were 
adhered to, and compliance effected;  
5. This included the failure to implement a penalty function which would penalise SIS 
for failure to deliver against requirements;  
6. Lack of internal resources with relevant technical skills to oversee SIS deliverables 
as a result of the DOL IT resources being taken over by SIS as demanded in the 
contract.  
The intention of the transfer of IT resources to SIS was for the DOL staff to shadow SIS and 
gain the expertise and knowledge to manage the IS platform when the contract was 
completed. This was shortsighted since it meant that non-ICT personnel were required to 
monitor and control ICT deliverables with no expertise in the field. 
In addition to this, it should be noted that removing the business analysis that was contracted 
from the scope of work resulted in the DOL not being able to effectively identify or specify 
its requirements before development started. The negotiation of this activity, as well as the 
lack of internal resources with relevant technical skills to oversee delivery, meant that the 
Department lost a degree of control over the work being performed by SIS.  The ‘descoping’ 
of these services entitled the Department to a reduction in the unitary fee. However, this 
failure to meet the service requirements and to agree on the status of deliverables 
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highlighted the lack of governance and a formal sign-off process. (DOC=01; 07; 20) In 
some cases, this meant that SIS was disputing with the Department as to whether or not 
certain service requirements could be deemed as being complete.   
According to the DOL, systems such as Siyaya were delivered and provided the level of 
functionality required. Other systems such as Financial Management System (FMS) were 
delivered but a number of functional issues existed and the failure to conduct a thorough 
post-implementation review meant that corrective action was not taken to address the 
outstanding issues. The Department also identified a number of open projects including 
Integrated Computer Management (ICM) where critical issues existed such as the lack of 
integration with SAP amongst other systems, and the limited number of automated 
processes. In many of these cases, the Department was in on-going disputes with SIS, as no 
clear service validation or sign-off process existed to facilitate agreement on the completion 
of projects.  
 
Legitimacy  
Legitimacy claims centre around participation of the inclusion or exclusion of specific 
stakeholders’ views in the media discourse. There is potential evidence of distortion in some 
of the claims for utility and accessibility when examining who is addressing the challenges 
of the project outcomes and the impact on the DOL. Considering who is included and 
excluded when experts are cited is another measure of legitimacy (Cukier et al., 2009). The 
fact that some were included for political reasons whiles others, e.g., the auditor who had no 
stake in the project, provided legitimacy and validity to the discourse.  Based on the content 
analysis, it appears those certain stakeholders’ perspective was more privileged in the 
discourse while others were not contacted and were marginalised. Most of the media reports 
consisted of all the high profile stakeholders’ opinions, such as the labour minister and 
committee members on the top structure, while the opinions of office employees working on 
the project, e.g., business analysts, the DOL staff that was managed by SIS/EOH, had 
basically disappeared from voicing their opinions (DOC=01; 05). The KPMG report of 2010 
noted that one of the key outcomes of this service area was the decision to utilise SAP as the 
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main software platform. The manner in which this system was introduced and implemented 
was under scrutiny as the report found a failure on the part of SIS to communicate and 
receive relevant authorisation from within the Department (DOC=01; 12; 20; 06). 
Another key point of contention was about the purchase of software licenses and 
responsibility for the license costs during and after the PPP contract. Using their global 
agreement with SAP, SIS negotiated an enterprise suite SAP licence package without the 
DOL’s approval (DOC=20; 04). A SAP enterprise suite licence package has an unlimited 
number of licence users compared to a licence per user package. SIS’s intention in buying a 
SAP licence enterprise suite was to enable the DOL to have as many SAP users as possible 
under one package, therefore realising the cost saving which they would not have realised 
had SAP licences been procured per user. At the time, the KPMG analysis found that SIS 
purchased the enterprise SAP licence suite at a cost of R54m. An amount of R8m for 
software licences was paid as part of the unitary fee (DOC=19; 20). SIS was claiming a 
figure of R46m for SAP licences, which is a difference between the cost of the enterprise 
SAP licence suite and the R8m licence fee, as defined in the PPP. There was no invoice for 
the R46m submitted by SIS to the DOL.  
KPMG reported that the internal observations were that SIS made use of SAP as the main 
operating platform; at this stage in the contract, Inspection and Enforcement (IES) system, 
the Compensation Fund’s claims and financial systems, and the Integrated Client Database 
(ICD) were all being developed on the SAP platform at an advanced stage. The Intranet 
Portal and National Skills Fund financial system were already completed by SAP. The 
Department’s view was that SIS undertook no adequate consultation exercise, and thus the 
Department was not given the opportunity to formally approve the decision (DOC=20; 17). 
However, it is also noted that the Department did not proactively engage in the discussion 
around the utilisation of SAP. Annexure 9 of the PPP contract sets out a clear governance 
structure to ensure that the fundamental objectives of the PPP are met and there are clear 
channels for communication and decision making (See Appendix 1). The agreed structure 
sets out roles and responsibilities for an Executive Committee, Steering Committee, Service 
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Management Committee and a Change Management Committee (DOC=17). The Executive 
Committee was required to authorise appropriate amendments and changes to the PPP 
contract, whilst the Service Management Committee was mandated to ensure that contracted 
services delivered ICT enablement to the Department’s business processes, consistent with 
the PPP (DOC=20; 17; 11).  
Another key issue noted was that the Department was still using the same software for its 
business productivity applications as well as the operating systems that these ran on. At the 
point of review, these had reached the end of life, and support for these was due to expire 
soon. In addition to this, it was noted that the original PPP contract had made provision for 
100 laptops but this had increased to 900 laptops, thereby increasing the costs for 
infrastructure, support and the unitary fee.  
Sincerity 
Sincerity requires agreement between what is said and what is meant, or between the 
underlying intent and the expressed intent in the communication. Hyperbole, imagery and 
metaphor can support some viewpoints in the discourse even in the lack of evidence. 
Implied meaning has been used in the body expansively. A basic word choice could have an 
insightful impact on the interpretation of the speech act. Most of the articles quoted the 
Director General of the DOL saying “The management of the contract did not fully meet 
expectations, owing to the department’s inability to manage the scale of the project”, and 
described it as being “a boat that was allowed to float without direction” (DOC=10; 01; 18). 
This is a very valid statement considering all the challenges experienced with the delivery of 
a successful project. We see language with influential suggestions used to reinforce the 
claim about terminating the contract because of contractors’ default. For example, despite 
the contractor’s default on SIS's part, the KPMG report said a termination of the contract 
would prove too onerous (DOC=02; 04). For this reason, it suggested a negotiated 
termination since the legal route would also be costly. There were areas where the DOL 
could have implemented penalties, for example, the late commencement of services, said 
KPMG. For example they state: “There is evidence of billing inconsistency with the 
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intention of the contract” (DOC=02; 12; 19). They added that the department should review 
invoices and reclaim these bills. The treasury also found that a lack of contract 
understanding by DOL stakeholders resulted in contractual remedies not being utilised when 
SIS's performance was inadequate. 
Comprehensibility 
The semantic and syntactic accuracy of the text was the most important factor to consider 
for the purpose of this study, for the assessment of comprehensibility. The analysis gave a 
clear indication that the articles were to the point and clearly articulated. There was little 
evidence of violation of the comprehensibility claims, hence the media reports did not 
sensationalise the details of the contract failure but focused on the facts which led to the 
failure of the projects – such as the blatant neglect of training IT skills to manage the DOL 
after the project was completed; and the challenges experienced with having competent 
management that could have prevented the cost overruns if the contract was managed to 
impose the necessary penalties for non-delivery. 
7.7 Discussion and conclusions 
The analysis revealed communication distortions based on the fact that the media discourse 
represented stakeholders such as the DOL, CIO, Minister, auditors and some politicians, but 
end users working at the DOL using the system were not represented. The lack of end user 
representation was a major distortion to this discourse. Even though the media reports were 
congruent with the main stakeholder views, not getting the end users’ perspective leaves 
room for bias. 
The media became part of the creation of general distortions by reporting claims factually 
and reinforcing those claims through loaded language. However, the media did show some 
caution in their reporting. Verification with the public and private sector was evident in the 
empirical evidence. The media’s interest in this PPP was highly visible in many press 
releases and the CIO and Minister were very vocal, voicing their opinions in the media. 
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Despite the stakeholders voicing their opinion about SIS failure to provide a fully functional 
and integrated system, there is little evidence that SIS provided a remedy for the lack of 
project success or the role they played in the failure. To SIS this was not a failure, but a 
breakdown in communication in a partnership. Even though SIS did not admit to failure, the 
fact that the DOL had to re-engage consultants to assist with the termination phase pointed 
to failure and distortion in the discourse. Stakeholders are not all equal to have their 
opinions heard in the face of the media; this may partially account for reliability and 
governance of the discourse despite the illogical elements exposed in the analysis.  
The research indicates how the validity claims can provide a framework for assessing public 
discourse for PPP contracting for IS implementation, to reveal distortions. Even though the 
scope of this analysis was fairly small, the similarities identified are reflected in other 
discourses about technology (Chigona & Chigona, 2008; Cukier et al., 2009). The research 
illustrated the use of Habermas’ validity claim to investigate media discourse. It illustrated 
the method by investigating media discourse to PPP contracting for ICT service delivery on 
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CHAPTER 8: Theoretical Reflection, Integration, Contribution Limitations and 
conclusion of the research 
8.1  Reflections  
As a researcher, the decision to embark on this research was prompted after many years of 
observing ICT/IS service delivery failures. These failures had a huge impact on 
organisational effectiveness and inefficiencies perpetuating organisational challenges 
instead of improving business solutions (that are expected of implementing integrated ERP 
solutions). The research emerged as a result of observing ERP challenges during the 
researcher’s career of 25 years in the corporate world, having had the opportunity to observe 
system failures, which are due to management competency challenges and not system 
complexities. Human beings design and implement systems and should ultimately have the 
capability and competence to manage these systems ensuring the intended results are 
delivered.  
As a researcher, my interest to embark on this research was further enhanced by 
organisation project sponsors that fail to search for the technical expertise that can facilitate 
seamless ICT/IS implementation. The organisations’ choice of service providers is based on 
prior relationship associations, which have coined the term nepotism. Nepotism might be 
rife in the public sector but the private sector is not immune to this governance challenge, 
hence colluding with consultants has become the norm rather than the exception. Collusion 
has been to the detriment of achieving the goals and objectives of the organisation.  
Consultants have created various complexities when implementing ERP solutions to 
intentionally or unintentionally generate dependency and reliance on them for continuous 
service delivery. This is as a result of top management putting too much power in the hands 
of the consultants and overlooking key in-house resources to closely monitor the 
consultants’ performance. In most cases it is the other way around – consultants are more 
empowered and feel inclined to micro manage in-house resources on the project, due to fear 
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of being exposed. This unfortunate behaviour disempowers in-house resources since 
consultants are valued based on the perception of being more knowledgeable.  
The researcher has taken a detailed view of this PPP contract for ICT/IS service delivery 
challenges that were experienced by the DOL. The aim is to contribute to the dearth of 
literature on PPP contracts for ICT/IS service delivery. The initial goal was to conduct one 
study of the failure of the PPP contract for ICT/IS service delivery between the DOL and 
SIS. Conversely, three studies have emerged from the research, due to the complexity of 
public sector PPP arrangements for ICT/IS service delivery.  
It has emerged that the real value of PPP arrangements is the way in which these 
partnerships were managed. The value that the public sector is looking for is a fully 
integrated system that will increase efficiencies and develop in-house expertise and 
technical knowledge. Prior to engaging in such an agreement, government departments are 
required to complete a number of activities to ensure that a PPP contract is suitable to 
meeting specific requirements. This is a lengthy process, which sometimes defeats the 
objective of the requirements, specifically in IS implementations. ICT/IS implementations 
should be achieved over 18 to 24 months at the maximum to extrapolate the best value and 
to ensure business is aligned with the rapid changes in innovation, specifically IS.  
The contract for this ICT/IS implementation was scheduled to take place during a ten-year 
period and it is clear case of project fatigue. The analysis of the contract and policy in 
empirical Study 1 pointed to the fact that the contract was weak and favoured SIS, which 
was confirmed by the CIO in the minutes of meetings. Management and staff of the DOL 
failed in managing the performance of the consultants and, from the empirical findings, it 
became clear that critical risk factors were not taken into account. A weak management 
structure in the public sector, and challenges with maintaining skilled IS resources, 
weakened institutional structures and created a major dependency on EOH/SIS resources. 
There was reluctance from the stakeholders to take part in the interview process for 
empirical Study 2, due to government sensitivity and political issues, but the minutes of 
meetings were comprehensive and gave much needed substance which corroborated the 
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findings in the Study 1. Empirical Study 3, which used Harbermas’ four validity claims of 
truth, legitimacy, sincerity and comprehensibility, assisted with the analysis of the media 
discourse, and corroborated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 which have been reflected in the 
propositions in section 8.2.2. 
The sections that follow provide a discussion on the theoretical integration, findings, 
contribution and limitations of this research. 
8.2 Theoretical contribution 
In this PhD thesis, the researcher set out to develop an understanding of the factors and 
conditions contributing to PPP ICT service failures in South Africa. The empirical setting of 
my investigation was the DOL ERP project; a failed attempt to implement an ERP system to 
support government services using a PPP; the new public management approach promoted 
by international institutions as a solution to inefficiencies; and resource constraints of 
governments. The objective of the thesis was the development of a theoretically informed 
understanding of the challenges of managing PPP ICT service contracts, on which improved 
management strategies and practices could be developed to ensure better returns on public 
investments in ICT services. The researchers’ inquiry was informed by agency theory and 
used a multi-methods approach to collecting and analyzing the empirical data. Three 
empirical studies were designed to inquire into critical aspects of the problem, namely the 
DOL’s PPP policy and contractual arrangements for the management of risks, management 
competence challenges, and perceptions about public accountability (Refer to Figure 4). For 
the first empirical study, the researcher used an agency theory framework to interrogate risk 
factors and risk management strategies addressed in the PPP policy framework and the PPP 
contract. For this inquiry, the researcher used agency theory and content analysis to analyze 
the PPP policy, the contract and relevant organizational documents to determine the 
preparedness of the DOL to manage the risks of the ERP implementation. In the second 
empirical study, the researcher interviewed key stakeholders of the DOL ERP 
implementation project and analyzed key meeting minutes to develop an understanding of 
the challenges, which the implementation managers faced during the unfolding of the 
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project. Finally, in the third empirical study, the researcher conducted a critical discourse 
analysis of the extensive media reports on the DOL PPP implementation projects to develop 
an understanding of the public accountability issues concerning the failure of the project.  
The principal finding of this research is that while the DOL project faced challenges of 
institutional PPP policy, contracting framework and management competence limitations for 
effectively managing the project risks, the central issues were; A set of interlocking 
conditions, including extreme dependency on the private partner, which doomed the project 
to failure. To illustrate these interlocking conditions and develop a more general explanation 
of the empirical observations the researcher developed a causal loop modelling technique 
proposed by Senge (2006). The causal loop model is a useful tool for illustrating and 
theoretically elaborating the empirical findings. It enabled the researcher to capture and 
model influences of organisational conditions and responses of the organisational actors as 
they tried to mediate the challenges of the PPP project.  The causal loop model Figure 4 is a 
systems analysis technique with tools for illustrating relationships among organisational 
conditions, their influences on actor behaviour and how these reinforce patterns of 
organisational activity that are supportive growth (success) or decline (failure) (Senge, 
2006). Causal loop models consist of two distinct feedback processes Reinforcing (or 
amplifying) feedback systems are engines of growth and balancing (or stabilising) feedback 
systems, which operate whenever there is a goal-orientated behaviour. Reinforcing feedback 
can also generate accelerating decline – a pattern of decline where small drops amplify 
themselves into larger and larger drops. In the next section, the researcher used the causal 
loop modeling technique to illustrate the interlocking dynamics of the principal-agent 
relationship, and institutional and organisational conditions that influenced the failure of the 
DOL PPP ERP implementation project.   
8.2.1 An explanation of the interlocking logic of the IS failure 
An isolated interpretation of the findings of the individual empirical studies of the case 
might lead one to conclude that incompetent managers were responsible for the PPP failure 
(cf. newspaper reports). A critical reading of the case points to a set of interlocking 
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organisational conditions (policy, expertise, incentive and resource deficiencies) 
constraining the potential for effective management actions and successful implementation 
of the PPP project. However, when the empirical observations is interpreted within the 
wider institutional and organisational context, logic begins to emerge of interlocking 
organisational conditions constraining management action and influencing decisions sub-
optimally to effectively manage the DOL PPP project. It becomes clear that the 
management, even with the lack of ERP expertise and PPP management competence, is not 
singularly responsible for the failure, as the news reports have suggested. The causal loop 
model in Figure 4, illustrates direct and indirect relationships between empirical observed 
organisational conditions and organisational outcomes. Organisational conditions such as 
lack of IT expertise and/or project management expertise, dependency on consultants, 
inappropriate vendor selection and lack of skilled professionals influenced organisational 
outcomes. Further, the causal model illustrates these inter-locking organisational dynamics 
that could explain the failure of the PPP initiative.  
8.2.2 Organisational conditions and PPP failure 
The first empirical study revealed key institutional structures, organisational policies and 
resources that were inadequate to support the DOL managers effectively in executing their 
fiduciary responsibilities with regard to managing the PPP initiative. For example, 
Empirical Study 1 revealed that key policy instruments (government legislation and the PPP 
contract) did not account for, nor offer prescriptions for, the specific risks that accrue from 
principal-agent relationships when information asymmetry is in favour of the agent, even 
though it was quite clear that this was a prevailing organisational condition of the DOL. 
Further, the empirical analysis of the DOL contract also revealed that no provision was 
made for the effective management of specific risks that accrue from principal-agent 
relationships. For example, the DOL contract did not specify risk mitigation mechanisms for 
the following common principal-agent risks: lack of performance monitoring, inappropriate 
vendor selection, lack of competent management and skilled IS resources, moral hazard and 
strategic planning.  
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The results from the first study prompted Empirical Study 2 in which interviews were 
conducted with key stakeholders and minutes of meetings were perused for the challenges 
of the PPP contract for ICT/IS service delivery. The interview responses corroborated the 
findings of Study 1 – that risk mitigation strategies were not in place and that there was a 
major challenge with mitigating risk. Challenges with risk mitigation created a huge 
dependency on consultants resulting in inflated project cost and tainting the viability of the 
project. Empirical Study 3 which analysed the media discoursed corroborated the empirical 
finding of the first two studies which contributed to the failure of the implementation. The 
DOL contract did not include any incentive structures to assist in the effective management 
of performance, as admonished by researchers of such principal-agent relationships in ICT 
contracting services (Ngwenyama & Bryson, 1999; Osei-Bryson & Ngwenyama, 2006; 
Sullivan & Ngwenyama, 2005; Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007; Bryson & Ngwenyama, 
2000). 
Systemic models can be enablers to demonstrate combined, systemic planning in relation to 
the realisation of goals and expected outcomes. Often PPP project proposals may not clearly 
specify the relationship shared among resources, planned activities/outputs, and the benefits 
expected from the PPP project. The systemic model can be useful in the magnitude to which 
the PPP project has made an impact, or how it can make a difference. 
The detailed features of a causal loop model are enablers to illustrate the associations amid 
the mechanisms of the PPP IS implementation. A model provides a collective vocabulary to 
describe elements of the PPP contract in a way that encourages deeper understanding of the 
challenges that are experienced and highlights the dependency on consultants who challenge 
international best practice.  Causal loop modelling could be a transformation tool for PPP 
managers in the way of solving PPP-related problems systemically (Senge, 2006). 
The new model characterises an effective concept that will allow for better communication 
of the expected results of managing a successful PPP contract ICT service delivery. It 
represents a strategic view of staff and other stakeholders’ input into the preparation phase, 
with the intention to produce the expected results through utilising input of these resources. 
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Furthermore, the causal loop model for PPP contracting is beneficial in focusing 
accomplishments and in clarifying how each is expected to contribute to the expected 
results. 
Through integrating PPP contract elements, actions and resources in an explicit model 
format, PPP stakeholders are better able to monitor the progress of IS implementation with 
regard to the most important project objectives. Systemic models inspire practical project 
planning and enable investors to visualise what can reasonably be expected from the 
implementation of the planned activities and the delivery of intended outputs. This approach 
is also extended to risk management of large and complex construction projects (Wibowo & 
Patria, 2007). 
According to McNamara (2006), systemic modelling is a tool that helps to consolidate the 
relationship between major project activities and expected outcomes. It can be effective in 
planning a PPP project design, implementing project deliverables, and evaluating project 
success. It should be noted that while a systemic model demonstrates the relationships 
shared by PPP project fundamentals, such as expected outcomes, variations, or impact that 
could be derived through the project processes, a systemic model does not take the place of 
the performance indicators within a PPP project context.   
The theoretical understanding is based on the empirical findings of the initial configuration 
of the nomological net and the empirical conclusions have been formalised by reviewing the 
institutional the framework with specific reference to the five risk factors (See Table 4). 
Further, due to the non-linearity of the interactions, the causal loop model (Refer to Figure 
4) is an appropriate tool for illustrating the dynamics of influences in the case situation.   
This diagram shows a reinforcing feedback process wherein actions snowball and a 
balancing feedback process starts with the discrepancy between what is desired and what 
exists. 
The tendering process is enforced by government legislation and is intended to be open and 
transparent. Whether the process is followed and enforced remains questionable. The bidder 
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should prove their knowledge in relation to their technical capability, financial standing and 
knowledge management. Siemens had the financial standing and commercial exposure but 
lacked technical expertise. It was brought to light that during the project implementation, 
EOH was performing the work at the DOL for which Siemens had been appointed. Siemens 
indicated that they were taken over by EOH, the reason for EOH being the main service 
provider. This begged the question whether Siemens was selected based on technical 
expertise or merely commercial exposure, which, in fact, nullifies the tendering process. The 
fact that SIS was not held accountable for breaching the tendering process encouraged their 
iniquitous behaviour. 
There is a large body of literature which argues that management failure is often not the 
result of irrational or incompetent individual actions, but a complex web of organisational 
conditions (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994; Ulrich & Lake, 1991; Brunsson, 1982; Lyles & 
Schwenk, 1992; Hyvari, 2006; Kanter, 1989; Weick, 1993). For example, Lyles and 
Schwenk (1992) argue that when organisational policy instruments do not address strategic 
objectives, managers are unlikely to reach their goals.  
The causal loop model/ feedback systems are numbered one to four starting with an 
introduction to the legislation and tendering process, which is now explained. 
1. The lack of the DOL’s commercial and technical experience increased dependency on 
SIS since DOL was unable to define performance measures. Siemens was not the 
appropriate vendor for this projects due to lack of technical knowledge, hence the need 
for EOH to manage the implementation. The CIO of DOL state: “Siemens is a global 
company that specialised in providing machines and boxes, and did not develop systems. 
Ten years in the IT sphere is being regarded as too long since it is such a dynamic and 
changing environment”. An inefficient public management system and lack of skilled 
managers allowed Siemens to renege on meeting critical goals and deadlines. The belief 
that Siemens had superior knowledge and expertise increased the DOL’s dependence on 
them as a service provider. The fact that SIS undermined the entire implementation 
points to the weak management and lack of expert IT resources that failed to point out 
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shortcomings on project deliverables.  
2. The challenge of information asymmetry that exists is hidden information and hidden 
action. In the former, it was perceived that SIS had superior knowledge to the DOL and 
this would have affected the governance aspect of this implementation. The fact that SIS 
actions could not be observed or monitored was the other challenge. Hidden action and 
hidden information are closely related to the possibilities of adverse selection and moral 
hazard, respectively. It also appeared the DOL did not have a handle on the consultants 
day-to-day performance based on asymmetry of information, and could not monitor the 
activities of the consultants. The challenge with the project scope not being defined and 
managed was another inability of the DOL’s lack of training and expertise to manage an 
IT implementation of this nature with limited expert resources. Challenges with 
monitoring and governance of the project posed many challenges for the success of the 
project, further increasing the DOL dependence. 
3. The attrition of key the DOL staff that was supposed to be trained by SIS created a 
deepened dependence on SIS. The erosion of key IT resources destroyed internal 
capacity which reduced input levels, leading to lack of skilled management being trained 
to manage the termination process. With SIS controlling the project, moral hazard 
affected the project success, since the efforts of the agent could not be observed by the 
principal, resulting in further monitoring problems. The attrition of staff slowed down 
continuity, reinforcing dependency on consultants. 
4. The challenges experienced with input levels had a snowball effect on the project cost 
overruns and the quality of the project deliverables. The fact that consultants were left to 
run rampant with the project by replacing the DOL staff with consultants at inflated 
salaries increased moral hazard.  DOL incurred further cost when they had to take on the 
Siemens staff in terms of Section 197 of the Labour Relations Act. These challenges 
destroyed the expected benefits of the PPP contract and the loss of social surplus was 
enhanced. Taking over the Siemens/EOH staff meant that they were going to be paid the 
salaries they had been earning as consultants which was higher than the salary scales 
offered by government, further exploiting the public sector’s already depleted budget. 
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The IS implementation for the Department of Labour did not meet with the time and cost 
goals that were established by risks identified in the agency theory framework. Sterman 
(1992) state, that several large projects do not meet their time and cost goals, and if projects 
are not well defined, complexities that are difficult to manage set in, which was experiences 
on this project. Project manager researchers (Rodrigues and Bowers 1996, Williams 1999, 
Love, Edwards & Irani, 2012) state that the project goals are often not realised, and that the 
project management concepts and tools utilised today are too linear and rigid. The systems 
available for project management are too complex and unstable and contain much 
unpredictability that is difficult to manage effectively by the linear, rigid tools that focus on 
one aspect of the system periodically. These researchers have suggested that system 
dynamics ideas and tools, such as causal loop diagrams and detailed model, should be 
integrated into PPP contracting for ICT/IS service delivery. This should allow project 
managers to get a global perspective of the structures of the system in which project 
management is utilised and potentially provide better planning and control over projects.  
A systemic model (refer to in Figure 4) is a graphical technique of representing associations 
between project resources, activities, outputs and results. Systemic models are scheduling, 
implementation and monitoring tools that stipulate the resources a PPP project will employ, 
to conduct activities that are intended to produce detailed, definite and measurable changes, 
or results in individuals, organisations, or the more comprehensive physical and public 
environment (Senge, 2006). 
It is imperative to have an understanding of the context in which the PPP projects were 
studied, how they were developed and what basic assumptions and purpose of the project is 
designed to have an impact on. There are very precise terms used in systemic modelling that 
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The main theoretical contribution is addressed in the propositions using agency theory as a 
guideline, clarifying the risk presented during the contractual phase. The research followed and 
agency theory perspective and the nomological net (See Figure 1) assisted the researcher to 
clarify any integrated aspects that would assist with the suggestions of future PPP contracting for 
ICT service delivery in the information systems domain. The principles from the extant literature 
integrated what emerged from the individual studies and provided a cohesive and coherent 
theoretical understanding. The connection of the empirical findings forms each study and their 
connection emphasises the nomological net that makes explicit the applicability of agency theory 
in the theoretical elaboration. 
The research, through the findings of the three empirical studies, made specific contribution in 
other areas. It connected the media and stakeholders’ perspective and provided clear indications 
on where challenges were experienced and what contributed to the project failing. It enforced the 
reason for investigating a research project by using different data sources, taking into account the 
media’s views, different stakeholder perspectives as well as documents that were the foundations 
of starting the contract. The researcher identified several specific factors that are critical to PPP 
contracting for ICT service delivery success in the future. Firstly, the retention and training of 
relevant IS resources. Secondly, the development of key management competencies and the 
selection of a vendor with appropriate skills. Thirdly, having a revolving strategic plan and 
ensuring that there is competent management to monitor and manage the project exclusively, 
without losing focus of day-to-day business or critical project delivery deadlines. 
Using an agency theory framework, the researcher highlights the interactive processes that are 
required when engaging in PPP contracting for ICT service delivery for information systems 
implementations. The proposed framework, unlike the existing generic PPP model, 
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negotiated and the various stages that need to be re-evaluated and adjusted, as they are unfolding. 
The ‘one size fits all’ PPP procurement model for successful PPP contracting for ICT service 
delivery in the information systems domain cannot be taken for granted. 
The empirical analysis in Chapters five to seven provides evidence that the agent was in a 
superior position from the start of the contract. Organisations are dynamic; therefore, vendor 
experience and expertise should have been verified before the contract was granted. Large IS 
projects are difficult to monitor, particularly if they are longer than three years. It is a challenge 
to know whether things are going well during an implementation, until ultimate abandonment 
and failure (Oakeshott, 1962).  
The above discussion leads to the following propositions, which have been derived from, a 
holistic reflection of the three studies conducted in this research.  
P1: When public sector managers lack expert knowledge of the work to be contracted 
out, they are highly likely to inadequately specify the contractual obligations of the 
external consultants/vendors engaged to perform the work. 
Based on the empirical evidence, management’s lack of knowledge of ICT services had a major 
impact on the success of the contract. The lack of skilled managers and IT professionals in the 
public sector is a major challenge when contracts for ICT services are crafted. This has resulted 
in contractual obligations not being specified or action taken by consultants. The effect of this 
has been that consultants’ performance was not adequate managed and has given consultants a 
gateway to behave opportunistically. Consultants’ opportunistic behaviour is a direct result 
stemming from the realisation that there is a skills challenge and lack of competent management 
in the public sector. Lack of expert knowledge influences good decision making, affecting the 
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researchers have indicated that the key goal to ensure successful PPP contracting requires legal 
and technical experts to design contracts that are clear and comprehensive, so as to avoid the 
likelihood of failure which leads to renegotiation (Marques & Berg, 2011; Klein, 1998; Lane, 
1997). Klein (1998) reiterates that it is essential to design contracts resistant to renegotiation and 
which can be adjusted to changing circumstances without undermining the original terms of the 
contract. Klein (1998) further defines specifications of a contract as problematic; even when the 
greatest of care is taken when drafting a contract, certain aspects will be left out, resulting in all 
contingencies not being covered, leading to loopholes in the contract. The proposition below has 
been developed based on the previous discussion. 
P2: When public sector managers lack expert knowledge of the work to be contracted 
out, they are unable to define risk factors, risk mitigation strategies and performance 
measures to effectively manage the performance of external consultants/vendors. 
The proposition derived from the empirical analysis is corroborated in the content of the 
literature and the empirical evidence. The fact that the contract for ICT service did not 
adequately specify risk factors and risk mitigation strategies to effectively manage the private 
sector’s performance contributed mostly to the failure. 
 
Opportunism, which is a major risk factor in an ICT service delivery, seems to have played a 
definitive role in the failure of the contract. The most important displays of opportunism are 
moral hazard, adverse selection and flawed guarantee. Moral hazard results from the fact that it 
is impossible for the public sector to observe the private sectors performance since ethical 
challenges are difficult to detect, without incurring unreasonable costs. Moral hazard is not 
obvious during the implementation of the contract since loophole that exists arise 
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being able to monitor the private sector’s performance. Failure to address adverse selection 
challenges the role of the public sector to make wise choices in partnerships (Jensen, 2003). The 
public sector will have to be trained to handle adverse selection problems or ‘ex ante’ contractual 
opportunism, since the private sector might sue the public sector for contract violation rather 
than correct the supply, when faced with criticism for non-delivery (Gottlieb & Moreira, 2013). 
P3: When public sector managers lack expert knowledge of the work to be contracted 
out, there is a high likelihood of selecting unqualified consultants/ vendors and increased 
chances of project failure. 
The empirical evidence has proven that Siemens was chosen because of commercial exposure 
and was not necessarily based on sound technical skills. During the ex-ante contractual period, 
selecting a right vendor through tendering is the most important priority. The factors that might 
result in the failure of this process are automatic selection due to nepotism and political 
favouring; sometimes adverse selection in cases where the agent misrepresents their skills, since 
a complete verification of agent skills cannot be done at the stage of hiring or the early stages of 
implementation (Eishenhardt, 1989). Dibbern, Brehm and Heinzl (2002) state that the agent is 
selected based on the business image and years of commercial experience, they provided to 
previous EPR implementations. This influences the principle’s decision to choose them, thus 
constituting the core of what can be concealed or misrepresented. Knowledge that can be 
misrepresented is that of IS infrastructure required, configuration knowledge and integration with 
legacy systems (Violino & Caldwell, 1998). Some of the concerns are that there is lack of 
incentives for workers in the public sector to promote accountability and transparency, hence the 
fact that they shirk on pointing out when the private sector misrepresents or reneges on 
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misled is that of the retention of skilled IT professionals, placing a huge dependency on the 
private sector. The proposition below is developed in light of the above discussion. 
 
P4:  When public sector managers lack expert knowledge of, and competence for, 
managing the work to be contracted out, and they are dependent upon external 
consultants/vendors for the expertise, this undermines their capacity to secure the public 
interest.  
 
The fact that the DOL transferred all staff to Siemens was shortsighted, leaving the DOL 
vulnerable and exposed. The DOL staff retention strategy was dismal, there was no existent 
leadership, they had three CIOs for the duration of the contract, and Siemens consultants mainly 
filled the technical environment as well as the external supply environment, since they had taken 
over the DOL staff. As staff turnover occurred, continuity in capability was lost and expertise 
was eroded in the DOL. The subject of skills retention in contractual arrangements has received 
little attention (Willcocks et al., 1999). In the UK it has been observed that the public sector keep 
staff in a ‘residual’ function in order to maintain IT governance and contractual monitoring to 
ensure active engagement with the private sector on their responsibilities (Fitzgerald & 
Willcocks, 1994). Feeny and Willocks (1998) show the need to mitigate risks relating to 
resourcing of skilled IT professionals by ensuring there are resources in the four phases of IT 
function, i.e., governance and elicitation; delivery of IS requirements; maintaining the technical 
base; and managing external supply with nine capabilities and their underlying skills. These nine 
capabilities are leadership, informed buying (governance); relationship building, business 
systems thinking (business face); technical architecture, making technology work (technical 
face), contract facilitation, contract monitoring and vendor development (external supply face) 
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observe in other cases, if capabilities erode and consultants take over responsibility of the 
principal by rationalising it as part of the ‘strategic relationship’, it becomes a high risk factor. 
The depletion of critical skills due to attrition, politics and principal-agent frustration was 
detrimental to the termination phase and success of this project. To assist with skills retention, 
Feeny and Willcocks (1998) suggest that the different types of skills and knowledge need to be 
spread throughout the nine capabilities mentioned above to assist with skills retention. The 
proposition below was developed because if IT skills are harnessed and competent management 
is operational, ethical threat can be limited. 
 
P5: When public sector managers lack expert knowledge and competence for managing 
the work to be contracted out and they are dependent on external consultants/agents for 
their expertise, their ability to effectively manage the external consultants/agents is 
undermined. 
 
The public sector was able to observe certain outputs of the PPP for ICT/IS services but, in the 
case of low output, they were not able to determine whether it related to low-level effort on the 
part of the private party, or moral hazard. The public sector itself represented a source of risk 
based on their dependency on the consultants. Lack of experience or expertise of the public 
sector is a major risk factor, specifically for ICT service. The public sector engaged the private 
sector for the delivery of ICT services, due to lack of experience and resources to manage the IS 
domain. When a contract is signed, the public sector should ensure all clauses are in the contract 
and are being monitored, e.g., controls and penalties that could limit but generally not prevent 
the ability of the private sector to indulge in corruption (de Palma et al., 2009). Tuttle, Harrelland 
Harrison, (1997) have indicated that the moral hazard construct is central to agency theory and 
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includes actions and behaviours inconsistent with the goals of the principal. The two greatest 
challenges of shirking in contractual relationships exist. First, the agent’s avoidance of 
contractual obligations when the principal is not vigilant to use adequate monitoring mechanisms 
while the agent has a motive to capitalise on profits. Second, the agent misrepresents the facts 
and challenges to protect reputation and avoid reprimand by the principal (de Palma et al., 2009).  
8.3  Contribution to Practices 
The risks that influenced the success of this project were mainly related to management 
competence and the retention of skilled IT resources. The empirical analysis has indicated that 
the effective management of the contractual obligations by the principal could have ensured the 
successful execution of the contract.  If penalties for non-performance against the agent had been 
imposed and IS capacity, planning had been a priority it could have curbed the contract failures.  
The structuring of the contract showed many gaps, specifically in the area of risk mitigation, as 
well as challenges with the lengthy procurement process, which created institutional bottlenecks. 
As Drake and Moberg (1986) and Ngwenyama and Nielsen (2014) point out, the agent has five 
important sources of power and influence – legislative authority over the target, the ability to 
reward, the ability to coerce, expert knowledge and control of the target’s critical activities. The 
lack of public vigilance is what allows the private sector to reduce their input level, which may 
influence project cost and quality and lead to moral hazard (Gottlieb & Moreira, 2013).  Moral 
hazard is a strategic behaviour that refers to the endogenous variables of the private sector that 
cannot be observed by the public sector. With the use of Habermasian concepts of ideal speech 
and the four validity claims of truth, sincerity, legitimacy and comprehensibility, further 
understanding was provided to some of the arguments that various actors in the public discourse 
made to explain the issues of skills retention and management competencies influencing the 
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Based on the findings from the three studies, the researcher proposes a new model for 
formulating PPP contracts for ICT/IS service delivery. Figure 5 below provides an illustration of 
the framework and the concepts to be embedded in a successful PPP contract. 
Level 1: PPP success and sustainability will produce benefits when the business environment is 
conducive to transparency; accountability and governance at the beginning limit corrupt 
practices.  Risk allocation has a direct financial influence on the project; it could result in lower 
overall project costs and will provide enhanced value-for-money when compared to outdated 
procurement options. The allocation of risk management and risk management strategies should 
reflect the specific characteristics of the project and the strengths of each party. 
Level 2: The Legal framework at all intervals, or legal indecision, due to non-existent and 
incomplete legal frameworks, can delay successful project implementation. This results in 
project delays in implementation and poor results due to the lack of effective project 
management and monitoring process. 
Level 3: Governments face major challenges when awarding PPP contracts due to the ‘ex ante’ 
contractual strategic behaviours that exist, such as adverse selection (sometimes-automatic 
selection) when having to select the most suitable consultant for a contract. This can be 
disallowed if independent observers manage the tendering process. It will prevent moral hazard 
‘ex post’ contractual strategic behaviour playing out after the contract is awarded, which is 
inconsistent with clauses in the contract that create opportunities for consultants to shirk. The 
aim to get the institutional environment on track will be to ensure strategic behaviours and 
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Level 4: The more complex the project and the involvement of local and international 
stakeholders, the easier it is for corrupt practices to go unnoticed. The escalation of such 
practices can jeopardise the long-term financial feasibility of the project.  Performance 
monitoring is a major component to minimise cost overruns, specifically monitoring resources 
and project implementation cost. Penalties need to be imposed as stipulated in the agreement and 
salary scales need to stay aligned with government structures. 
Figure 5 is a proposed conceptual framework for successful PPP contracting for ICT/IS service 
delivery; it sets out the processes to follow to achieve success. The fact that the bidding or tender 
process must be without bias will be the first goal in achieving success with PPP contracts for IS 
implementation between the public and private sector. IS implementations are generally complex 
activities calling for coordination from all stakeholders involved (Markus et al., 2000). The 
coordination between the implementation partners, the public and private sector in this case, 
deserves special attention because many partnerships have reported having conflicts (sometimes 
severe) with IT professionals and private sector service providers, especially over contractual 
provisions (e.g., pricing and billing arrangements) and project directions (e.g., project 
management) (Basu & Lederer, 2004). Empirical evidence from this research suggested that it 
was challenges with risk factors that affected the project success. Contracting out information 
systems implementations to a consultant is the principal-agent relationship at its clearest, with a 
written contract binding the parties (Phelps, 1996). With the private partner as the agent and the 
public sector representing the principal, typical agency problems are expected to be evident in 
their relationship. Tuttle, Harrell and Harrison (1997) have established that private sector IS 
professionals are inclines to implement IS systems with quality problems resulting in ethical 
threat. In a decision-making experiment Tuttle et al., (1997) examined the effects of ethical 
threat posed by IS professionals; whether they intentionally implement a system with quality 
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employment due to ignorance of the principal. Tuttle et al., (1997) concluded that IS 
professionals who experience conditions of ethical threat would exhibit propensity to implement 
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8.4   Limitations of this research 
While conducting the empirical studies the researcher discovered that PPPs are joint ventures in 
which a government agency commits to a long-term relationship with a private-sector vendor (or 
consortium) to share investments, risks and rewards to build and run a public-sector programme. 
Unlike traditional outsourcing or performance-based contracts, PPP contracts are based on a 
model of shared benefit and shared risk. The degree of risk involved for both the public and the 
private partners is very much based on the type of PPP contract put in place. 
Even though there are many other methods, South Africa has not made use of them. Design 
Build Finance Operate Transfer (DBFOT) worked for the successful execution of the Gautrain; 
however, it does not mean it will work for ICT/IS service delivery. Lack of accountability by the 
private sector and low level of efficiency from the public sector to monitor the private sector’s 
performance have resulted in opportunistic bargaining and shirking on the private sector side. In 
addition, the lack of management competence and capacity planning for expert resources for 
skills retention by the public sector in the IS domain posed a serious risk and threat to the project 
success. This resulted in high project costs overruns and the need for further expenditure for 
termination support after the completion of the contract. Transparency is significantly important 
in ensuring selecting the relatively optimal contractor and deterring corruption in the tendering 
process, but sometimes cannot fully combat strategic behaviours such as contractual perils. 
Project preparation is also extremely important because it may help reduce the risks of cost and 
schedule overruns. Project should not start until the entire requirements and approvals are ready.  
As the Department’s PPP contract with SIS involved elements of design, build finance, operate, 
transfer (DBFOT), it is evident that a high degree of risk was involved with no maintenance 
factored into the model. This shared risk and benefit model (DBFOT) requires careful 
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that should be derived. Gaps in existing institutional mechanisms have become obstacles in 
providing the appropriate environment for applying innovative procurement models. Some of the 
limitations are the inherent inconsistency of the existing legislations and regulations. For 
instance, the blurry responsibility and boundaries of the regulatory authority constitute inherent 
inconsistency. Other limitations are; the lack of transparency; adverse selection, and moral 
hazard that result in PPPs not being favourable for government contracting. 
8.5   Recommendation for future research 
Further systemic research should be conducted relative to the causal interrelationships for the 
various PPP contracts, specifically ICT/IS for ERP implementations. A comparative study on 
transaction costs of PPPs for ICT/IS between South Africa and other countries in Africa, Europe 
and Australia should be investigated and analysed, and it is recommended that the PPP unit 
implement sector-specific studies that seek to compare performance across PPP and non-PPP 
contracts. Risk management should ensure a fair allocation and monitoring system, and avoid the 
tendency to transfer risks after contracts have been signed.  
Researchers need to examine the processes that need systemic improvement to facilitate PPP ICT 
service delivery. The PPP unit can implement systemic strategies in the PPP procurement 
processes, since there is a need for government departments to build and sustain capacity, to 
ensure IS professionals and skilled management in the public sector. It is necessary to adopt a 
project management approach in the implementation of PPP projects in South Africa at all levels. 
Where appropriate, the use of PPPs should be adopted as an alternative procurement strategy, 
since the research findings indicate PPPs require more responsibility of risk management cost 
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There is a need for training in project management, skills for accounting officers, management 
skilled IS resources and other staff, in order to be able to conceptualise viable PPPs for ICT 
service and add value to the successful delivery of projects in the future. Empirical evidence 
from the study shows that the costliness of PPP projects is due to government budgetary and 
inadequate financial controls, as well as competent management and the retention of skilled and 
professional IS resources.  
Risk should be shared rather than transferred, since ineffective risk, distribution can lead to huge 
financial losses and renegotiation of PPP contracts for ICT/IS service delivery. The research 
findings show that the existing PPP policy framework and guidelines in South Africa are, 
however, adequate, apart from the risk factors and mitigation strategies not being specified. If 
interpreted and applied, risk factors and mitigation strategies can be a catalyst for increase public 
sector efficiencies. There is a requirement for sustained PPP awareness, public awareness and 
involvement of taxpayers in selection of PPP contractors, as a fundamental tool to mainstream 
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Study 1 Terms and Conditions Service level agreement the DOL and SIS 
Annexure 1 -Department's Business Objectives 
Annexure 2 –DOL Business Requirements 
Annexure 3 -Services 
Annexure 4 -Letter of Support & Parent Company Guarantee 
Annexure 5 -Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery 
Annexure 6 - Standards & Regulations 
Annexure 7 - BEE 
Annexure 8 - Service & Agreement Change Management 
Annexure 9 - Service & Agreement Management 
Annexure 10 - Financial & Commercial 
Annexure 11 - Transferring Employees 
Annexure 12 - Exit & Service Transfer 
Annexure 13 - Premises and Service Sites 
Annexure 14 - Insurance 
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Appendix 2: List of Empirical Material 
Study # Empirical Materials = Interviews and Minutes  
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Study 2 Interview Questions for Appendix 2 
 
 Question Justification Theoretical Perspective 
1. Why is it necessary for an 
organisation to ensure that the 
appropriate vendor is selected to 
perform the project? 
The process elements of a phenomenon are 
key components of agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). 
Clarifies the agent/principal 
relationship during the tendering 
phase of the contract.  
2. Can you describe what in your view 
should the criteria be that is applied 
for vendor selection for Information 
Systems implementations? 
The process elements of a phenomenon are 
key components of agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). 
Identifies the agent/principal 
objectives and deliverables. 
3. What performance monitoring 
systems should be in place to monitor 
the project? 
Consequence and outcomes of a 
phenomenon are an important part of theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Identifies the agent/principal 
objectives and deliverables. 
4. Can you describe what would have 
been a good retention strategy for 
scarce IS skills? 
Clarification of the contract stipulation 
regarding skills retention and alignment of 
goals (Eisenhardt, 1988). 
Identifies the agent/principal 
objectives and deliverables. 
5. What do you think were the 
fundamental issues for not having a 
skills retention strategy in place? 
Clarify the contextual parameters of the 
contract and measurement for incentives 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Identifies the agent/principal 
objectives and deliverables. 
6. What do you believe the role of 
management should be throughout 
the project life cycle? 
Clarify the contextual parameters of the 
contract and measurement for incentives 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Identifies the agent/principal 
objectives and deliverables. 
7. What do you think were the 
challenges that influenced 
management competencies? 
Clarification of behaviour and goal 
alignment (Demski & Feltham, 1978). 
Identifies the agent/principal 
objectives and deliverables. 
8. What consequence management in 
your opinion should have been put in 
place? 
  
Consequence and outcomes of a 
phenomenon are an important part of theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Demski & 
Feltham, 1978). 
Identifies the agent/principal 
objectives and deliverables. 
9. What in your opinion do you believe 
should be the benefits of good 
contract management? 
Consequences and outcomes of a 
phenomenon are an important part of agency 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). 
Identifies the agent/principal 
objectives and deliverables. 
9. What could have been done to 
manage cost overruns? 
Consequences and outcomes of large 
contracts plagued by cost overrun 
(Dewatripont & Legros, 2005). 
Identifies the consequences of 
cost overrun. 
10. Do you believe the project was a 
success or failure, and why? 
Contextual parameters of system design and 
outcomes (Bostrom & Heinen, 1977). 
Identifies the context in which 
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Appendix 3: List of Empirical Material 
Study3 Media Reports Analysed: Source: Researcher 
 DOC=01: Department of Labour briefing on progress made with Information Communication Technology (ICT) transition. 10 Sep 2013. 
Mr T Godi (APC). http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130910: accessed 23 February 2014. 
DOC=02: Labour Department ICT and data cost R2-billion.  Edmund Furter July 2012 http://sheqafrica.com/dol-ict-siemens/: website 
access 23 February 2014  
DOC=03: Department of Labour has little to show for R1.9 billion IT Public Private Partnership. Sejamothopo Motau, Shadow Minister of 
Labour. 7 March 2012: http://www.da.org.za/newsroom.htm?action=view-news-item&id=10395: website access 23 February 2014 
DOC=04: DOL, Siemens to split. Farzana Rasool, ITWeb IT in Government Editor. Johannesburg, 10 Feb 2011: 
http://www.itweb.co.za/?option=com_content&view=article&id=40995: 23 February 2014 
DOC=05: IT tender alert for labour department. Gareth Vorster. 25 October 2012 http://businesstech.co.za/news/government/25013/it-
tender-alert-for-labour-department/: 23 February 2014 
EO06: Labour Department takes over EOH staff. By Nicola Mawson, ITWeb deputy news editor. 
Johannesburg, 18 February 2014 http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option : 23 February 2014 
DOC=07: DoL’s ICT wage bill to balloon as it absorbs contract staff. Natasha Odendaal:  11 September 2013 
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/dols-ict-wage-bill-to-balloon-as-it-absorbs-contract-staff-2013-09-11: accessed 23 February 2014 
DOC=08: Labour, Siemens part ways for future growth. Audra Mahlong. 24 Oct 2012. http://saitnews.co.za/e-government/labour-siemens-
future-growth/: accessed 23 February 2014  
DOC=09: Department on a recruitment drive for ICT skills. Lloyd Ramutloa.13 February 2013. http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media-
desk/media-statements/2013/department-on-a-recruitment-drive-for-ict-skills: accessed. 23 February 2014. 
DOC=10: Department of labour and Siemens to split in South Africa. Issue no. 541. 11 February 2011 http://www.balancingact-
africa.com/news/en/issue-no-541/computing/department-of-labour/en: accessed. 23 February 2014 
DOC=11: Labour Department: Siemens failed us. 09 February, 2011. http://www.timeslive.co.za/scitech/2011/02/09/labour-department-
siemens-failed-us: accessed 23 February 2014 
DOC=12: DOL EOH contract termination becomes costly divorce. Edmond Furter. 11 September 2013. http://sheqafrica.com/dol-eoh-
contract/: accessed 23 February 2014 
DOC=13: Department faces huge ICT wage bill. Lloyd Ramutloa. 10 September 2013. http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media-desk/media-
statements/2013/department-faces-huge-ict-wage-bill: accessed 24 February 2014 
DOC=14: SA: Statement by the Department of Labour, DoL faces huge ICT wage bill.  11 September 2013.creamer media report. 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/sa-statement-by-the-department-of-labour-dol-faces-huge-ict-wage-bill-11092013-2013-09-11: accessed 23 
February 2014 
DOC=15: Labour to clear “misconceptions” on Siemens partnership. Audra Mahlong. 23 Oct 2012. http://saitnews.co.za/e-
government/labour-clear-misconceptions-siemens/: accessed 23 February 2014 
DOC=16: More costs for R2bn labour contract.  Farzana Rasool, ITWeb IT in Government Editor. Johannesburg, 8 Nov 2012. 
http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=59889: accessed 23 February 2014 
DOC=17: Siemens, Department of Labour set a trend for ICT PPPs. Posted by IT-Online on Jul 3, 2009. Http://it-
online.co.za/2009/07/03/siemens-department-of-labour-set-a-trend-for-ict-ppps/: accessed 23 February 2014  
DOC=18: Department of Labour PPP agreement clarification. Press release issued by EOH. 15 February 2013. 
http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61772: accessed 23 February 2014 
DOC=19: Department of Labour unveils a new ICT Strategy to propel the department into apex. Lloyd Ramutloa. 2 October 2012. 
http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media-desk/media- statements/2012/department-of-labour-unveils-a-new-ict-strategy-to-propel-the-
department-into-apex: accessed 23 February 2013 
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Appendix 4: Ethics Approval Letter 




Faculty of Commerce  
Ethics in Research Committee 
Courier:  Room 2.21 Leslie Commerce Building Upper Campus University of Cape Town 
Post: University of Cape Town  Private Bag  7701 
Email: Irwin.brown@uct.ac.za 
                                                       Telephone: +27 21 650-2311 
November 8, 2014 
Information Systems 
Project title: Public Private Partnership (PPP) contracts for Information Communication 
Technology (ICT) Service Delivery: A South African Case Study 
 
Dear Researcher, 
This letter serves to confirm that this project as described in your submitted protocol has been 
approved.  
Please note that if you make any substantial change in your research procedure that could affect 




Professor Harold Kincaid 





PHD THESIS                                                                         RENE ALBERTUS 201 
 
Appendix 5: Ethics Application Form 




Commerce Faculty Ethics in Research Committee 
Updated Ethics in Research Form January 2014 
 
Any individual in the Faculty of Commerce at the University of Cape Town undertaking any research that 
involves the use of human subjects, or research that may hold ethical consequences for the University of 
Cape Town, is required to complete this form. The completed form should be submitted to departmental 
Ethics Committee representatives for submission to the Commerce Faculty Ethics in Research Committee  
 
PLEASE TAKE NOTE OF THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS:  
 
1. All sections of this form must be completed  
2. This form should be completed electronically and emailed to your departmental Ethics Committee 
representative in the Commerce Faculty Ethics in Research Committee  
3. To select the various options please double click the appropriate box and select the option ‘checked’ under 
the heading default options – then click ‘ok’ 
4. You should include your electronic signature under section 8  
5. You are required to attach your research proposal, questionnaire(s) with cover letter(s), informed consent 
forms, organisational consent documentation, and/or interview schedules 
6. NO RESEARCH CAN BE CONDUCTED UNLESS YOU HAVE RECEIVED ETHICAL APPROVAL FROM 
YOUR EIR REP 
 
1. PROJECT DETAILS 
 
Project title:  Public Private Partnership (PPP) contracts for Information Communication 
































Data collection: (please select by double clicking the box which you would like to select – and clicking the default value - checked option)  
 
Interviews   Questionnaire    Experiment     Secondary data     Observation     
 
 Other (please specify):  
 
Procedure: (please describe) 
 
Interviews will be conducted face to face, telephonically and via email.  
 
Please remember to attach your research proposal OR a literature review with research methodology 
2. PARTICIPANTS  
 













Race / Ethnicity:   
Have you included a “Prefer not to Answer” response category in your questionnaire? (please select) 
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If you answered ‘No’ why not?  
      
Affiliations of participants: (please select) 
Company employees       General public          UCT staff          UCT Students 
 Other (please specify):  ex employees 
 
If your sample includes children (aged 18 and below), mentally incompetent persons, or legally 
restricted groups please explain below why it is necessary to use these particular groups. If subjects are 
minors or mentally incompetent, please describe how and by whom permission will be granted? If you 
are including children under the age of 18 and are not getting parental consent, please explain why you 
believe that their parents would consent if it was possible to contact them. 
 
 
3. ORGANISATIONAL PERMISSION 
If your research is being conducted within a specific organisation, please state how organisational 
permission has been obtained: 
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If you cannot obtain organisational permission, please justify why below: n/a 
 
Have you attached the letter from the organisation granting permission? (please select)       
  Yes          No               Not applicable  
Are you making use of UCT students as respondents for your research? (please select)                  
Yes          No  
If yes, please get your supervisor to sign below:  
I Miss/Mrs/Mr/Dr/ Prof        (insert name) as supervisor(s) to       (insert researcher’s name) agree to ensure that 
approval is granted by the Executive Director: Student Affairs prior to the researcher conducting the 
study.  
Insert electronic signature below  
Contact Emails: *Executive Director: Student Affairs   (Moonira.Khan@uct.ac.za) 
                         **Executive Director: Human Resources   (Miriam.Hoosain@uct.ac.za) 
4. INFORMED CONSENT 
What type of consent will be obtained from study participants?   
Oral Consent 
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Anonymous questionnaire (covering letter required, no consent form needed)  
 Other (please specify):       
If you are making use of oral consent, please explain by written consent is not an option:  
How and where will consent/permission be recorded? 
 5. CONFIDENTIALITY OF DATA 
What precautions will be taken to safeguard identifiable records of individuals? Please describe 
specific procedures to be used to provide confidentiality of data by you and others, in both the short 
and long run. This question also applies if you are using secondary sources of data that is not 
anonymous. 
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Does the proposed research pose any physical, psychological, social, legal, economic, or other risks 
to study participants you can foresee, both immediate and long run? (please select) 
 Yes          No  
If yes, answer the following questions: 
Describe in detail the nature and extent of the risk and provide the rationale for the necessity of such 
risks 
Outline any alternative approaches that were or will be considered and why alternatives may not be 
feasible in the study 


















2.         
 
3.         
 
7. AUTHORSHIP 
What authorship agreement have you reached with your co-researchers or supervisor?  
 This research is not intended for publication  
 Standard authorship agreement (principal researcher first author, co-researcher(s) and 
supervisor(s) co-authors) 
 Customised agreement (please specify below):                                                         
      
8. DECLARATION 
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I certify that we have read the the UCT Authorship Policy, and Commerce Faculty Authorship 
Guidelines        (http://www.commerce.uct.ac.za/Commerce/Information/research.asp) 
I certify that that the material contained herein is truthful and that all co-researchers and supervisors 
are    aware of the contents thereof. 
I understand that it is my responsibility to conduct research in accordance with the ethical 
requirements of UCT. 
__ __________ 
Applicant’s electronic signature 
Date:  
CHECKLIST SELECT 
A full copy of a research proposal or a literature review with methodology is 
attached 
Interview schedules / cover letters / questionnaires / informed consent forms 
and other materials used in the study are attached  
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On your cover letter to your questionnaire have you included the following?  
 
The following UCT Logo  
A sentence explaining the aim of the research  
Sentences of a similar nature to below must be included in the cover letter or 
consent form:  
This research has been approved by the Commerce Faculty Ethics in 
Research Committee.  
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You can choose to withdraw 
from the research at any time. 
The questionnaire will take approximately X minutes to complete 
 
You will not be requested to supply any identifiable information, ensuring 
anonymity of your responses. 
Due to the nature of the study you will need to provide the researchers with 
some form of identifiable information however, all responses will be 
confidential and used for the purposes of this research only.  
Should you have any questions regarding the research please feel free to 
contact the researcher (insert contact details).   
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For Ethics committee representative only 
Recommendation(s) 
 
Signature:                                                   
 
Date:               
 
For Ethics committee chairperson only 
Recommendatio
n: 
      
Signature:                                                      
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Appendix 7: PPP Projects signed in terms of Treasury Regulation No. 16 as at 1999, Source: KZN PPP 
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